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This thesis explores the effects of grant competition on Chilean Municipalities. I select a mixed 
method approach to assess this phenomenon from a top-down and bottom-up perspective. The 
research carries out a statistical analysis of the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional (FNDR) grant 
and also collects the views of 21 Chilean local, regional and municipal officers. I establish New Public 
Management (NPM) as my theoretical lens from which I problematise the formulation, evaluation 
and final allocation of grants. To integrate my different sources of data I link my quantitative and 
qualitative data with the contextual particularities of the Chilean institutions to form a synthesis of 
interconnected findings that shed light onto a relevant but understudied phenomenon in public 
administration. The first part of this thesis describes and assesses the FNDR, scrutinising the 
accomplishment of its goals and testing the impact of a municipality’s capacity on its success in 
bidding for funds. With the records of allocation obtained in the quantitative analysis I selected my 
purposive sample of municipalities and officers to be interviewed. Finally, I have integrated both 
sources of data, drawing conclusions and establishing an overarching perspective on the effect of 
grant competition. 
The study finds that the FNDR grant has a regressive pattern of allocation in which better-off 
and more populated municipalities are favoured. Success in bidding for FNDR is positively associated 
with municipal capacity and this effect gets stronger for municipalities located further from the 
capital Santiago. This pattern reinforces municipal inequalities, widening the gap between high 
capacity and low capacity authorities and acting against the goals of the FNDR. This is acknowledged 
by local officers in poorly-resourced municipalities who feel handicapped in bidding for funds by the 
high fixed cost of making bids. Central officers exercise their power when evaluating and prioritising 
bids. The research found that contrary to what the existing theoretical analysis of competitive grants 
suggests, grant competition in Chile favours central government agendas instead of being driven by 
local needs. This situation works against the efficiency of the competitive scheme, fostering the 
shaping of bids to meet central agenda rather than local needs. This centralised orientation of grant 
allocation is facilitated by a lack of regional and national service standards, together these elements 
lead to a patchwork of isolated and uneven municipalities unable to set up cooperative agreements 
to tackle social issues. This study finds that, due to the historical circumstances of the introduction of 
FNDR, competition has been established among municipalities as the predominant theme of 
intergovernmental relations. This hampers local collaboration and makes it difficult to respond to 
regional challenges. The situation has a deep impact on local officers’ motivation, leading to 
frustration and feeling of hopelessness. In their view, competition is seen as being more than just a 
system to allocate grants and instead reflects a centralists’ conception of local government action, 
where municipalities are passive agents competing for the chance to improve their territories. 
This thesis provides a relevant contribution to public administration theory and policy practice 
by showing the complexities of adopting quasi-market strategies in underdeveloped and unequal 
contexts. The establishment of NPM reforms in Chile had profound consequences and although more 
scholarly effort has gone into exploring collaborative forms of governance, in Chile inter-municipal 
competition is still very much alive. These findings may be informative in considering other countries 
in similar situations and might contribute to improving the structure of incentives set up in 
intergovernmental competitions for goods or services. In addition, using a mixed method approach 
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to assess both extremes of the competitive exchange allowed me to better understand the processes 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Research aim and focus   
 
It is commonly accepted that competition between firms is a sound strategy for delivering what 
customers want. In markets, firms cannot afford to ignore customers’ needs so competition can ease 
communication to improve the situation at both ends of the exchange. Public intervention to 
promote competitiveness in industry is seen widely around the world. Nevertheless, the adoption of 
competitive market systems in public administration has proved to be more complex than amongst 
private firms. This arises from the difficulty of measuring public outcomes, and differences between 
purposes, conditions and tasks between the private and public sectors (Stewart and Walsh, 1992). 
Private firms and public institutions differ in their goals, so market strategies require a process of 
adaptation and control to deliver the right incentives in each case. 
One notable adoption of a competitive mechanism in the public sector is for the process of 
central government allocating grants to local government by requiring local authorities to submit 
competing bids. In such grant competitions, central government institutions acting as grantor 
establish the rules of competition and evaluate the bids, while local jurisdictions (or other public 
bodies) acting as grantees construct the bids that will be later assessed by the grantor. Central 
government then allocates the resources to the best bids until the budget is fully distributed.    
Local governments have been commonly scrutinised by scholars analysing the effects of fiscal 
competition. In this kind of competition sub-central authorities strategically interact with the 
objective of attracting and retaining mobile tax bases. Much of the academic effort in this area is 
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devoted to three main sources of strategic fiscal interaction: benefit of spill-overs across jurisdictions, 
distorting taxes and mobile tax base, and political economy and information asymmetries 
(Lyytikäinen, 2012).  
In contrast, comparatively little has been written on local grant competition, regardless of its use 
and political appeal (Entwistle et al, 2016). Research in this area has focused on the distributive 
patterns of the centrally-determined resources through a top-down approach. The research 
emerging from this literature suggests that central government officers manipulate grants as political 
spoils to favour preferred local jurisdictions. This finding has been sustained by distributive politics 
scholars describing the groups targeted by the central government grantor. The second main 
outcome shows that there can be a bias in favour of better-off jurisdictions and a frequent 
misalignment between grant objectives and the final allocation of resources. The main consensus in 
this area is that, despite declared normative equalisation goals, grant competitions have been shaped 
by central governments to serve other central goals under its role as evaluator-grantor. Declared 
equalisation goals may therefore fail to be realised.  
It is argued in this thesis that much of the research into competitive grants has been limited to 
cross section statistical analysis limited by the available demographic variables used to categorise the 
competing jurisdictions. Understood in these terms, grant competition can be seen as being solely 
about the allocation (or non-allocation) of resources.  
This thesis seeks to develop a more complex analysis of grant competition having multiple effects, 
with the impact of grant competition going beyond the allocation of funds. In this work I have sought 
to categorise grant competition as a system of processes with local authorities as active and complex 
entities where expectations, practices and rituals combine and collide.  
To frame my research, I use New Public Management (NPM) as the theoretical lens from which I 
problematise the introduction of competition in the public arena. NPM, although perhaps fading as 
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a focus of scholarly attention, is still the predominant theory in Chilean public administration. NPM 
reforms have been commonly studied by looking at the factors easing its emergence and the direct 
effect of the reforms, but according to Lêgreid (2017): “Far fewer studies have addressed the long-
term consequence and effects of the reforms” (p.4).    
  This study contributes to the literature in the field by implementing a double process of 
analysis. Firstly, I analyse statistically a major Chilean competitive grant, the Fondo Nacional de 
Desarrollo Regional (FNDR), looking for tendencies of allocation. Then, from the results, I construct a 
sample of interviewees and locally collect qualitative data through semi-structured interviews. 
Finally, I use both the quantitative and qualitative data to construct an overall perspective on the 
working of this competitive grant system, drawing general conclusions.       
This thesis describes how local grant competition in Chile impacts the way jurisdictions think 
about themselves and their environment. It also reveals how competition has shaped the way 
centrally determined funds are distributed. Whilst most OECD countries have adopted intermunicipal 
grant competition systems that include new paradigms of governance, in Chile the adoption of such 
new paradigms of governance has been hampered by the competitive ethos of intergovernmental 
relations.  
This study reveals how intermunicipal competition has been adopted by local authorities in Chile 
and how it has transformed their role as service providers by creating a distance between winners 
and losers. It also demonstrates how competition has influenced central-local relationships, by 






2. Context  
 
When the Thatcher government came to power in the UK in 1979 the NHS was the largest 
employer in Western Europe and the welfare state consumed almost a quarter of the UK’s GDP (Le 
Grand, 1991). The development of a welfare state on this scale increased citizens’ awareness of their 
role as consumers of public services and strengthened the role of governments as service providers. 
Public organisations and their bureaucratic structures were then gradually introduced to market 
practices to increase efficiency and cut costs.   
Developing countries imported these policies from Europe and the US with the hope of a leaner 
and more efficient government that could better respond to their citizens’ needs. These processes 
were accompanied, in the case of South America, by the overturning of socialist experiments at the 
hand of military coups. The militaries in power saw clearly how market strategies could increase state 
efficiency while at the same time depoliticising governmental action. Because of this, they were keen 
to introduce these practices rapidly at different tiers and levels of government.  
Unlike the UK, at the end of the eighties South American public administrations were not 
sufficiently developed to respond to the pressures of market-based practices. Where they existed, 
social policies were extremely limited and the state was devoted to consolidating the recently re-
implemented democratic system. In the words of Araya and Cerpa (2008), what emerged in South 
America was a different version of NPM. This new version emerged in contexts where the Weberian 
model of bureaucracy was incomplete and underdeveloped. Public administrations in these 
situations were not only required to adapt to the new concepts of NPM but they also had to join the 
state in its overall goal of improving the democratic system, the seeking of legitimacy in governance 
and the fostering of economic development and wealth distribution. For these reasons the 
implementation of NPM and competition in South America had different effects than in other parts 
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of the world. As research in this topic has been centred to a great extent on western democracies 
(with some notable exceptions; Polidano, 1999; McCourt, 2002; Manning, 2001; Haque, 2017; 
Nickson, 2002), the implementation of NPM concepts and strategies in Chile are still largely 
unexplored.  
The empirical section of this study focuses on Chilean municipalities. Municipalities present a 
relevant case of study due to the importance placed on grant competition to obtain much needed 
funds. 
Chilean municipalities struggle to fund their investment projects due to a myriad reasons. The 
most documented refers to the lack of local revenues, the central control of locally-collected taxes 
and the impossibility for municipalities to borrow money (OECD, 2017). Under these conditions, grant 
competition emerges as the sole source of funds for locally-raised investments, resulting in a 
manifestation of fierce intermunicipal competition. The importance of local competition is magnified 
by the general scope of the grant that I selected to scrutinise, the FNDR. This grant does not use any 
general rules to differentiate between municipalities’ bids except their purported relative merit. 
Therefore, as a researcher, I had the possibility to capture grant competition in one of its purest forms 
marked by unrestricted inclusion and high participation at the same time.  
 
3. Empirical research  
 
In this thesis the overall question that I address is the following:  
- What are the effects of grant competition between Chilean municipalities? 
This general question is split into three and each one has its own empirical chapter. The three sub 
questions are: 
- How does capacity influence the allocation of competitive grants? (Chapter Six) 
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- How local and central government officers experience grant competition and how does this 
reflect the reality of intergovernmental relations? (Chapter Seven) 
- What is the current state of grant competitions? Do they respond to local needs in Chile? 
(Chapter Eight) 
 
My research employs a mixed methods approach to examine the above questions. The 
framework was intentionally constructed to respond to the challenges of the subject in a rigorous 
way. Research was designed to following a sequence that could enable my immersion in the 
phenomenon. I start my account by presenting the contextual features of Chilean history, detailing 
the role played by local governments and the emergence of NPM and competitive grants. Then, 
quantitative analysis is used to depict the patterns of distribution of the FNDR, the largest grant 
competition in Chile. This quantitative analysis estimates the main predictors of funds allocation. The 
findings from this quantitative work are then used as the starting point for qualitative analysis. This 
second phase captures the narratives of the main protagonists of grant competition. In choosing a 
sample for interview, I included successful and unsuccessful jurisdictions, scattered around two 
different regions. To clarify this process I ran a cluster analysis to group jurisdictions with similar 
demographics but different success ratios in their bidding experiences.  
As revealed in the quantitative section, competition success is dependent on internal capacities. 
Internal capacities are likely to be subject to economies of scale. Large municipalities will be better 
able to bear the costs of a bid writing unit. My sample includes large, small and rural municipalities 
in order to look for this effect. My sampling strategy therefore covered a large number of local 
jurisdictions, but to widen the scope, I also included regional and central government officers. 
Altogether a wide range of different municipalities were included as well as different tiers of 
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government officers. My interview structure was theory-led but left enough space for emergent 
topics to arise.  
The analysis connected different voices interchangeably, composing a fabric of narratives centred 
on the competitive process. Once the two sources of data were analysed the final empirical chapter 
condensed the discussions previously assessed. In the following parts of this chapter I link the findings 
and present some general insights applied to Chile and public administrations in general.  
 
4. Contribution  
 
This thesis provides several insights into an area of public administration that has not been fully 
explored. Intermunicipal competition represents a rich area of study that has been commonly 
addressed by two perspectives, firstly by examining the fiscal impact of tax competition among local 
units and secondly from the distributive politics perspective of funds allocation.  
My research is situated between these two topics and scrutinises intermunicipal competition 
from both local and central perspectives. This approach has allowed me to shed light on a fertile area 
of local studies.  
To set up the background structure of my research this thesis tracks the implementation of grant 
competition in Chile from a historical and institutional perspective. This analysis depicts how NPM 
policies were implemented in the South American context, building the foundations from which 
competition emerged.  
As noted, authoritarian regimes across South America were a fertile ground on which NPM 
policies flourished. In the case of Chile, the Pinochet dictatorship was interested in how market forces 
could replace the action of political debate to administer the provision of public goods, so he led a 
transformation that shaped the way local governments were managed. Pinochet and his team of 
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advisors relied on the market as the force to decide the distribution of services that could be 
privatised, shrinking the size and capacity of the state. These reforms helped to reduce public 
spending and balance macroeconomic equilibriums but had a detrimental effect on the role played 
by public administrations. During this time thousands of officers were dismissed, and the civil service 
was dramatically dismantled. This situation was especially difficult for local authorities who lost scope 
for political decision and fiscal capabilities, unable to exercise their authority.  
Once Pinochet left office, elections took place and local authorities began to administer their 
territories. Notwithstanding, the diminishment of the civil service and the inherited inequality in the 
distribution of wealth took a toll on all subnational authorities and especially among the small, rural 
and deprived authorities. Originally, and under Pinochet, local grants were centrally designed with 
zero space for negotiation. Once democracy returned, political leaders were suspicious of devolving 
powers to municipalities, knowing their impoverishment and lack of administrative and managerial 
capacities. Instead of establishing a system that could ease subnational convergence inequalities and 
bridge regional gaps, the older system was kept while allowing jurisdictions to compete for funding 
for their proposed investment projects. Through these arrangements, central politicians secured that 
the funds would be allocated only to municipalities with sufficient capacities, whilst at the same time 
retaining some power of decision over the projects finally funded.        
The analysis made above illustrates how market-led policies can have long run effects when there 
is no system in place to facilitate their results. Competition is a sound strategy to satisfy customers 
and obtain value for public money. Although, to have that effect, customers must have the capacity 
to exercise their role. As depicted in my analysis, the award of grants to bids in grant competition is 
decided by several stakeholders, each one with their own agenda, thus watering down the role played 
by local authorities. Despite what is declared, municipalities in Chile are not the final customers of 
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the competitive grants. Competition, as currently set, serves the preferences of central officers 
instead of representing local needs, undermining the overall objective of the FNDR. 
With no alternative funding, municipalities compromise their local vision to accord with central 
officers’ desires. In this situation asymmetries of information arise whereby officers distant from local 
problems end up deciding policies with a marked local impact.   
Empirically, my study presents the patterns of distribution of the FNDR, the largest local grant in 
Chile. In line with part of the scholarly evidence, I find that competition favours better-off 
municipalities. Then, to test the impact of geographical location I examine how capacity effects 
increase as we move away from central and populated regions. Despite being named “the fund of 
decentralisation” FNDR does a poor job of establishing a regional balance of investments and of 
mitigating inequalities of investment between municipalities.  
Grant competition has put in motion a set of rules, practices and expectations that have not been 
fully covered by the literature. In this study I research the experiences of the central and local tiers 
involved in competition to examine how this intergovernmental system is implemented. My aim was 
to capture the impact of competition within municipalities and between municipalities and central 
government departments, looking for patterns and discrepancies. The study of grant competition has 
usually been restricted to the statistical results of who gets what. In this case I use the results of my 
statistical analysis of grant allocation to construct my sample for interview data collection and explore 
more deeply the workings of competition.   
To structure the analysis, I used the conceptual framework of grant competition identified in the 
literature as the starting point from which I analysed my qualitative data. Through the connection of 
local, central and regional narratives I constructed a fabric of different voices that I used to feed the 
three key attributes of a framework built on that found in the literature. I also added two topics that 
I purposefully selected and the ones which spontaneously emerged from the analysis.  I found that 
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due to the uneven distribution of wealth many of the attributes of grant competition are not 
translated to a large group of municipalities. Entry barriers are too high to a significant group of 
jurisdictions who cannot afford to spend their resources on expensive and lengthy competition with 
no certainty of success.  
Municipalities are viewed in the competitive bidding framework as being the beneficiaries of the 
FNDR, but success in bidding is decided by a series of higher-tier actors who can exercise veto powers 
over the municipalities’ bids. During the bid assessment, projects not only need to fulfil technical 
requirements established by law, they also need to convince regional and central government officers 
of their merit and at risk of being discarded. Deprived, small and rural municipalities have a poor 
vision of themselves and this feeling is reinforced by competition if their effort and capacities prove 
to be insufficient to achieve success. The process has been undermining for certain municipalities 
and some of them have decided to no longer participate, restricting the pool of competitors and the 
quality of the competition itself.  
In Chile, inter-municipal competition has established a yardstick of how municipalities are 
evaluated by the community and the media. Newspapers play an important role in this 
conceptualisation, constructing metropolitan rankings where each municipality is assessed, 
measured and compared. As expected, every year better-off jurisdictions are at the top of these 
rankings and deprived ones are at the bottom. These ranking-style type of comparisons take 
demographic variables as a given without addressing their high correlation with wealth-related 
capacities. Deprived jurisdictions in Chile are destined to underperform, restricted by the chains of a 
highly centralised system with innumerable operational responsibilities and extremely tight budgets. 
Without addressing those key differences, rankings and competition reinforce the inequality 
between municipalities by dividing them into binary classifications such as winners or losers. This has 
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a significant effect on how municipal officers see themselves, their work and their capacity to make 
improvements to their territories.  
In contrast, central government officers believe that success is a matter of effort and will. To 
build their case, officers reference stories of self-sacrifice and grit where deprived jurisdictions, 
despite having all the odds stacked against them, overcome their shortages and change the life of 
their citizens.  
In this study these two discourses are confronted. My aim was to depict how the tensions that 
emerge from these narratives define the way jurisdictions see their role and administer their 
territories, by listening to the voices of their protagonists. Doing this, I shed light on a topic that has 




5. Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapters Two and Three set the conceptual foundations on which the research is based upon. 
Chapter Three introduces the emergence of New Public Management (NPM) in the public 
administration field. Following a broad characterisation of the main concepts of NPM, I detail how 
competition arose as an alternative for cheaper and more efficient public service delivery.  
Chapter Three introduces the theoretical discussions about intergovernmental grants. Firstly, I 
outline the different types of grant, the contexts under which they are used and their effects on 
recipient jurisdictions. With the context set, I detail the emergence of grant competition and link it 
to the NPM conceptualisation presented in Chapter Two. I group the discussions into four conceptual 
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clusters. These concepts are the grant attributes of value for money, local empowerment, 
innovation/flexibility and partnership.   
Chapter Four presents my research and methodological framework. After defining my role as 
researcher and my epistemological position I detail how these roles informed my choice of a mixed 
methods strategy. Then, the chapter outlines my sample selection, process of data analysis and the 
mechanisms to integrate the two different sources of data. I finally finish the chapter by describing 
the ethical underpinnings of my research.  
Chapter Five introduces the Chilean context of subnational governments. The aim is to set out 
the foundations of municipal governments, unpacking the historical milestones on which they were 
built. Then, the chapter establishes subnational attributions and regulations detailing how Chilean 
state-centralism has hampered the development of local authorities. With the historic and socio-
political factors set, the focus of the chapter is to present the emergence of competitive grants, 
placing special attention on the FNDR competitive grant, my subsequent object of study.  
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight discuss the findings of my empirical research. Chapter Six is 
centered on the quantitative analysis of the FNDR and tests its association with wealth-related 
demographic variables. After a brief description of the data I examine the determinants of the 
distribution of the fund using ordinary least squares regression.  
Chapter Seven is the second phase of the methodological sequence of analysis. Here, after 
establishing my sample selection, I thematically scrutinise the discourses of my interviewees. Topics 
are theoretically grouped but allow the emergence of new sections for exploration.  
After the presentation of the two data sources, Chapter Eight serves a dual objective. First, it 
integrates the findings that were independently assessed in the prior two chapters and then 
establishes a set of general conclusions and particular findings emerged from the Chilean case.  
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Chapter Nine reviews the sequence of analysis performed, highlighting the contributions made 
by the research and returning to the original research questions. It also depicts the challenges of the 
topic and methodology selected, stressing the inherent limitations of mixed methods on the public 
administration field. The chapter finally ends by identifying some potential areas of future research 



















CHAPTER TWO: NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND COMPETITION 





New Public Management (NPM) has been named one of the most influential paradigms in the 
public administration field of the twentieth century (McLaughlin et al, 2002). Its relevance may be 
caused by the fruitful adaptation of managerial practices into the public sphere, the rapid spread of 
these concepts around the globe or the wide academic interest awakened by it.  
The use of market-led strategies into the public field did not start in 1991 with the seminal 
work of Hood, “A public management for all seasons”, but that article has been commonly cited as 
the first academic effort to encompass a collection of related policies that could be seen as NPM. As 
time went on the concept of NPM started to gain traction among scholars from different fields, 
establishing a common consensus of the policies labelled under this now ubiquitous acronym.  
This chapter aims to conceptualise NPM as the paradigm under which competition was 
theorised and introduced in the provision of public services. After reviewing the origins of NPM the 
first section lists and defines the concepts and policies commonly grouped under this heading. The 
second section begins by discussing the plausibility of having philosophically sound paradigms in the 
social sciences and in public administration particularly. Then, I describe the main scholarly debates 
around the adoption of private mechanisms in the public field. The third section begins by detailing 
the role of competition in NPM, establishing the features of competition in comparison with in-house 
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service provision. After outlining the features of competition, I conclude the section by discussing the 
relevance of the contexts and regulations to accomplish competition objectives.  
NPM is used through this thesis as my theoretical lens. The aim of this chapter is therefore 
twofold: the first aim is to review debates about this paradigm by listing the main academic 
discussions. The second is to track how concepts that emerged from NPM influenced the design and 
administration of the mechanism of intergovernmental grants and in particular, competitive grants. 
This relation will be then further developed in the following chapter where I assess the objectives 
and effects of intergovernmental grants. 
Once NPM and public-sector competition have been conceptualised, in the next chapter I 
briefly present a review of the design and effects of intergovernmental grants. This final step is 
necessary to build the foundations from which I discuss the emergence and development of local 
grant competition, my final object of enquiry.   
 
2.2 New Public Management  
Origins 
During the late seventies and eighties public service provision was criticised for being 
inefficient and ineffective. A feeling of doubt emerged among Western nations which questioned the 
capacities of the bureaucratic system to respond to a welfare state of enormous scale and rising costs 
(Haque, 2004). In this context, political leaders soon began to blame the public sector for causing 
budget deficits and contributing to fiscal crisis, leading to a general reconsideration of public sector 
operation. At the same time, public officers, protected by their unions, lacked strong incentives to 
improve the quality of the service delivered, worsening the situation and justifying politicians’ fears 
(Dawson and Dargie, 2002).  
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Osborne and McLaughlin (2002) offered a different take on this matter. For them, critiques 
of the welfare state were not based on efficiency grounds, but in the rigidity of a standardised service 
provision. User-citizens, tired of receiving the same public offer, demanded an increasing 
participation in the design and delivery of services as well as a wider range of alternatives. 
Whatever the reason, politicians facing that scenario turned to the private sector to look for 
answers. The new agenda was set, and the objectives were to reduce costs, increase efficiency and 
restructure or re-invent public sector administration and government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
With its high entry-costs, natural monopolies and incrementalist nature, the public sector was the 
perfect place to start reinventing government action . Hopes were high and boosted by the belief 
that private sector practices could be adopted into governmental action. As Dawson and Dargie 
(2002) blandly state: “Public and private sectors did not have to be organized and managed in 
fundamentally different ways. Indeed that it would better for the public services if they could be 
organized and managed as much like the private sector as possible” (p.35).  
Suddenly the consensus was that the public sector was inherently inefficient and bureaucrats 
budget-maximisers. But where did NPM supporters find the theoretical and ideological support to 
back their measures?.   
 
Theoretical background 
Despite its impact, the idea of using economics in public administration was far from new. 
Years before it was brought up by politicians and leaders alike, Ostrom (1973) argued that the work 
of contemporary political economists was built on the premise that efficiency was the key criterion 
of a sound public administration. In his work, he defined efficiency in two concepts, hierarchy 
organisation and cost calculus, where cost calculus was made under the accomplishment of an 
objective: “at least cost or a higher level of performance at a given cost” (p.35).   
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Ostrom’s ideas were then brought together and could be seen as being part of public choice, 
a theory capable of setting a new approach for public administration born long before NPM was even 
mentioned. For Gruening (2001) the event that marked the institutionalisation of public choice was 
the foundation of the Thomas Jefferson Centre for Studies at the University of Virginia by James 
Buchanan and Warren Nutter in 1958.  
The Centre founded by these two economists was interested in a society based on individual 
freedom and choice. They sought to explain social phenomena by aggregating the behaviour of single 
individuals instead of referring to more ethereal concepts such as society or class. Welfare state social 
policies were assessed using the public choice framework and, as expected, the critiques were 
extensive. Regarding bureaucratic organisations the main deficiencies were: “A strong tendency 
toward the accumulation of tasks and resources, toward excessive conservatism, and toward a law-
like inability to accomplish certain tasks” (Gruening, 2001, p.6). As seen, these critiques presaged by 
many years those set out by NPM scholars. 
Based on their analysis, public choice scholars made several recommendations to improve 
public service delivery. Among them, one of the main measures was the invention of a polycentric 
administrative system where provision and production of services were separated. This idea of 
flexibility and decentralisation was then also accompanied by the priority for citizens (as consumers) 
to be offered choices (Gruening, 2001). 
Similar recommendations were advised by the Chicago School of Economics. There, 
academics had been attacking prevailing notions of public governance since the middle of 1960s. For 
Lane (2002) the radical nature of NPM served well the purposes of neo-liberal governments in the 
nineties but, without the academic support of public choice scholars, Chicago and the “heavy 
artillery” of Nobel Prize winners, governments would have been more reluctant to follow these 
practices.    
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These ideas were the ideological underpinnings from which quasi-market strategies were 
then implemented. NPM supporters activated public choice theories that had been sitting in 
academic journals for years and put them into practice. The combination of econometric methods of 
policy assessment with the administrative tools from business management proved to be a successful 
mix that more and more countries were willing to implement.  
Politically the first UK response to this came in the Thatcher government which: “was very 
much upon market disciplines as the solutions to the ills of the public sector… In this model, 
marketization was held to promote the efficient and effective provision of public services” (Osborne 
and MacLaughlin, 2002, p.9). From there, NPM was exported to several nations across the globe.  
Part of the NPM international vogue was explained by the institutional support of 
International Organisations, such as the OECD, APEC, NAFTA and the EU (Haque, 2004). These meta-
regional organisations served as advocates of the NPM measures, championing their use in 
developing countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa.  
Major Western countries such as the UK, US, New Zealand, Canada and Australia were the 
pioneers in the adoption of these reforms but, as soon as they proved to be mildly successful, they 
were adopted by many countries with different levels of public administration.      Since public 
administration is inherently context-specific any list of general NPM practices will have a single-
country focus.  Nonetheless I will use the summary made by Osborne (2006) to characterise it.  
To Osborne the main elements of NPM are: 
“- An attention to lessons from private-sector management  
 - The growth both of hands-on ‘management’ – in its own right and not as offshoot of 
professionalism – and of ‘arm’s length’ organizations where policy implementation is 
organizationally distanced from the policy makers (as opposed to the ‘inter-personal’ 
distancing of the policy – administration split within PA)  
 - A focus upon entrepreneurial leadership within public service organizations 
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 - An emphasis on inputs and output control and evaluation and upon performance 
management and audit 
 - The disaggregation of public services to their most basic units and a focus on their cost 
management 
 - The growth of use of markets, competition and contracts for resource allocation and   service 
delivery within public services” (Osborne, 2006, p.379). 
 
Debates 
Like any other theory, NPM has been subject of critiques with some scholars even questioning 
its existence as a real paradigm (Ferlie et al, 1996). In this regard, Gruening (2001) poses an 
interesting question in discussing the plausibility of having a real paradigm in behavioural-
administrative sciences. He follows the paradigm definition made by Kuhn (1962) (cited in Gruening, 
2001) where: “A paradigm is the disciplinary system of science and consists of laws and definitions, 
metaphysical orientations, hypothesis, values and concrete examples” (p. 19). To question if such 
definition can be applied in the public administration field, following Kuhn’s definition, a paradigm 
will be (at minimum) a set of ideas in which scientists of a given discipline agree and use it to guide 
their research until some inexplicable anomaly forces them to enter into a crisis, and eventually 
change it.  
The problem here will lie in the agreement of a disciplinary system and the inevitable interplay 
of personal values. There are too many methodological issues among public administration scholars 
to allow an agreement about a set of rules or discipline. Therefore, developments such as NPM, which 
is mostly based in values rather than facts and explanations, are impossible to construct as a real 
paradigm. 
Gruening deepens this idea and argues that in public administration: “There will always be 
defenders of individual freedom. There will always be technically minded people who seek to order 
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the world with technique. So there is no hope that some scientific positions will become outdated 
(like in the natural sciences) and die out…there is no hope for unity—no hope for a new paradigm” 
(p.20).  
Despite these philosophical and epistemological concerns there is a scholarly agreement that 
something called NPM does actually exist (McCourt, 2001). Apart from the question of its mere 
existence, other criticisms of NPM concern its context-specific range of applicability and its intra-
governmental focus in a world with plural actors and interests (Osborne, 2006).  
NPM struggles to include different voices in the design and delivery of public services and for 
this reason is sometimes seen as disconnected from realities outside institutional hierarchies. Dunn 
and Miller (2007) argue that NPM is incapable of responding to the challenges faced by developing 
countries where among other problems, public administrations are plagued by domestic ethnic strife, 
hyper pluralistic political party systems and weak regulatory systems. The implementation of NPM 
outside developed Western democracies has been more difficult than it first appeared. This could be 
in part explained by the NPM focus on policies instead of politics. In the effort to reinvent 
government, NPM isolates the political contexts and processes on which policies are designed and 
implemented. Despite the fact that NPM is mostly about government reform, it is difficult to think of 
a reinvention without considering the political debate in which these reforms will take part. This issue 
was addressed by Osborne and Plastrik (2000). They recognised that political, legislative and 
parliamentary reform were needed to ensure the success of NPM reforms. The extent to which 
government action can be modified without rapidly crossing into the arena of politics is debatable. 
NPM bypasses this dilemma by focusing its attention on government action, but doubts have arisen 
about the sustainability of these types of measure. In addition, the lack of political advice to 
implement these policies leaves an important space for political misinterpretation and possible 
corruption among fragile democracies trying to join the NPM reinvention.         
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More generally, public and private institutions are unlikely to share the same objectives, 
which is why some NPM paradigms cannot be so easily translated. Peters and Pierre (1998) address 
this situation and argue that: “One substantive problem that arises when competitive dimensions are 
introduced in the area of public services is that public-sector organizations were never designed with 
that objective, but rather to ensure legality and equality. Although structural organizational 
changes—such as decentralization and moving decision making on operative issues downward in the 
organization—are very common today, the problems associated with changing the culture of the 
organization are often much more difficult than are the structural changes” (p.230). 
This point raised by Peters and Pierre shows that, regardless of the operational similitudes, 
private management practices cannot be perfectly translated into a public administration ethos. 
There is an important body of knowledge about organisational studies suggesting that deeply rooted 
norms and values cannot be imposed from a top – down position (Beer, 1990; Molinsky, 1999).  
Managerial support is not enough to achieve change in public institutions. Parker and Bradley 
(2000) examined six Australian organisations encouraged to depart from the old bureaucratic value 
system to embrace an entrepreneurial one based on values such as efficiency, flexibility and 
productivity. They found that despite the effort put to change the value system: “Public organizations 
are fundamentally different from private organizations and will, therefore, remain oriented toward a 
traditional model of public organizations involving a hierarchical culture, regardless of policy 
prescriptions designed to achieve organizational change” (p.137). The main reasons for this would 
be the different goals of the two types of organisations, the divergence in the access of resources 
and the nature of organisational constraints (economic vs political). 
Australian public administration was shown to be unenthusiastic about managerial 
reinventions, evidencing the difficulty of mixing public and private objectives. NPM does not have a 
political arm to address public officer motivations outside the discourse of efficiency and budget 
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control because that was never the intention. Without that substance NPM policies cannot be 
grounded in the public ethos defined in large part by altruistic motivations such as self-sacrifice.         
NPM imported market-style mechanisms into the field of public administration which, 
according to the critiques, was rooted in standardised managerial practices and undermined by the 
rising costs and inefficiencies of the welfare state. Despite the epistemological and conceptual 
discussions, scholars recognise NPM as a movement that changed the way public administration was 
understood. Public choice academics from the Jefferson Centre and economists from Chicago 
University were (sometimes without noticing) prolific supporters of NPM measures. Their 
contribution gave intellectual weight to NPM and eased the exportation of these concepts to 
different parts of the globe.   
However, the translation of market practices into public administration has not been an easy 
one. The epistemological reservations of establishing a paradigm in public administration casts 
doubts on the existence of NPM, whilst its intra-governmental focus seems alienated in a field 
marked by plural actors and hybrid arrangements of public service delivery. Finally, the lack of a 
political narrative aided the exportation of NPM, making it leaner and scientifically neutral. These 
features nevertheless, worked against the conceived benefits of installation of its concepts among 
countries at different levels of development where public administrations were not easily attracted 
to a sudden change in values.     
 
2.3 The case for competition in public administration 
 
After revising the emergence of NPM in the public administration field, this second section is 
devoted to conceptualising the role of competition in public service provision. Competition was one 
of the main elements introduced by NPM and in this section I build its case, detailing its operation in 
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public service delivery. Below, I link the debates on public sector competition with competitive grants, 
my main subject of enquiry. Then, I discuss how transferable the features of competition are to the 
allocation of intergovernmental grants, introducing the debates that will be further developed in the 
following conceptual chapter.  
 
Competition in the public field 
For consumers, competition is a critical driver of performance and allows them to choose 
from an array of products at accessible prices. Competition also forces firms to improve the quality 
of the services and products offered, fostering innovation and choice (Law, 2016). Due to its large 
array of benefits it is not surprising that competition has been portrayed as a sound strategy to 
improve the performance of public bodies.  
Competition was one of the core NPM strategies, as the following quote reflects: “Bringing 
competition into the public service is at the heart of NPM. Without competition there is little point 
to changing the managerial styles in the public sector”(Peters and Pierre, 1998, p.230). 
Regardless of the enthusiasm for NPM it must be recognised that before this others 
championed the same ideas with more or less success. Tiebout (1956) was one of the first supporters 
of local competition as an efficient source of service provision. He believed that market competition 
was the best strategy to determine the quality and quantity of services provided by jurisdictions so, 
to foster an efficient public service allocation, he saw mobility as being a proxy for market 
competition.  
Later, Ostrom (1973) reinforced the importance of having several units which can compete in 
service provision arguing that: “Overlapping jurisdictions and fragmentation of authority can facilitate 
the production of an heterogeneous mix of public goods and services in a public economy” (p.65).   
24 
 
As seen in the previous section, the school of public choice was vocal in championing 
competition in the public sphere. Supporters of NPM realise this, re-package it and use it as one of 
its main tools for government service delivery. Public choice generally disbelieves the idea that 
benevolent public officers guide their acts by abstract notions such as the common good, in part 
because for them: “Human behaviour is motivated primarily by selfishness rather than altruism. It 
follows that a pattern of incentives or structure of constraints is required in order to redirect the 
behaviour of public officials towards the public interest”. (Boyne, 1998, p.696).  
Competition was one of the structures that public choice suggested be put in place to 
enhance the public interest. Following this idea, Savas (1982) not only believed that competition 
enhanced efficiency but that efficiency exists within its limits’: “One of the most fundamental 
determinants of the efficiency of any arrangement is competition; that is, the degree of competition 
that an arrangement permits will, to a significant degree, determine how efficiently that arrangement 
will supply a service” (p.80). 
Many years after the emergence of public choice, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) recall these 
ideas, arguing that government administrations were stuck in the past doing business in an 
unprofessional way. Basically, to increase their efficiency public administrations needed to be more 
entrepreneurial and less bureaucratic. In this transformation the introduction of competition was key 
because: “Competition is a fundamental force that leaves the organization no choice but to heighten 
its productivity” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p.352). 
  Flynn (2002) on the other hand, introduces a moral argument behind the role of competition 
in public administration. He definitely erases the line between public and private organisations, 
championing a system where actors are equally treated. For him: “Industries are subject to intensified 
competition and are laying off staff, closing plants, restructuring, delayering and asking everyone to 
work harder and smarter, then public sector workers should do the same. If politicians have close 
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connections with business, they will be subjected to this moral argument and many will agree with 
it. The result of the position is that the public institutions should be subject to periods of staff cutting, 
restructuring, business process re-engineering whatever the impact on productivity or quality” 
(Flynn, 2002, p.66). Cohen (2001) supports this idea by arguing that organisational waste and 
inefficiencies are not restricted to a specific type of organisations and originate from monopoly 
habits.  
As noted in this brief revision of ideas, competition is seen to lead to efficiency gains for 
private firms with a clear benefit for the consumer. This being the case, it is worth asking if these 
benefits are transferable to public bodies and how the evidence could shed some light into this 
matter. 
 
Competition on public service delivery  
The study of competition is one of the main goals of this thesis, specifically focussed on 
competition for grants. Between all its possible conceptualisations, this research presents the effects 
of intermunicipal competition for funds among local authorities. There is a considerable body of 
knowledge devoted to intermunicipal competition, but this has been mainly focussed on fiscal 
regulations and the effect of different local tax schemes.  
Below I conceptualise intermunicipal competition for central government resources, 
contracts or any other type of intergovernmental benefit. Some of these schemes are for local 
authorities only whilst others are also open to private firms. I acknowledge that these two settings 
could eventually change how the incentives are placed; however, I will discuss them interchangeably 
to widen the debate. 
The main argument to support competition is its capacity to reveal the “true” costs of service 
provision. Some public services are generally provided in-house because of their high entry costs and 
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the unwillingness of citizens to pay for them (national security). Beside these, there are several 
services where officers do not have any incentive to reveal their true costs; on the contrary, acting 
as budget maximisers, they could try to raise them.  
In these circumstances competition acts as a sound strategy to force competing units to 
reveal the true costs of the services delivered (Niskanen, 1971). Agency theory addresses this matter, 
arguing that competition aids the principal (government) in two ways. First, it forces bidders to reveal 
information that they would not reveal in any other case. The logic behind this idea is transparent: 
“In non-competitive situations, vendors have an incentive to lead the principal to believe that 
production costs are higher than they actually are in an effort to extract rents. However, this incentive 
is diminished in competitive procurement environments, since high-priced bids lower the probability 
of winning contracts. Hence, in the presence of competition, potential vendors can be expected to 
bid closer to their true production costs” (Lamothe, 2015, p.45).  
Secondly, competition allows the replacement of vendors who underperform, thus improving 
the overall situation. Producers know that a change in quality could represent the end of a contract 
or the emergence of a better alternative, so, to survive, they must ensure a certain level of quality at 
a low price. Domberger (1998) supports this and argues that on average competition tends to reduce 
prices regardless of whether the provider is public or privately owned (p.163).  
But as in any other setting, here the context needs to be considered before calculating 
benefits. Markets of public services are commonly regulated and thus do not follow the relationship 
of a full competitive model between buyers and sellers. That is why these markets are known as 
“quasi-markets”, characterised by imperfection and failures. These imperfections need to be 
considered when calculating benefits and the suitability of competition. Goddart (2015) argues that 
instead of being ideologically for or against the degree of competition and regulations, critics need 
to examine specific cases.    
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Contexts matter. The Office of Health Economics Commission (OHE) report on competition in 
the NHS (2012) concluded that the desirability of competition depends on the comparative 
performance of local providers. When analysis of current providers suggests that improvements can 
be made, and competition seems feasible then it should be promoted.  
But how to recognise if the context is appropriate? The literature on public sector competition 
addresses this issue from two angles: first, regarding the number of competitors involved (supply 
side) and then the role of central government (demand side). From the supply side there are different 
theories about the number of bidders needed to ensure quality. A low number of competitors could 
allow collusion between providers, raising the price for the previously agreed winner (Krishna, 2002). 
Competitors thinking in their best interest can collaborate to keep prices high, so government would 
be well advised to disincentivise this practice.     
Lamothe (2015) on the other hand suggests that the quality of the bids is more relevant than 
their quantity. He found evidence that even with just two acceptable bidders, the loser may well be 
of high enough quality to serve as a replacement.  
From the demand side, Cooper and Menzel (2013) suggests that competition is not enough 
to ensure quality, and that management matters. Governments without the necessary capacity to 
maintain a working relationship with their contractors will not be able to get the best deal for the 
public. Governments therefore need to be prepared to assist them and go beyond the simple 
monitoring process.   
Moving away from its role in cost transparency, a second attribute of public sector 
competition revolves around the disentanglement of provision and production of public services. As 
seen in the previous section, this was one of the main arguments of public choice scholars against 
the omnipresent welfare state. Scholars considered that specialisation eases efficiency and client 
responsiveness. The separation of purchasers and providers improves client responsiveness and 
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results in giving greater weight to client needs instead of supplier interests. This separation also 
allows specialisation on one side of the exchange, increasing the quality of the service provided. 
Central governments are unlikely to efficiently design and implement the vast amount of public 
services delivered, so focusing their effort on the production side would improve the quality of the 
policies. This was one of the ideas championed by the NPM, stressing the need for governments to 
“steer not row”, making policies but utilising other actors to implement them (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992). For NPM supporters, the separation of demand and supply increases the quality of projects at 
the two extremes, saving costs and reducing the capture of government decision-making by rent 
seekers.  
This vision was nevertheless contested by classic public administration literature. Scholars like 
Barlow and Röber (1996) stressed the idea that steering and rowing were influenced by political 
values and politics, so any form of disentanglement was obliged to recognise this in a broader 
theoretical approach. Peters (2011), on the other hand, argues that steering in contexts with such 
diversity of goals as in today’s governance arrangements is extremely difficult. For him, when 
different outcomes are produced to respond to different goals the distinction between steering and 
rowing appears to be less viable than commonly assessed.  
A third benefit of using competition in public administration is the establishment of a set of 
comprehensive and meaningful service specifications to respond to governments’ goals. The 
economics literature had established that competition for contracts could overcome some of the 
principal-agent problems. A careful contract design with correct incentives and close monitoring 
could prevent agents’ opportunistically using their information advantage and expertise, securing a 
performance according to the principal’s (government’s) specifications. Brown et al (2006) reviewed 
the management of public service contracts and established a difference between three types of 
possible vendors: private firms, non-profits and other governments. Governmental units acting as 
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vendors seem to have a better alignment with contracting governments’ values and could also share 
similar public missions. Regardless of this, intergovernmental contracts do less than private ones to 
solve inefficiencies, lack innovation and would present other bureaucratic ills (Niskanen, 1971).  
For Brown et al (2006), more important than the type of vendor is how competitive markets 
are. Low transaction costs diminish the risk that service providers become monopolies, allowing the 
measurement of performance and enforcement of contract requirements.  
Following contract specifications requires discipline to adapt to clients' needs. During 
competition, bidders internalise their specifications and as a result the process of resource allocation 
not only becomes more efficient but also more fair and transparent. Setting specifications permits 
the comparison between projects and competing units by establishing a benchmark of success based 
in known metrics.  
Finally, the last element in this conceptualisation of public sector competition is performance 
monitoring. Evidence suggests that contracting brings greater emphasis on explicit inspection and 
maintenance of services, increasing their quality and encouraging accountability and performance 
(Domberger, 1998). According to Mayne (2017) effective monitoring of government services is 
essential to successful public sector reform. In times of increasingly complex social and economic 
situations, what Mayne calls “gut feel” is insufficient to respond appropriately. Public servants are 
called to focus on results rather than procedures and for that to happen they need reliable sources 
of information. Without performance information empowered managers and public officers are 
forced to follow procedures that hamper their capacity to improve service delivery.  
Also, facing high level of taxes, monitoring performance may be one of the most reliable 
sources to inform citizens what they are getting. To sum up, monitoring performance seems to be 
central not only in competition but also in the administration of public services. Nevertheless, it needs 
to be acknowledged that, contrary to private firms, measuring public performance is a complicated 
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endeavour. As Kearney and Berman (2018) discuss: “Many private sector applications emphasize only 
efficiency, but a distinguishing feature of public performance is that it is guided and assessed by 




NPM emerged in the public administration field as a transformative force with the promise of 
increasing the efficiency of the old Weberian system of bureaucracy. NPM was aided in this project 
by the academic underpinnings of public choice scholars who, sometimes unknowingly, helped to 
introduce market-style practices into public administration.  
This “reinvention of government” was promoted by international organisations and western 
political leaders alike, allowing its adoption by public administrations around the world. Nevertheless, 
the process of adaptation to the NPM measures was not as smooth as initially believed. Public officers 
were reluctant to change their value systems, which along with the lack of a political narrative to 
implement the measures, resulted in mixed experiences and deep questioning.    
One of the most influential measures proposed by NPM was the unravelling of the hierarchical 
organisation of service production, establishing a separation between provision and production of 
public services. This separation encouraged the competitive search for cheaper and more efficient 
public services, opening the bureaucratic “black box” of policy implementation to different actors, 
better alternatives and more transparent processes.  
Competition emerged as a strong mechanism to reveal the preferences of consumers, 
reaching the point where even the threat of competition can provide powerful incentives to discover 
least cost methods of producing goods and services (Rimmer, 1994). Because of this, the use of 
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competition to select public service providers has proved to have some clear advantages in 
comparison with in-house delivery. The establishment of a contract between central government and 
service providers fosters transparency by incorporating clear metrics and rules of competition. This 
also professionalises central government work, allowing it to focus on policy design instead of policy 
implementation, moving from rowing to steering. The process of competition also forces vendors to 
reveal more about the true features of their bids than they might otherwise do, increasing the 
efficiency of the system.  
All these elements in conjunction build a strong case for the introduction of competition in 
public services, but the academic support has not been unanimous. Competitive allocation of goods 
and services has been challenged on the basis of the relevance of contexts and regulations to achieve 
success. To reduce transaction costs, the number of suppliers must be high, and information costs 
must be low (Boyne, 2003), so when the opposite conditions apply, in-house provision could appear 
as a better alternative (Blank, 2000). Competition by itself would not deliver the promised benefits, 
so governments need to be willing to invest in management capacities and effective monitoring 
processes if efficiency is to be achieved.    
Most of the research on this topic is built on single case studies, making it difficult to draw 
generalisations across units or countries. Regardless of this, the theoretical appeal of competition 
has made it internationally adopted as a mechanism of public service delivery.  
The next chapter is a conceptual continuation of the debates here presented. Having set up 
NPM as my theoretical lens and defined competition as the measure to be examined, I narrow my 
focus to competition as a mechanism for allocating intergovernmental grants.  
The next chapter therefore examines main goals and effects intergovernmental grants. Then, 
the conceptual section of the thesis finishes by debating about local grant competition.   
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3.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of the previous chapter was to review the debates about NPM reforms detailing how 
competition was developed in public service delivery. This chapter comprises the second and final 
part of the conceptual debate, examining the main debates found in the literature regarding 
intergovernmental and competitive grants.  
Despite being a public funds allocation mechanism, grants put into play a range of themes 
across several bodies of knowledge. For that reason, the review is constructed around economics, 
public administration, urban and political science theories. 
The first section of this chapter serves as an entry point to the debate, reviewing the different 
types of grants and their effects on subnational levels of government. At the end of this section I 
discuss some issues regarding the agency problems of centrally designed grants to introduce the 
second section. The second section is devoted to reviewing the main theoretical debates on local 
grant competition. Here, I conceptualise how bids are constructed locally and then judged by central 
government, looking at tensions manifested in the process of bid formulation, evaluation and final 
allocation. This section is built upon four pivotal concepts found in the literature that will later be 
used to frame my analysis, namely, efficiency or value for money, local empowerment, innovation 
and political salience of grant competition.  
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Despite being subject to previous analyses, competitive grant research has been restricted to 
a few specific areas such as the political targeting of public monies. This could be due the lack of data, 
the contextual determination of competition or the switch into new governance theories. Moreover, 
and despite being used extensively, local grant competition in South American countries has not 
attracted scholarly attention. In Chile, grant competition is not just an administrative practice, it is 
deeply rooted in the Chilean ethos shaping the way municipalities both deliver services and 
understand their relationship with central government and other jurisdictions. Because of this, this 
study will shed some light on a relevant but unexplored area of local government studies.  
      
3.2 Intergovernmental grants   
 
This first section reviews the debates on the definition, types and main effects of 
intergovernmental grants. My aim here is to contextualise my research and track how competition 




Grants have been the object of study of public administration scholars for many years. 
According to King (1984) the main distinction between revenue sources for sub-central authorities is 
between independent sources, such as charges, taxes and loans, and sources dependent on other 
government bodies commonly defined as grants.  
Grants play an important role, allocating resources where sub-central sources are insufficient 
to fund or maintain a certain standard of service across jurisdictions (Beam and Conlan, 2002). In a 
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hypothetical and totally centralised system, grants would not be necessary since every service and 
policy would be covered by the central government budget as the only provider and administrator. 
Grants appear when decentralised units are not capable of funding their service costs, thus putting 
at risk an equal service provision across jurisdictions.   
According to the classic work of Oates (1972) and Tiebout (1956) the decentralisation of 
spending powers improves the efficiency of public investment, increasing the matching of provision 
to differing public preferences. Local governments, because of their closeness to local communities, 
are believed to have a better knowledge of local circumstances and preferences, lowering the costs 
of service provision and tailoring their offer to specific local priorities.  
This efficiency of decentralised spending is however not replicated on the revenue side of the 
government budget because unwanted effects could appear if local governments are in charge of 
the revenue collection. In this regard Smart (2007) argues that: “The potential for tax competition 
among local governments, for tax exportation to local non-residents, and a variety of other fiscal 
externalities reinforces the commonly-held notion that revenue-raising authority should be more 
centralized in a federation than expenditure authority” (p.2).  
Local governments are therefore usually responsible for policy implementation and service 
delivery without having the power to raise all the necessary revenues. This situation creates a vertical 
fiscal imbalance that needs to be corrected via grant transfers.   
For Beam and Conlan (2002) grants are: “payments from a donor government to a recipient 
organization (typically public or non-profit) or an individual. More specifically, they are a gift that has 
the aim of either ‘stimulating’ or ‘supporting’ some sort of service or activity by the recipient, whether 
it be a new activity or an ongoing one. Through this device, a governmental agency (the grantor) 
participates in the provision of a service, while leaving to another entity (the grantee) the task of 
actual performance”(p.341). As seen in the previous chapter, the disentanglement of service 
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provision and performance may carry beneficial consequences to the grantor, who can focus on 
steering instead of rowing.      
Grants traditionally have been classified based on the spending guidelines made by the 
grantor. In the following section I will set out this classification and analyse the effect and incentives 
generated by the system.  
 
3.2.2 Classification 
Grant rules or guidelines determine how free the local authority is when it comes to spending 
the funds received from the grantor. Following King’s classification (1984) the first distinction can be 
made between specific and general grants (Figure 1). Specific grants have also been known as 
“conditional”, “selective grants” or “earmarked” and as their name suggests they need to be spent 
in some specific activity decided by the grantor. General grants, (also known as “unconditional”) by 
contrast may be spent in the area selected by the grantee.  
Shah (2006) argues that between the specific and general there is another kind of grant, 
namely the block grant and this one: “Falls in the grey area between general-purpose and specific-
purpose transfers, as they provide budget support with no strings attached in a broad but specific 
area of subnational expenditures” (p.129).   
General grants can take two forms: if the amount transferred is fixed it is a lump-sum general 
grant and if the amount depends on the actions of the grantee it is called an effort-related general 
grant. Specific grants also differ based on how much of their own revenue the grantee spends on the 
service concerned. If the grantee receives a fixed sum of money the grant is called a lump-sum 
specific grant and if the sum depends on the grantee’s effort it is called matching specific grant.  
King (1984) also made a final distinction between matching specific grants according to the 
value covered by the grantor. On a closed matching specific grant, the grant is established subject to 
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an upper limit whereas on the open matching specific grant the grant covers a certain percentage of 
expenditure no matter how high that is. 
 
3.2.3 Effects 
Having categorised the different types of grants I review their effects and objectives and look 
at the central debates. Due to its relevance among scholars, below I briefly analyse one of the central 
debates on the effects of general grants on public spending. After that I develop the main discussion 
regarding conditional and matching grants.   
 
General grants, veil hypothesis Vs Flypaper effect  
  General purpose lump-sum grants have been at the centre of the academic debate due to 
their effect on public expenditure. One  line of thought, presented by Bradford and Oates (1971), 
states that grants to local governments are equivalent to an equal increment of community income. 
This idea works under the assumption that politicians act in a benevolent way and in a setting of 
perfect information and political competition. This result is known as the veil hypothesis because it 
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suggests that intergovernmental transfers are simply a veil for central government tax rebates 
(Oates, 1999).   
The veil hypothesis has been consistently debated by the literature, as it conflicts with 
empirical evidence that the stimulus of local public expenditure from general purpose lump-sum 
grants largely exceeds the effect of what would be an equivalent increase in private income 
(Gramlich, 1977; Hines and Thaler, 1995; Bailey and Connolly, 1998).      
The above Bradford and Oates (1971) logic argues that general purpose lump-sum grants 
would simply increase grantee resources (an income effect) without affecting relative prices of goods 
and services (King, 1984; Shah, 2006; Ahmad, 1997). However, according to Shah (2006) this kind of 
grant: “tends to stick where it first lands, leaving a smaller than expected fraction available to tax 
relief, a phenomenon referred to as the “flypaper effect”… grants to local governments tend to result 
in more local spending than they would had the same transfer made directly to local residents” 
(p.130).  
To illustrate this, consider Figure 2 where the indifference curves represent the median 
voter’s preferences over a private and a public good. In this situation the initial optimal choice is A 
subject to a budget constraint line M1 to M2. According to Oates, if a general grant is given to a local 
government the median voter’s new budget constraint changes from M1-M2 to M1’-M2’ and he 
chooses local expenditures at the level of B. The median voter’s share of the general grant is 
equivalent to an increase in his income of the same amount (income effect) with relative prices not 
changing. In contrast, the flypaper effect sees local public expenditure as increasing by more than 
from A to B. One way of explaining this is that the median voter may incorrectly perceive the local 
tax price of local expenditure as having gone down as a result of the grant. The median voter might 
perceive not the actual marginal tax price but a fraction of total costs covered by local tax collections, 
called an average tax price. Given this, after the general grant the median voter perceived tax price 
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would move the perceived budget line from M1-M2 to M1-M’2 which is called tax price illusion (Bae 
and Feiock, 2004). Under this situation the illusion makes the voter think the budget constraint 
changed from M1-M2 to M1-M’2 and the optimal choice changes from A to C.    
 
Arthur Okun has been attributed as the first to use the metaphor of the flypaper effect based 
on the work of Courant et al (1979) on the stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants. In his 
article, Courant explains why an intergovernmental grant stimulates more spending than an equal 
increase in local resources, an idea that contradicts the theoretical prediction. According to Courant, 
the rationale behind the effect is that: “In order to for the nonmatching grant neutrality to hold, local 
officials must take the grant into account in computing tax shares, an action that seems quite unlikely. 
If this is not done, there will be a relative price effect for nonmatching grants which will stimulate 
expenditures more than private income increases” (p.29). Since Courant’s paper, the flypaper effect 
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has been the object of study for many theorists (Gamkhar and Shah, 2007). Schwartz (2005) reviewed 
the subsequent debates in the topic and found that most of the empirical explanations relate to 
probable grant miscategorisations, misspecified models or omitted variables. She concluded that 
despite the many revisits, as yet there is no clear consensus about the flypaper effect. This debate 
has raised many questions not only for how it is calculated but also for the question of how the role 
of public officers is modelled. Different debates arise if public officers are framed as benevolent 
agents in search of the common good or contrastingly as selfish budget maximisers. Different points 
of departure in this matter may arrive at different conclusions. I argue that given the possibility of 
either using nonmatching grant money to reduce tax levels or using it to finance local public spending,  
local bureaucrats would probably opt for the second, thus affecting the technical neutrality of the 
nonmatching grant. 
 
General grants - Tax effort   
Ahmad (1997) considers that general purpose or “gap–filling” grants discourage own tax 
collection efforts by sub national jurisdictions without creating any incentive for efficient 
expenditure. He also argues that with this kind of transfer: “macroeconomic balances are 
jeopardized, and inefficient outcomes are virtually assured, with sub national governments regularly 
engaging in strategic games with the central government” (p.7). Shah (2007) and Bravo (2014) also 
believe that formula based general-purpose transfers induce municipalities to underutilise their own 
tax bases or fall under “soft budget constraints”. Deprived jurisdictions do not have an incentive to 
spend their grant money efficiently if this could lead them to be seen as less needy and thus receive 
a smaller share of grant money.  
Rajamar and Vasishta (2000) analysed the impact of general purpose grants on the tax effort 
of local governments in India and found that a grant increase of one rupee reduced own tax revenues 
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in 12 of 14 districts by more than one rupee and in eight of these by more than two rupees. These 
findings are in line with a more recent research carried by Mogues and Benin (2012) in Ghanaian local 
governments. Sanogo and Brun (2016) provide a different point of view on this matter: looking at the 
effect of central government grants on Cote d’Ivoire municipalities, they found that central grants 
had a positive effect on local mobilisation of tax and non-tax revenue. They argue that fiscal 
decentralisation policies could have a different impact on local jurisdictions as well as the scope of 
local government’s revenue assignment and their discretion to set their tax bases.   
Oates (1999) on the other hand, made a case for unconditional-general grants arguing that 
they are “the appropriate vehicle for the purpose of fiscal equalization” (p.1127), and they should be 
based on a formula that measures fiscal needs and fiscal capacities. General grants are generally 
recommended to be designed to deliver an equal standard of service provision among jurisdictions 
trying to avoid the “poor chasing rich” phenomenon. This phenomenon, also known as “musical 
chairs”, occurs when: “jurisdictions with high-income households face the threat of low-income 
households choosing to move into the jurisdiction and free riding on the contributions to the public 
good made by the wealthy. This can potentially lead to an empty result due to the “musical chairs” 
phenomenon of the poor chasing the rich who then relocate only to be chased again” (Epple and 
Nechyba, 2004, p.2448). In this context a compensation (or grant) is expected to be paid to 
jurisdictions with high expenditure need, small tax base or where central government will usually try 
to restrain the level of local taxes (Bailey, 1999); this debate will be further analysed below. 
 
Conditional and matching grants 
Specific or conditional grants are designed to promote specific programmes or services that 
central government wants to encourage and where local government provision seems to be 
insufficient. Based on the restrictions imposed by the grantor, conditional transfers may be input-
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based, specifying the type of expenditure that can be financed, or output-based where a certain 
attainment of results is required. According to Shah (2007) output-based conditionality is less 
intrusive than input-based conditionality. It could also advance grantors’ objectives, preserving local 
autonomy, and in his own words: “grant recipients prefer unconditional nonmatching transfers, 
which provide them with maximum flexibility to pursue their own objectives…grantors, however, may 
be prepared to sacrifice some recipient satisfaction to ensure that the funds are directed toward 
expenditures on which they place a priority” (p.132). 
Ahmad (1997) anticipates three administrative costs of using conditional or special-purpose 
transfers. He argues that this type of grant presupposes that central government has the capacity to 
ensure that the funds are not being used for other purposes, that the funds were used in the 
stipulated manner and they do not substitute resources which have been allocated otherwise.    
The literature recommends the use of open matching specific grants when the benefits of 
local services spill over to other jurisdictions, producing positive externalities. So, in order to have an 
adequate level of service provision without reducing the local offer it is expected that central 
government covers the costs of these spill-overs. According to Oates (1999): “The rationale here is 
simply the usual Pigouvian one for subsidies that induce individuals (in this case policy-makers or the 
electorate) to incorporate spillover benefits into their decision-making calculus. The magnitude of 
the matching–shares, in such instances, should reflect the extent of the spillovers” (p.1127). 
Despite the flypaper effect some scholars argue that matching grants would be more efficient 
in stimulating the spending on a given service than general grants. This would be because they have 
not only an income but also a substitution effect. Matching grants give the community more 
resources (income effect) and also reduce the relative price of the output, encouraging consumption 
(substitution effect) (Bailey, 1999).  
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Ahmad (1997) believes that matching grants could lead to lower expenditures on other 
services provided by the jurisdiction so additional provisions should be taken to prevent this situation. 
He is also suspicious about the effect of matching grants in countries with wide variations of local 
fiscal capacities because: “Poorer regions would be faced with severe resource constraints and may 
not be able to meet the matching requirements to fully utilize the grant, whereas the richer regions 
would generally be able to meet the matching criteria with little difficulty. Thus the matching 
requirements could add to the horizontal imbalances” (p.7). Shah (2006) supports this idea and 
argues that: “matching grants can correct inefficiencies from spillovers, but they do not address 
uneven or inadequate fiscal capacities across state and local governments…. States with limited fiscal 
capacities may be unable to match federal funds and therefore fail to obtain as much assistance, 
even though their expenditure needs may be equal to or greater than those of wealthier states” 
(p.134).  
Grantors usually decide to use closed matching grants because having a limit allows them to 
have some control over spending. Furthermore, empirical studies by Gramlich (1977); Shah (2007) 
and Ghamkar and Shah (2007) find that closed-ended grants stimulate expenditures on the 
subsidised service more than open-ended ones.  
Grants are an indispensable mechanism to correct fiscal disparities across jurisdictions but 
despite being used thoroughly there is little agreement about their effects in the literature. 
Contextual and institutional differences across countries and regions mean that most of the research 
in this area is conducted under single case studies, impeding the extrapolation of most of their 
findings. Nevertheless, there is some agreement about the discouraging effect of unconditional 
general grants on tax collection and the stimulative effect of public against private income increases. 
Conditional or matching grants are recommended to correct the costs of positive spill-overs but need 
to consider local capacities to avoid increasing local disparities.  
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As discussed above, many of the complexities of selecting and administering a grant revolve 
around the fact that they are generally considered a gift by the grantees (Beam and Conlan, 2002). 
The literature shows that to accomplish grant objectives, grantors must place incentives accordingly, 
so grantees are encouraged to reveal their real preferences without over representing their needs. 
Below I discuss how NPM tried to tackle this situation by introducing market-style practices in the 
public administration field.   
 
 
3.3 Competitive grants  
 
After reviewing the effects and types of grants, this section aims to cover the scholarly debate 
on local grant competition. I selected local competitive grants as the embodiment of NPM strategies 
and in this section I conceptualise its main attributes and theoretical discussions.  
As described above, intergovernmental grants can take different forms depending on the 
objective that the grantor intends them to accomplish. General grants usually aim to equalise 
horizontal fiscal imbalances when local fiscal capacities differ across jurisdictions whereas matching 
grants seek to encourage the spending on a specific public good that would be otherwise under-
supplied. Competitive grants (or challenge funds) cannot be easily classified within this scheme 
because despite having a matching element (represented by the bid preparation costs) the uncertain 
returns of the competition make this grant different from the rest.  
Policymakers had to reach a complex balance of direct and conditional incentives in the design 
of local grants. This situation was facilitated by the emergence of NPM reforms which, among other 
measures, promoted the use of competition as source of efficiency. The literature addressed this 
topic by depicting how NPM influenced the way grants were designed and then distributed not only 
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amongst public but also third sector organisations (Irvine et al, 2009; Enjolras, 2018). The strategy 
has a clear appeal since competition for finite pots of money leaves local authorities no other 
alternative than to reveal their requirements, easing central government agency problems.     
Below, I review the main conceptual debates around this subject. The review is composed of 
five subsections. After defining what competitive grants are and how they are decided, I review the 
core ideas following the evidence found in the literature and grouped into four main topics, these 
are: value for money, autonomy/local empowerment, innovation and political salience.  
 
3.3.1 Definition 
Competitive grants are a scheme of fund distribution in which a central government agency 
evaluates and selects the best locally-constructed bids for funding. The amount, objectives and 
number of bids selected varies across countries and government institutions but in all cases, there 
are fewer resources than projects looking to be funded, which is where competition emerges. 
John and Ward (2005) argued that grant competition represent a quasi-market because: “It 
replaces the allocation of resources on a formula basis with one where the government agency invites 
organizations to submit bids and chooses them accordingly, ensuring that the most ‘fit’ win. However, 
it is a special case of a quasi-market because the position of the buyer and the seller are reversed: 
the buyer is the central agency, and the micro organizations… compete for scarce funds. The 
competitive edge is provided by the bidding groups that compete and seek out more innovative 
projects. The market is enforced by the central agency that scrutinizes the bids for service quality, 
making the agency the main guarantor of competition” (p.72). As seen in section 2.2, quasi-markets 
were implemented by NPM supporters to improve the quality of the public offer. During grant 
competition jurisdictions involved require a specific set of skills and must be capable of firstly ‘selling’ 
a policy to the agency in charge and then implement it correctly, outlining a special type of exchange.    
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Foley (1999) goes a little bit further in his analysis and, using a concept first developed by 
Hogget (1996), refers to grant competition not as a quasi-market but as a situation without markets. 
Foley argues that unlike competition within a producers’ market (where potential contractors 
compete to supply goods and services to government agencies) or competition within a consumers’ 
market (where contractors compete to supply services to individual purchasers) competitive grants 
are developed in a system without markets. For Foley this situation is unique even within quasi-
markets because of the incongruous notion of competing in areas without markets.  
The disarticulation of service provision and production was one of the key concepts of NPM 
to attract better and cheaper alternatives to consumers. In that respect, grant competition goes 
further and alleviates the task of contract formulation at the expense of the competing bidders who 
are the ones in charge of writing the contract. This change nevertheless carries the unwanted effect 
of indirectly exposing the capacity of the contestants to invest in preparing their bid. 
Grant competition, or challenge funds, are also well known in international development 
where this mechanism has frequently been used by agencies (or charities) in charge of distributing 
funds across the globe following specific guidelines. Copestake and O’Riordan (2013) in their study 
of challenge funds in international development provide a definition based on seven principles: “A 
challenge fund: (1) provides grants or subsidies (2) with an explicit public purpose (3) between 
independent agencies (4) with grant recipients selected competitively (5) on the basis of advertised 
rules and processes (6) who retain significant discretion over formulation and execution of their 
proposals and (7) share risks with the grant provider" (p.3).  
Due to its different nature and objectives the concepts revised in this thesis do not consider 
international development grants and focus on intergovernmental grant competition instead. After 




Process and features 
Regarding its process of allocation, grant competition is commonly run in a standard way and 
follows a similar rubric. First, organisations apply for their projects through bids that are evaluated 
and ranked by an agency and then: “Funding is allocated to proposals that are most highly ranked 
until the funding is exhausted” (Collins and Gerber, 2008, p.1131). The funds distributed through 
grant competition varies across countries and agencies. In some cases, there is a cap on the funds 
available to request in each round whereas in others every organisation set its own budget.  
The benefits of using competition as a source of grant allocation are multiple. Section 2.3 of 
this thesis, above, set out some of the advantages of competition in comparison with in-house 
provision. In this subsection I link these advantages to the case of grant competition.  
As previously seen, one of the best advantages of adopting competition to decide the 
allocation of public funds is the incentive it provides to reveal information that competitors would 
not otherwise reveal. Through competition, under the threat of the grant not being awarded grantees 
have an incentive to present their true needs and the most efficient solution. The free flow of 
information between grantor and grantee would also alleviate one of the issues of intergovernmental 
fund allocation, the contract design and enforcement.      
Foley (1999) develops this idea further, arguing that: “The bidding stage of challenge funding 
requires the contractor to define the contract and the conditions that are to govern the contract (i.e. 
expenditure, outputs, timespan and monitoring arrangements) … The relationship is still largely 
contract driven, but it is the prospective contractor who draws up the contract not the client. This 
relieves the client of many of the problems… that arise in defining detailed contract requirements” 
(p.814). 
The disentanglement of production and provision of public services was championed by 
public choice scholars and then incorporated into NPM measures. This idea was exploited in grant 
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competition where central government exercises the role of judge-evaluator and passes on the 
responsibility of policy implementation to the jurisdictions awarded. The benefits of this measure are 
twofold: first, through competition, central government can concentrate their efforts and resources 
on planning and developing the big picture (steering not rowing). Second, the local decisions on the 
bid formulation may allow localities to cater to their specific needs instead of implementing a one-
size-fits-all kind of policy. The UK Treasury recognised the potential of grant competition to increase 
new and hands-on solutions and described the ‘bidding culture’ as being: “Open to organisations 
fulfilling certain criteria to determine where available funds can be allocated to best effect, thus 
allowing bidders to decide how the aims of the funding body can be best achieved to improve levels 
of service provision. Winners therefore take ownership of both the problem and the solution, usually 
in partnership with other appropriate service organisations, either local or international, and/or the 
private sector” (HM Treasury, 1996, p.2). 
The use of guidelines and contract specifications may secure the accomplishment of grant 
objectives at lower costs. According to Ray, Coulson and Harrop (2001) competitive grants might 
deliver better results than other need-indicator formulas because they feature: “less bureaucracy, 
cost savings, better value for money, more innovative, enterprising and imaginative proposals, 
sharper strategies, greater flexibility, more local choice and enhanced responsiveness as well as 
greater policy integration through partnership” (p.189). 
In the UK and other European countries, partnerships between local agents are bid 
requirements to secure funding. This feature may have been introduced to attenuate the potential 
self-centred mentality that might be induced by competition or to widen the scope of the funds 
allocated. For Loader (2002) this requirement represents a step forward in the local governance 
arrangements. For her, partnerships bring together groups that normally would not meet, generating 
new and innovative ideas which impact the integration of programmes and the overall strategy.  
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Among the different competitive grant conceptualisations, the one carried by Brennan et al 
(1998) briefly synthesises the main arguments to use a challenge-fund-led strategy in four points. 
They propose that grant competition gives value for money, promotes a more ‘hands-off’ approach 
by central government, and allows local involvement through partnerships and fosters innovation. 
This list of attributes is set out below to frame the scholarly discussions on grant competition.  
 
Relevant examples 
Due to the intensive use of grant competitions in the US and UK during the nineties, most of 
the research on local grant competition has been focussed on two specific policies: the City Challenge 
in the UK and the Non Entitlement Community Development Block Grant in the US. 
The City Challenge initiative was launched in 1991 and its aim was the: “Releasing of 
development potential, understood in terms of both economic development and property 
development, with the targeting of the residents of ‘areas of concentrated disadvantage’, to improve 
their access to opportunities, primarily conceived in terms of access to the mainstream economy” 
(DoE, 1991, p.80). Under this initiative, local partnerships could bid for funding, proposing strategies 
to tackle local issues on a large scale. In 1995 it was succeeded by the Single Regeneration Budget 
who ran under a similar scheme until 2001.  
In the USA, since 1981 the Non-Entitlement Community Development Block Grant enabled 
state governments to allocate federal funding to eligible small cities and counties. It provided block 
grants to cities with less than 50,000 inhabitants and counties with less than 200,000 residents. Under 
this scheme, funds were most commonly used for local infrastructure such as economic development 




The structure of the following section 
After sketching the definition and procedures of grant competition and briefly describing two 
examples, below I outline the main academic discussions about the effects of grant competition. I 
structure the debates by following the four features of grant competition identified above, namely, 
efficiency seeking (or value for money), local empowerment, innovation and political salience. These 
four features are discrete categories which cover most of the literature on this topic and these 
categories will be used later as the theoretical foundation for my instrument and subsequent grid of 
analysis.  
 
3.3.2 Value for money and efficiency seeking 
In the literature of grant competition, efficiency is the value that attracts the greatest 
scholarly attention. This should come as no surprise since the declared goal of NPM policies is to 
improve the efficiency of government action. A group of scholars have assessed how effective grant 
competition has been in its goal of increasing efficiency and the results are presented below.   
The evidence on this matter seems to question the idea that competition improves efficiency 
and in the following subsections I review the main discussions found in the literature. Due to its large 
range of topics, this subsection is divided into seven main themes. First, I review the relation between 
grant competition and transaction costs; then, I analyse the trade-off between equity and efficiency; 
following that I assess the impact of municipal capacity on competition. The fourth theme discusses 
the suitability of auction theories in grant competition whilst the fifth analyses the influence of the 
bid appraisal mechanism. Finally, the sixth and seventh themes are the impacts of competition on 




Competition and transaction costs  
It is argued that competition should increase the level of performance and accountability 
because it forces grant applicants to reveal information that would mitigate agency problems (Collins 
and Gerber, 2008). Under the threat of their bid being unsuccessful and not matching the quality of 
others’ bids competitors have a clear incentive to reveal their true preferences and keep costs of 
service provision low.   
This idea was investigated theoretically by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) who concluded that 
competition was a necessary but insufficient condition for grantees to reveal the truth. Since 
interested parties do not know what type of information favours them they may unwittingly withhold 
it. In this context, a rational and sceptical decision-maker could achieve a full information disclosure 
by inducing one party to reveal information even if it is damaging to its interests.  
Without competition and with poorly-informed buyers (or grantors) decisions can be at the 
mercy of unscrupulous sellers (grantees) so buyers need to be well informed or count on laws and 
regulations that can create a liability for the competitors withholding information (Milgrom, 2008). 
In the process of grant competition, information flows from both sides, saving resources to the 
grantees and the grantor. This situation has been illustrated by a previous research of Collin and 
Gerber (2006). In this they argue that the competitive processes induce local governments to 
generate and share detailed information about the resources needed to develop a project in case 
they are selected. Local governments would also save resources under a competitive scheme because 
in each round they receive sound feedback from central government that they can later use to 
improve their bids. For the authors this exchange of information incentivises local governments to 
focus on bids with higher chances of selection, reducing transaction costs and creating an 
information-rich environment on both sides. 
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Since bidders are responsible for planning and developing proposed projects they must 
carefully consider costs to ensure they are feasible for delivery. For Foley (1999) cost reduction is at 
the heart of competition, establishing a policy shift from equity to cost and efficiency. This change 
would also represent a paradigm shift in control strategies moving from inputs to outputs combined 
with a strong managerial surveillance. Central government control would vertically oversee policy 
results giving more flexibility to the authorities in charge of the project implementation (Kirkpatrick 
and Martinez-Lucio, 1995). 
 
Equity and efficiency  
One of the most debated elements of grant competition has been its change of policy 
priorities. As seen above, competition and most NPM measures switch policy goals from equity to 
cost efficiency. This change or ‘retreat from social needs’ (Stanton, 1996) brought back a trade-off 
that has been present in the literature since the appearance of the seminal work of Okun (1975), 
“Equality and Efficiency, the Big Trade-Off”.   
In his book, Okun argues that the blind pursuit of efficiency would inevitably lead to disparities 
between individuals, transferring wealth to some while leaving others disadvantaged with less 
government assistance. For Okun, the United States lives under a double standard where the 
constitution embraces the equality of every citizen while market forces allow the emergence of 
disparities of wealth among individuals sometimes by talent or sometimes by plain luck. According to 
Okun, the disparities raised by the market need to be offset by rights, transfers and payments; he 
also believes that competition and greed are not intrinsically bad if that does not lead to a zero-sum 
game and a less than decent standard of living for the underprivileged.  
Okun argues that the market needs a place and needs to be kept in that place. Among the 
things that market does well, Okun lists: “it limits the power of the bureaucracy and helps to protect 
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our freedom against transgression by the state. So long as a reasonable degree of competition is 
ensured, it responds reliably to the signals transmitted by consumers and producers. It permits 
decentralized management and encourages experiment and innovation. Most important, the prizes 
in the marketplace provide the incentives for work and productive contribution” (p.115). 
But Okun also warns about the so called “tyranny of the dollar”, where: “Given the chance [to 
the market] it would sweep away all other values, and establish a vending-machine society. The rights 
and powers that money should not buy must be protected with detailed regulations and sanctions, 
and with countervailing aids to those with low income. Once those rights are protected and economy 
deprivation is ended, I believe that our society would be more willing to let the competitive market 
have its place” (p.116).  
Harrow (2002) on the other hand, brings a relevant point to this discussion, questioning the 
incapability of NPM to incorporate equity goals. Without ignoring the tension between efficiency and 
equity he argues that NPM is still capable of including social justice aims. According to him, it would 
be unfair to blame NPM for pre-existing extensive inequities and even though competition may have 
relegated social justice, it is by the virtue of efficiency that other equity goals are able to be 
incorporated in government agendas.  
Harrow explains that NPM could act as an empty signifier that reflects society’s values via 
citizens’ responsiveness, so an erosion of equity values may be explained: “in terms of an altered shift 
in preference among citizens generally toward competitive behaviour and individualistic 
responsibility” (p.147). 
Citizens’ involvement, along with the emergence of choice and participation in the policy 
process, have also delivered a more transparent governmental procedure, exposing what was called 
by Barberis (1998) an “accountability gap” in public institutions. In today’s context multiple actors 
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and periodic evaluations could result in a more transparent environment where competition acts as 
a catalyst of information flow between government and citizens.  
Piña (2017) contributes to the debate of equity and efficiency by assessing the allocation of 
the homeless prevention and rapid re-housing programme in the US. He found that: “Decisions that 
emphasize a more equal distribution of funds through the use of formulas are associated with higher 
levels of equity and access. In other words, as states decide to screen out potential providers through 
the use of competition, they are less likely to achieve an equal allocation of federal funds across their 
jurisdiction. At the same time, the more extensive the use of formula allocations instead of 
competition is also associated with lower implementation performance, revealing a fundamental 
trade-off in the intergovernmental grant system” (p.27).  
The tension between equity and efficiency is not easy to disentangle. Okun warned about the 
tyranny of the dollar where efficiency seeking authorities could swap out any other value and thus 
the rights and powers of the underprivileged need to be protected. These rights are difficult to assess 
and fund without placing incentives for local governments to over-represent need. Grant competition 
seems to act against equity values by rewarding quality instead of need; nevertheless, competition 
may foster transparency, incentivise participation and secure a better use of tax-payers’ money. The 
above idea suggests that competition would be better suited to environments where competing 
actors shared similar rights and powers and grants were allocated based on bid merit. The next 
subsection develops this topic in greater depth, assessing the relevance of capacity and need in grant 
competition. 
   
Great needs – great disadvantages  
The funding outcomes of grant competition are decided by officers with personal tastes and 
agendas. For Collins and Gerber (2008) this trivial but relevant truth has a deep impact on the social 
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equity performance of competition. Analysing the non-entitlement element of the Community 
Development Block Grant in the US (CDBG) they found that to avoid problems: “[managers] have 
incentives to reward organizations that invest in administration rather than closely matching funding 
to needs in a socially equitable manner. Consequently, jurisdictions with great needs but little 
capacity are likely to suffer funding disadvantages” (2008, p.1137).  
In their study they provide evidence that competition for funds negatively affects needy and 
understaffed authorities. They argue that if social equity is part of the policy goal, administrators 
would rather move from a pure competition to a hybrid model of grant allocation.  
In a previous work, Collins and Gerber (2006) conceptualise CDBG grant as setting up 
contracts between state and local governments where transaction costs critically affect the final 
allocation. What they found is that only local governments with the capacity to absorb the, 
sometimes considerable, contracting costs will be able to secure federal funds. They argue that in 
CDBG competition: “Some organizations may lack the administrative capacity to obtain grants. 
Consequently, some local governments may not have the capacity to engage in successful grant 
contracting and are therefore excluded from accessing federal funds for their constituents”  (p.616).  
The consequences of this also have some redistributive impact among constituencies 
because: “If administrative capacity is related to the wealth of a government’s constituents, then the 
constituents more in need are likely to have limited access the redistributive benefits awarded via 
grants” (p.618). This situation is especially relevant if grant competition was set in place to foster 
horizontal equity. Due to its mechanism of bid appraisal, competition may be worsening the original 
situation, increasing the gap between needy and wealthy jurisdictions.   
For Beam and Conlan (2002) local capacity to endure competition is non-trivial and especially 
complex because applicants need to: “spell out a sufficiently interesting approach to the problem 
being addressed by the program to win the competition for a grant award and must “sell” itself to 
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the administering agency as capable partner committed to the goals of the program and able to carry 
it out effectively” (2002, p.357). This, according to the authors, requires specific “grantsmanship” 
obtained by the experience of a team capable of “psyching out” priorities and preferences of the 
programme administrators.  
The findings made by Collin and Gerber and Beam and Conlan have been supported by several 
studies scrutinising how capacity affects grant allocation under competitive schemes. Carley et al 
(2015), looking at the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, found that capacity and guidance 
were the two main reasons why local authorities were able to win and implement the policy 
programmes. Capacity, according to the authors, consisted of human capital and relevant policy 
experience, and both in conjunction increased the chances of implementing the policy locally. 
In further research, Collins et al (2016) analysed whether the use of a grant-contracting 
system affected the equitable access to CDBG funding among local governments. Contrary to their 
earlier findings the authors did not find a statistical association between local capacity and grant 
allocation. Nevertheless, they did find that need was negatively associated with the amount of grant 
received. They also found that municipalities who reported obstacles to finding, contracting with and 
monitoring vendors, received fewer grants that those without such obstacles. According to the 
authors, municipalities may restrict their participation in grant competition if they perceive that the 
complications of implementation might be too high.  
In a similar trend, Hall (2008) found an association between the number of public sector 
employees and the federal funding allocated per jurisdiction. Moreover, in a later study (2010) Hall 
arrived at the conclusion that an increase in need decreased the targeting of federal funds. This idea 
is also supported by John, Ward and Dowding (2004) who argued that the costs of bid formulation 
represented a natural barrier to deprived and under-staffed authorities. More recently, Robinson 
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(2017) backs Hall’s conclusion. After exploring the distribution of local environmental grants in 
thirteen Californian cities Robinson concluded that wealthier cities are more likely to be funded. 
Unlike the debate in the earlier section about equity versus efficiency, literature converges 
on the view that local capacity is associated with larger grant transfers. Bid costs are a natural barrier 
to needy and deprived municipalities. If the costs of bid-formulation are not paid for by the grantor, 
there is the risk that the authorities funded will be those with enough resources to absorb these costs 
more effortlessly. This situation would be especially critical in areas where municipalities differed 
greatly in their abilities to generate local revenue.   
 
Central appraisal mechanism   
Another element commonly examined by the literature on grant competition is the role 
played by central government as bid evaluators. As previously stated, central government may have 
well founded reasons to participate in the decision-making process instead of the implementation of 
local policies. Being the decision-maker, central government places the responsibility of policy design 
and implementation on bidders who have a better knowledge of local needs. Additionally, with this 
scheme, grantors can ensure that resources will be well spent and according to known metrics and 
measurements.  
Most scholarly research disputes the above idea of neutral and precise evaluations carried by 
efficient central agencies (Keating and Midwinter, 1994; Foley, 1999; Wunsch, 2001). Unlike private 
settings where profits are easily measured, the goals of public institutions are multiple and much 
more complex to assess. Central officers in charge of bid evaluation, due to their distance from the 
local bidder, are unable to know all the required information to establish a sound judgement. For 
Stanton (1996) this represent a serious issue because: “Such assessments might be possible in a 
commercial setting where investment options can legitimately be reduced to one financial 
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dimension. But the multiple outputs from local public investments will not lie on a common scale. 
Efficient choice requires a very rich array of information about net costs/returns on component 
projects, available only in close proximity to them” (p.196).  
This argument is supported by John, Ward and Dowding (2004) claiming that, despite a few 
limited cases such as waste disposal, the complexity of measuring local services could affect the 
accuracy of the evaluation process. They assess the urban regeneration grant and argue that: “the 
government (the judge) has many aims, allowing a wide interpretation in the nature of what bidders 
might offer and making objective assessments of the quality of the bids problematic” (p.406). 
The match between central aims and local proposals can represent a difficult challenge at 
both extremes. Manna and Ryan (2011) assess the US programme Race to the Top and found that 
evaluations: “can become complex in competitions that invite diverse range of applicants who may 
have tremendously different ideas about how to accomplish the grant program objectives” (p.532). 
There seems to be a trade-off between the scope and the measurability of proposed bids 
created by the evaluation mechanism. The wider and broader grant aims are, the less rigorous and 
more ambiguous the evaluation may be. Grantees are likely to favour general and loose guidelines 
able to be adapted to their local requirements. The competition rubric is therefore likely to be wide 
enough to capture all sort of bids, increasing its subjectivity and difficulty of being understood by 
grantees. On the other hand, narrow and clear grant aims may restrict local freedom but would be 
easier to understand and win by most of the jurisdictions.  
  
Grant competition auction theories 
There are some cases in the literature where grant competition has been assessed as a special 
type of auction (Baik, et al, 2001). Particularly in all-pay auctions models, agents compete by making 
irreversible investments before the outcome of the competition is finally known (Siegel, 2009). This 
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situation has been compared with grant competition where a municipality can be seen as making an 
irreversible investment of resources in a bid for funding which may or may not be successful. 
In this study I will follow the argument made by Ward and John (2008) regarding the relevance 
of these models. For them, classic auction theory models cannot be extrapolated to grant 
competition because of the extra costs of delivering the proposed projects. They argue that: “the 
analogy with all-pay auction breaks down because competition may force those who do get funding 
to pay an additional price: carrying through a project which is not what they exactly wanted to do. As 
far as we know auction theory does not deal with situations where the number of prizes depend on 
a budget constraint and the bids made, and is endogenous to the game-equilibrium, not determined 
in advance” (p.48).  
Following central government guidelines can, and probably does, affect the incentives of the 
competitors as well as the uncertainty in the number of prizes to be delivered. These arguments 
make a strong case against the adoption of all-pay auction models and their ability to empirically 
predict the competition incentives and competitors’ behaviour. I agree with the case against such 
models made by Ward and John, and consider that using an all-pay auction model would considerably 
over-stretch its original idea, leading to wrong conclusions about the grantor and grantees.   
In the last two subsections I review the debates on grant competition and its capacity to 
enhance the quality of projects quality and review the cases where the actual costs of competing 
were assessed. In conjunction these two subsections seek to test empirically the attributes previously 
discussed and serve as conclusion to the conceptualisation of the efficiency of grant competition.   
 
Competition and quality of projects 
As seen in the first subsection of this chapter, fund allocation mechanisms based on need (or 
unconditional lump-sum transfers) do not incentivise efficient expenditures. Without appropriate 
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incentives, officers may act as budget maximisers (or rent seekers) affecting the overall quality and 
quantity of investment projects. In this context, competing for a finite pot of money appears to be an 
inexpensive measure to assure a certain level of quality at a given budget. 
Quality or policy efficiency are concepts difficult to measure due to the multidimensionality 
of public goals. Despite this, some studies have tried to assess it with mixed results. John and Ward 
(2005) analysed the Single Regeneration Budget Program and found that the overall social efficiency 
gains through competition were, at best, small. They argue that: “real competition only exists at the 
margins where groups that would not otherwise get funded may move away from the sort of project 
they most wanted” (p.71). Central government guidelines pushed local authorities to evaluate how 
far they could adapt their ideal project and found that the increase in quality was only observable 
among a small fraction situated at the mid-quality point. They found that projects that government 
found valuable did not need to adjust proposals to compete successfully because they would be 
funded anyway. For the authors, the same happened with low quality bidders who saw benefits solely 
in participation; they will never compromise their ideal project to fit central government standards. 
Consequently, they concluded that the small increases in project quality may be lower than the 
transaction costs of competition negating its overall benefits.  
This idea is reintroduced later by the same authors (Ward and John, 2008). Using Monte Carlo 
simulations, they showed that many bidding groups are not under competitive pressure. They argue 
that the grantor uses a relatively efficient algorithm to select winning bids and given this assumption: 
“the theoretical results and simulations suggest that competition will be confined to groups whose 
ideal projects are neither too near what the agency wants or too far away” (p.61).  
In this regard, Tullock (1975) poses a relevant question addressing the appraisal mechanism 
of competitive grant systems. For him, central government guidelines, constructed to enhance 
efficiency, could act as a deterrent because: “The government grants to a local community are 
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normally accompanied by special requirements, and that the community’s behaviour is to a 
considerable extent adjusted to the desirability of obtaining these grants, means that the grants are 
always worth less to the community than their cost to the central government. Once again, 
competition among communities for these grants may lead to a very large costs to the community 
and the nation” (p.50). 
Local authorities need to adapt their needs to externally-decided guidelines and because of 
this, the project finally implemented will always be worth less for them than its actual cost for central 
government. In this situation competing jurisdictions could deliberately limit their effort to follow 
central guidelines if they are too distant from their needs, impacting the competitiveness of the 
process and the quality of the bids.    
Competition protocols and rubrics cannot exactly match local authorities’ needs so the 
efficiency gains will always be debatable. Competition might also be limited by authorities unwilling 
to compromise their ideal projects and by compliant authorities that would be funded regardless of 
the competition.  
 
The costs of competition  
The last theme of this subsection outlines the costs of competition. During grant competition 
the free flow of information between grantee and grantor can be argued to allow the revelation of 
true needs and their costs. To test this assumption a group of authors examined the monetary costs 
incurred by jurisdictions during competition. Oatley (1995) synthesised the different costs into three 
headings: the costs related to the preparation of the documentation of the bid, the opportunity costs 
of officers’ time and the costs of public consultations and consultancies for economic analysis. He 
calculated that the average cost of a Single Regeneration Budget bid was £114,080. Multiplying that 
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figure by the number of unsuccessful authorities (44) he found that nearly five million pounds were 
spent by “loser” authorities.  
Before that, in the US, Gilbert and Specht (1974) analysed the Planning Grant Review Project 
(PGRP) and realised that despite the high costs incurred the returns were modest. They calculated 
that given the ratio of applicants, one third of them would have been chosen anyway by random 
selection. They also stated that: “The employment of inexpensive and simply-constructed measures 
of the cities’ prior experience would have produced estimates of performance generally equivalent 
to those that emerged from the array of qualitative judgements employed in the PGRP decisions” 
(p.572).  
The department of Land Economy at Cambridge (1996) also analysed the costs of bid 
formulation for the Single Regeneration Budget but their calculations were much more conservative. 
They calculated the costs of ten unsuccessful bids and found that: “On average unsuccessful bidders 
had invested about sixteen man weeks in preparing their SRB bids which might be valued at about 
£10,000. However some bids had taken 40 man weeks of preparation at a cost of £23,000” (p.28).  
In a more recent examination Localis (2014) calculated the costs of the competitive funding 
process in the UK by looking at four funds from the UK and the EU and concluded that the average 
costs (not including staff time) ranged approximately from £20,000 to £30,000. Interviewing local 
officers they found that: “local areas are firmly of the view that, due to the timescales and costs of 
competitive funding processes, such processes can only make up a proportion of growth-related 
funding. Indeed, nearly half of our respondents suggested that competitive elements should 
comprise only 25% of growth funding” (p.23). 
Loader (2002) on the other hand questions the costs calculations, arguing that they are 
extremely difficult to assess, so most of the authorities usually under report them. The hours spent 
by officers who are not solely dedicated to grant management are hard to count and usually squeezed 
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within the normal workload of officers across the local authority. Loader exemplifies this by: “A one 
off assessment exercise, for a specific bid was carried out by one department surveyed. It estimated 
that the resources devoted to the exercise could be valued at £70,000. The only cost recognised by 
the authority’s finance system was approximately £5,000 paid for work carried out by consultants. 
The £65,000 difference reflects the resources devoted by the department” (p.570).  
Besides the men/hour calculus of formulating a bid there is another cost that scholars have 
taken into consideration. This one could be referred as the “morale” cost of losing. Grant 
competitions usually demand several weeks of officers’ time and could involve the local community 
in the process. Because of this, the effects of not being selected could be deep and have several 
consequences. Oatley (1995) addresses this situation and argues that: “Failure may actually have 
negative effects in how people work together – recriminations may set in or demoralisation may lead 
people to conclude that their effort should be directed elsewhere. It cannot be assumed that failure 
will lead people to work harder together in order to overcome adversity” (p.11).  
Stanton (1996), on the other hand, has referred to this as an “institutional cost”. He argues 
that losing could damage team morale and have negative effects not only within but also between 
competing authorities. Losing can also discourage local authorities from being part of future 
competition. Harrop et al (2002) analysed the situation of the funding of local authority archives and 
states that: “For those services unable to take advantage of the rich opportunities on offer, a vicious 
circle of diminishing resources, leading to inability to bid, leading to further impoverishment, is 
occurring”(p.45). 
Finally, for Edwards (1997) local needs should not be decided through competition because: 
“what is being competed for is something which, if not won, will result in continued suffering or 
unmet need. It is not on a par with the consequences of losing other competitions such as for the 
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best-kept village or the prettiest peripheral housing state”(p.837). Edward believes that because of 
its nature, failure in this type of situations can cause real hardship for the team in charge of the bid.  
 
 
3.3.3 Autonomy / local empowerment 
In conjunction with value for money, local autonomy has been seen as another powerful 
attribute of intermunicipal grant competition. During competition, competing authorities receive 
valuable feedback about their bids which may improve quality. This process aids the implementation 
of technically-sound projects that incorporate the local needs collected by the municipal authorities.  
A study conducted by the University of Bath (2014) found that challenge funds were the right 
vehicle for central government agencies to engage with smaller and less well-known local 
organisations. They found that grant competition was an instance to: “demonstrate the advantages 
in joining a mechanism in which they (grantees) control project design and implementation, and 
which supports capacity building and learning to promote best practices” (p.3). They also found that 
this type of scheme can strengthen performance management, institutional learning and 
accountability by devolving influence over resources administration. 
In grant competition grantees become those ultimately responsible for projects’ 
implementation so to respond accordingly they must to be able to improve their performance. 
Through competition authorities also have a chance to decide locally the projects that better suit 
their necessities, bringing local projects closer to satisfying local needs. Finally, local ownership 
increases processes of co-responsibility where local authorities are more deeply involved during 
formulation and implementation of local initiatives (De Valk et al, 2005).       
Foley (1999) rebuts the above idea arguing that grant competition and the ‘contractual 
culture’ brought by it has created a paradox of policy decision making where local units are: “subject 
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to more centralization and decentralization at the same time; centralization of policy and the setting 
of parameters within which the system works, and decentralization of operational management” 
(p.824).  
Oatley (1995) also has reservations about the role played by central government and how 
influential its participation may be. He analysed the City Challenge and argued that: “City Challenge 
can be seen as a more subtle approach by central government to achieve its political aims for local 
government, namely, the continued dilution of local government powers and the increased 
involvement of the private sector in local governance, together with the promotion of an enterprise 
culture via competitive bidding” (p.3).  
It is debatable how empowered local jurisdictions may be in a system where the final decision 
is taken by a central agency far from the source of need. For Stanton (1996) grant competition was 
used as a tool by the Conservative government to hide budget cuts. He suggests that immersion in 
the competitive game rhetoric imparts a message that only players (or bids) can be inadequate not 
the resource, so competition acts as a platform to legitimise central policy transformations.  
Grant competition has the capacity to improve local performance and accountability but 
could also serve as a strategic mechanism to cut resources and focus public offer according to a 
centrally decided agenda. In the next section I enrich the debate by addressing the role played by 
officers during this process.  
 
Bureaucratic assessment  
Tullock (1975) assessed the role of central government bureaucrats in charge of grant 
evaluations. He examined how evaluators’ interests could shape the competition process and found 
that: “[evaluators] are likely to develop standards for delivery of these funds which in part are an 
expression of their own tastes, and in part are designed to reduce their decision problem. 
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Bureaucrats in general, although they like power, normally do not like the business of finally turning 
down applicants. Thus, the introduction of essentially arbitrary requirements in the review process 
by reducing the number of applicants is an improvement in the well-being of the bureaucrats” (p.50).  
Bid restrictions and rubrics could be designed to decrease the number of applications to be 
evaluated and hence to make life easier for the bureaucrat in charge of the appraisal. This could have 
negative consequences during the appraisal calculations and also disincentivise participation.  
As seen previously, officers face a difficult job in trying to capture all the complexities of a 
local project through a typology of finite measurements. Complexities arrive when standardised 
measurements are imposed onto ecosystems characterised by their heterogeneity, as Scott (1998) 
theorised: “The more static, standardized, and uniform a population or social space is, the more 
legible it is, and the more amenable it is to techniques of state officials…many state activities aim at 
transforming the population, space and nature under their jurisdiction into the closed systems that 
offer no surprise and that can best be observed and controlled.” (p.82). 
The power of population data and categorisation, according to Scott, revolves around their 
capacity to shape the way state-created institutions structure daily life experiences. Despite its 
intrinsic limitations, officers make sense of their work using categorisations not only as “means to 
make their environment legible; they are an authoritative tune to which most of the population must 
dance” (p.83). The main issue would be that once these categories are set they operate unavoidably: 
“as if all similarly classified cases were in fact homogeneous and uniform” (p.81). 
Kirchgassner and Pommerehne (1993) defined as low-cost decisions those where the 
outcome is indifferent to the decision maker. They argue that to avoid negligence, decision makers 
need to have a good system of incentives constructed by career considerations or (a more intangible) 
sense of peer pressure. Therefore, autonomy can be under threat when external officers do not have 
the correct incentives to act accordingly and weigh the local impact of their decision.  
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Officers guide their decisions based on facts of a simplified version of society. This situation, 
according to Chambers (1988), acts against the diversity of local conditions and permits a tendency 
for officials to neglect poor areas and poor people in diverse environments.  
Autonomy and local empowerment seems to be enhanced in authorities which can effectively 
adapt to a competitive environment. Competition can also foster local accountability, making 
jurisdictions co-responsible for the delivery of their bids. Nevertheless, the fact that a central agency 
oversees the bid appraisal raises some doubts about its role and influence. Finally, officers facing low-
cost decisions may set arbitrary requirements or be guided by their personal interests. Their role is 
especially complex given the standardised measures used to assess multiple and diverse local 
realities.  
 
3.3.4 Innovation / flexibility 
It has been argued that innovation has been one of the elements fostered by competition. 
Loader (2002) supports this idea but in his analysis, innovation has come from the required 
partnership agreement and not from the competition itself. Oatley (1995), on the other hand, 
suggests that competition changed the way in which local authorities operate to become more 
entrepreneurial and open, but he does not establish whether this has been solely caused by 
competition or whether there were other contextual factors intervening as well.  
John, Ward and Dowding (2004) argue that what, externally, could be seen as innovation is 
internally just more of the same procedures strategically adapted. In their own words: “Bidding 
creates strategic opportunities for the bidders. They can easily learn the new language of government 
aims and objectives in order to disguise old programmes and policies as though they are vibrant new 
ideas.” (p.406).  
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The University of Bath (2014) found that challenge funds enhanced innovation by two means: 
first, stimulating responses to complex problems for which there is no standard solution, and second, 
fostering responses: “to a problem that need to be tailored to diverse contextual factors, by tapping 
into local knowledge and creative capacity to develop context-specific responses” (p.3). 
 
Innovation in standardised environments  
The following theme is the capacity of grant competition to promote innovation and stimulate 
flexibility in the solution of locally-raised needs. As seen in the first subsection, direct transfers or 
formulas calculated by need may not incentivise the search for new and better solutions. According 
to John and Ward (2005) policy makers acknowledge this situation and consider that prior to 
competition urban projects: “were unimaginative and organizations such as local authorities put 
together standard schemes ‘off the shelf’ and repackaged them for the funding regime of the 
moment” (p.73). 
In these circumstances, competition puts pressure on local authorities by forcing them to 
design better projects to receive funding, setting up a virtuous circle that leaves no other option but 
improve the quality of the public offer.  
Foley (1999) once again puts forward this idea, arguing that it is difficult for innovation to 
flourish in bureaucratic environments used to standardisation and following of procedures. 
Innovation, he argues, demands experimentation and, more importantly, raises the possibility of 
failure and uncertainty about the possible outcomes. Noticeably, failure would be the exact opposite 
of what grant competition tends to encourage. Local officers do not have any incentive to promise 
something that they may not deliver, thus a strong barrier against failure is built and therefore, a 
barrier against innovation. Besides this, Foley argues that: “The high levels of contract control exerted 
over challenge schemes (which would cause winners to adhere to output guessed for innovative 
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projects) and the lack of flexibility or difficulties in altering outputs or budgets after winning a bid 
may cause many to be more conservative and avoid innovative bids” (Foley, 1999, p.827).    
In line with the latter argument, Ward (1997) suggests that grant competition could hinder 
innovation to ensure instead limited but certain outcomes. According to him: “Bids which confront 
problems of a particularly wide or serious nature and where success cannot be guaranteed are 
unlikely to be selected in preference to a site where `success’ is more certain. These riskier bids are 
usually rejected at a pre-bid stage locally in internal competitions” (p.80). 
The point raised by Ward is especially compelling considering how safe bets or easier 
problems could overcome more demanding issues where public action is expected to be taken. Boyne 
(1996) makes a point similar to Ward and Foley arguing that: “innovation and diversity is suppressed 
by strong central controls on local discretion” (p.718).    
Due to its iterative process commonly comprised of yearly rounds of allocation, it would be 
expected to see innovative bids during the first rounds. At the beginning, no one knows well enough 
the appraisal mechanisms, neither the rules nor the previously selected projects, which opens a space 
for experimentation. After the first rounds, local officers would have probably learned from their 
mistakes (unsuccessful bids) and understood how to read through bid invitations. With this expertise, 
officers and bids would converge into a specific and standard kind of proposal. In consequence, grant 
competition sustained on a periodic basis with no alterations would soon reach a point of diminishing 
returns in terms of innovation. This would be fostered by an ecosystem composed by risk averse 
officers whose first aim is to secure funding rather than to be innovative.  
Pompa (2013) shed some light onto this matter. For him, to promote innovation among 
converging proposals, expectations need to be explicitly stated by the grantor. He proposes that this 
could be achieved by three means: prioritising innovation in the scoring criteria, through the creation 
of a special innovation chapter or giving more time to declared innovative proposals.  
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Innovation is unlikely to emerge in contexts where policy predictability is rewarded. Risk 
averse officers therefore need a clear and specific impetus to propose innovative solutions to public 
problems. Without guidelines to promote innovation, grants could rapidly converge into similar 
solutions and easy-to-solve issues hampering innovation and avoiding complicated local issues.  
 
3.3.5 Political salience  
The final topic reviewed in this chapter is the political salience of grant competition. In the 
last 30 years the field of distributive politics has built a body of knowledge assessing the potential 
electoral benefits of the allocation of government goods and services. Despite the common point of 
departure (intergovernmental allocation of resources) the approach taken by distributive politics 
makes it differ from the aims of the present study.  
Distributive politics uses a top-down approach to analyse how central governments target 
their resources and services. Under this view, grants are treated as political spoils, without 
establishing a distinction as to whether they were directly or competitively allocated. Because of the 
approach used the conceptual debate set by this field of research is partially relevant to the objective 
of this chapter. Despite the lack of a local perspective, the question of central government targeting 
of grants is still relevant when seeking to understand the big picture of my phenomenon of study so 
below l briefly synthesise its main debates.  
 
Core versus swing voters 
The theoretical question that concentrates most of the attention in distributive politics is 
whether politicians distribute their resources among core constituents or swing voters. According to 
Dixit and Londregan’s model (1996) political parties compete for the undecided voters who can 
“swing” from one to another preference in the ballot. This model suggests that, compared with the 
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strong party supporters, swing voters are more easily convinced. Along with this, the model also 
suggest that poor voters would require smaller transfers to change their vote due to several multiple 
needs. On the other hand, Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that politicians are risk averse and not 
willing to waste their resources on undecided constituents so they would target their goods to their 
core supporters. 
For Golden and Min (2013) regardless of swing and core voters, information is the key factor 
when it comes to distribution of goods and in their own words: “When politicians have enough 
information about voters that they can target transfers with few deadweight losses, the Dixit and 
Londregan model produces the same results as an earlier analysis of transfer to core voters by Cox 
and McCubbins.” (p.79). 
Politicians may not have a specific strategy of distribution but a certain amount of information 
that they can use to decide how to focus their resources. If the environment is rich in information 
and core voters are well-identified and sufficient in number, politicians will focus their resources on 
them; otherwise, they will look to invest in swing voters.     
There have been more than 150 case studies of distributive politics conducted in the last 20 
years. But, due to the inherent differences in political culture and institutions, it is difficult to derive 
definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, Golden and Min’s review would suggest a mildly pro swing voter 
tendency overall. Party institutionalisation and grassroots support are good predictors of election 
success and they might also influence the amount of risks political parties are willing to take to win 
an election. Institutionalised systems such as the Chilean one incentivise the pursuit of swing voters 
because core voter support is relatively secure.  
To conclude this section, it can be argued that the interplay of grantees’ decisions and 
grantors guidelines establishes a tension between policy goals that is difficult to settle. Most of the 
academic effort in this area has been focussed on assessing how grant competition could deliver 
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value for money. Competition incentivises the revelation of local needs, enhancing a reduction in 
transactional costs. This process nevertheless can  indirectly favour local jurisdictions with more 
capacity to the detriment of equity goals. Central mechanisms of bid evaluation may secure a neutral 
and transparent assessment of local needs but, due to the multiple needs experienced locally, bid 
evaluations are destined to standardise and limit local scope of action.  
Bids that do not match local needs could motivate suboptimal expenditures of central 
government monies. Nonetheless, competition would only be seen among authorities willing to 
adapt their ideal project to centrally-decided guidelines, limiting the overall effect of competition. In 
terms of costs, local jurisdictions invest not only time and resources, but they also incur institutional 
costs when bids are unsuccessful.    
Co-responsibility and ownership of local projects can be fostered by competition but the role 
and agendas of officers in charge of the evaluations need to be closely considered in order to deliver 
the desired results. Similarly, competition seems to be an insufficient ingredient to generate local 
innovation and may work against it. In contexts characterised by standards and procedures and led 
by risk-averse officers innovation needs to be a direct requirement to flourish.  
 
3.4 Conclusions  
 
This chapter was set out as a continuation of the conceptual discussion begun in Chapter Two. 
I began in Chapter Two by analysing the role of intergovernmental grants and their effects to lay the 
foundations for this chapter. The literature in this respect is rich and pays  special attention to how 
different grants could minimise the horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances produced by the uneven 
distribution of taxable resources. I found that to be successful in this task, grants require the 
achievement of a complex balance between needs and incentives. Self-revenue can be decreased by 
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general grants, but a matching component due to their costs could hinder poor jurisdictions’ 
engagement. In this situation, the NPM reforms, and competition in particular, seem like a sound 
strategy to diminish central government agency problems and allow a better provision of local grants.  
As reviewed in Chapter Two, NPM was vocal in the support of competition as a strategy to 
decide among service providers. The general appeal of competition also eased its incorporation into 
the design of local grants and was promoted by NPM supporters as fostering efficiency in the 
allocation of public resources.  
The second and final section of this chapter was devoted to the research on competitive 
grants. The review here was theoretically-driven and examined under four main headings. 
Competition between jurisdictions was implemented to increase efficiency and reduce costs. It has 
been advocated under the belief that this mechanism means that jurisdictions have no other 
alternative than increase their productivity. Nevertheless, the literature showed that to accomplish 
this, competition is subject to the multiple and complex contexts in which public organisations 
operate and is also subject to central government’s role in the process.  
The main tension seen in the literature is between equity and efficiency as policy objectives 
but there are other areas where tensions emerge. The bid appraisal mechanism might seem to be 
neutral and transparent but could be impaired by centrally determined agendas and officers’ 
limitations in assessing local priorities. Competition could also increase co-responsibility and 
ownership but for that to occur the correct incentives need to be in place.     
The literature on this matter considers a series of trade-offs between the attributes of 
competition (which have been mainly studied in private settings) and the management of public 
administrations. It is in this interplay of political and economic incentives that grant competition has 
developed as a small but relevant topic of study. This topic, despite its relevance, has not been fully 
explored so below I present the gaps found in the literature and how I plan to bridge them. 
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Gaps found in the literature 
After reviewing the literature, it is noticeable how most of the scholarly debate on local 
competition is centred on tax schemes and competitive tendering of public services (waste 
management as the most recurrent example). In comparison, the studies devoted to 
intergovernmental competition for funds seem to be modest in number and less recent.  
Scholarly interest in this topic diminished when grants were subject to new and hybrid 
governance arrangements of service delivery or when grant competition systems were discontinued. 
When examined in the literature, local grant competition is mainly studied from a central government 
perspective, looking at the overall patterns of allocation. Under this framework jurisdictions are 
portrayed as passive recipients of the public offer without any internalisation of the processes 
experienced locally. The role played by intermediate agents such as evaluators or regional officers 
has also been underdeveloped in the literature despite their key part in the process.  
NPM reforms, on the other hand, have received less academic attention with the appearance 
of new forms of public service design and delivery such as co-production and networking. Despite 
this, NPM prevails as one of the core concepts in public administrations across Latin America so its 
study is still relevant and academically appealing.  
My research bridges these gaps by including both a top-down and bottom-up approach of 
investigation as set out below. This has allowed me to capture not only the distributional patterns of 
grant competition but also capture its effect on officers from central, regional and local tiers of 
government. In this thesis, the patterns of grant allocation serve as an entry point to my research, 
but they are not an end in themselves. The triangulation of different sources of data enabled me to 
provide a clearer picture of the effects of grant competition and deliver a more robust contribution 
to the field. 
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The effects of grant competition do not finish once the funds are allocated: there is a complex 
set of emotions, expectations and policy implications triggered by the competition that has not been 
completely covered. My aim is to bridge this gap analysing how officers behave under these 
circumstances and what would be the effects of competing for funds.  
Conceptually, grant competition may seem to foster efficiency by giving customers what they 
want. An important issue raised by the literature is the non-trivial question of who is the final 
customer in grant competition and also, who would be benefited by the efficiency gained in this 
process. The literature recognises a tension between the role of central and local officers in grant 
competition, but this issue is never fully addressed, leaving an open question that I aim to tackle in 
the empirical work below.      
Finally, although the intense academic focus may have shifted away from NPM reforms 
somewhat, these reforms are still a vivid force in Latin American countries. The impact of NPM in 
public administration such as in the Chilean case, marked at first by strong dictatorships and an 
inherited centralism, can shed a different light onto this subject. Grant competition in Chile has been 
sustained for nearly 30 years and during this time many issues have been raised and developed by 














In this chapter, I present my reflection and choices in building up a methodological approach 
to the empirical study of competitive local grants. Below, I outline my analytical and epistemological 
reasons to select a mixed methods design. Then, I discuss the strengths and limitations of this strategy 
to assess the effect of FNDR grant competition.  
This chapter describes the reasons behind my decision as well as the two methods of data 
collection and analysis. The first section of this chapter describes my position as a researcher. Then, 
I present my epistemological approach and research framework, discussing the theoretical 
advantages and disadvantages of a sequential explanatory design.  
The second section presents the first phase of analysis detailing the procedures followed in 
the quantitative assessment of grant competition. Subsequently, the third section is devoted to the 
second phase of analysis. After listing my sample procedures, in this section I inform the reader about 
my strategies to conduct the qualitative analysis and integrate my sources of data. Finally, in the 







4.2 Mixed methods and grant competition 
 
Not so long ago qualitative and quantitative methods were believed to represent two 
completely opposite paradigms in social sciences (Rossman and Wilson, 1994). This belief was 
sustained in the idea that, more than being methodological views, these two approaches represented 
incompatible assumptions about the world. Quantitative methods were linked with post-positivist 
assumptions about reality. In this vision, cause and effect could be disentangled, and a researcher 
could separate himself from his object of study. In contrast, qualitative methods were deemed fit for 
research based on a constructivist world view. Under this view personal perceptions are constructed, 
meaning that there is no objective reality and no distance between the researcher and his object of 
study (Savaya and Waysman, 2005). 
These beliefs were sustained by groups of researchers titled “purists” who argued that 
epistemological and ontological assumptions were linked with specific methodological traditions, 
these being qualitative or quantitative (Biesta, 2010). According to purists, there are two different 
paradigms in social science, each one with its own “cluster” or “package” of methodological 
assumptions. Under this position incommensurability of paradigms is assumed, and research must 
be conducted within the guidelines established by each individual method (Teddly and Tashakory, 
2010). 
The used of mixed methods emerged in this context as a new approach seeking to increase 
the internal validity of a construct by merging two different sources of data. The use of different 
approaches in the same research rejected the direct link between method and instruments, 
questioning the rigidity of the prior epistemological assumptions. As expected, this stance was 
controversial among purist researchers who questioned the suitability of merging different 
epistemological positions. Unlike prior traditions, mixed methods was not conceptualised as a holistic 
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assessment of reality; instead decisions were pragmatically assessed and based on particular 
considerations about the object of study (Johnson and Gray, 2010).  
Mixed method avoids the binary conceptualisation of reality in an effort to assess a multi-
faceted reality. After their introduction at the end of the 1980s, mixed methodologies have spread 
among fields of research gaining a position among different bodies of knowledge such as education, 
management, sociology, evaluation and health sciences (Creswell, 2010).  
 
My take on this debate 
As a researcher, I tend to disagree with the binding relation between epistemological world 
views and the use of specific methods to address them. Coming from the public policy and municipal 
world I have witnessed how single method approaches fell short in the construction of a sometimes 
much more complex reality. Competition, understood as a public policy, put into play a set of 
practices, operations and expectations that cannot be captured only by the allocative associations 
based on demographic variables or categories. At the same time, narratives from public officers could 
be incomplete or biased without knowledge of the quantitative context of funds allocation. I 
therefore argue that a single method of data collection will prove insufficient to fully describe it.   
Mixed method scholars adhere to philosophical foundations of pragmatism to build their 
case. This current of thought is based in the work of Pierce (1878), James (1995) and Dewey (1948). 
As revised by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), these three authors were interested in the practical 
and empirical consequences when judging the world and the actions that should be taken to better 
understand social phenomena.  
Pragmatism rejects traditional dualism in its aim to find the best way to tackle social 
phenomena. To do this, pragmatism replaces the distinction between subject and external object 
with a process-oriented transaction between an organism and its environment (Johnson and 
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Onwuegbuzie, 2004). However, the instrumental use of different approaches has been criticised by 
purist scholars who believe that two methods can not be rigorously used together. In the same vein, 
another question has been raised about the aim of mixed methods and who would be benefited by 
its pragmatic solution, the research or the researcher (Mertens, 2003). 
My view in the paradigm debate is rooted in the contextual particularities of my research 
question. Grant competitions are pragmatic mechanisms to allocate public funds. Funds comprise 
finite units of public resources that can be measured and ordered according to allocative patterns 
and demographic categories. Along the years, the distribution of these funds had involved practices 
and routines where the actors involved (grantor and grantees) have been in constant interplay. Thus, 
to capture the effects of competition I have aimed to integrate the outcomes of competition as well 
as the experiences of protagonists. 
This approach is pragmatic by its design and may be conceptualised as a sequential movement from 
a post-positivist perspective (quantitative analysis) to a constructivist one (qualitative analysis). After 
reviewing the epistemological underpinnings of my research, below I present a brief typology of 
mixed methods strategies in support of my methodological approach.          
  
4.2.1 Mixed method strategies   
In recent years scholars have developed several typologies to classify mixed methods 
strategies (Morse, 2003). Below I present the three more frequently used typologies and then, based 
on the conceptualisation of my research question, set out my approach. 
As seen above, mixed methods are defined by their flexibility to incorporate different 
approaches into the research inquiry. According to Greene et al (1989) the main premise of using 
different methods is that given that all methods have limitations the use of only one to address a 
phenomenon: “will inevitably yield biases and limited results. However, when two or more methods 
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that have offsetting biases are used to assess a given phenomenon and the results of these methods 
converge or corroborate one another then the validity of inquiry findings is enhanced” (Greene et al, 
1989, p.256). 
Among the many variations of this approach three strategies have attracted the most 
scholarly interest. These three strategies are: the convergent, the exploratory and the explanatory 
sequential design.  
The convergent (or concurrent) parallel design uses the same variables in both methods to 
confirm or disconfirm each other method based on the assumption that traits can be better assessed 
by gathering different forms of data (Creswell, 2014).  
The remaining two strategies comprise a two-phase project but differ in their order and 
research objectives. The first exploratory sequential strategy begins with a qualitative phase to then 
proceed to a quantitative phase. The aim of this strategy is to gather information from a few 
respondents to develop a better instrument that can then be used in a large-N sample design. Due 
to its initial exploratory phase, the use of this strategy is advisable when a researcher’s aim is to 
understand a social phenomenon before establishing generalisations to large sample populations.   
Finally, a second explanatory sequential strategy begins with quantitative data collection 
large-N analysis (LNA) and then moves to a qualitative small-N analysis (SNA). Here, quantitative 
results are used to inform the researcher about the participants and aid the purposeful design of the 
sample for the subsequent qualitative phase. Below I present this last method and detail how it fits 
with my research. 
 
4.2.2 Building the case for a sequential explanatory design 
As informed by the literature review, grant competitions have been commonly assessed from 
a distributive politics framework scrutinising the allocation of public monies between subnational 
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authorities. This strategy has been fruitful in capturing the political agendas behind grant allocations 
but has not covered the role of grantees as agents of competition.  
My decision to use a sequential explanatory design is based on my aim to address this 
theoretical gap and is based on the good fit between the strategy and my research question. For 
Liberman (2005) the first stage of this design, the LNA, serves and feeds the second-stage qualitative 
SNA. He argues that the payoff of using two methods is more than the sum of its parts because: “Each 
step of the analysis provides direction for approaching the next step. Most prominently, LNA provides 
insights about rival explanations and helps to motivate case selection strategies for SNA” (Liberman, 
2005, p.436). 
In the case of grant competition, the preliminary use of a quantitative analysis allows me to 
have a clearer idea of the allocative patterns and to scrutinise the role played by municipalities. 
According to Brannen (2017) quantitative methods derived from secondary or large-scale data sets 
could serve to provide background data in which to contextualise small scale intensive studies. To 
begin with a quantitative analysis would also strengthen the sample selection of the following 
qualitative stage of research. Despite all these strengths this strategy has some limitations, which are 
presented below. 
 
4.2.3 Limitations  
As any other framework of analysis, the sequential explanatory design has a series of 
limitations that need to be addressed. The first one is the difficulty of managing two different sources 
of data rigorously. Due to the linear identification of epistemological schools and methods, 
researchers are mostly educated in one specific cluster, namely post-positivist or social-
constructivist. This being the case, researchers often learn how to handle two different sources of 
data in academic environments where single schools are commonly followed. To Creswell et al (2003) 
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this situation is particularly demanding in circumstances where researchers ignore how to resolve 
discrepancies that could arise in integrating the results. To date, little has been written about how to 
guide the process of data integration, so researchers must find the answers by themselves.  
Once the rationale behind my method selection has been presented, in the next section I 
detail the processes that I follow during each of the two phases. The presentation begins with the 
quantitative (phase one) to then move into the qualitative phase (phase two). 
   
 
4.3 Phase one 
 
The objectives of this phase are twofold: the first is to seek to understand the patterns of 
allocation across jurisdictions, depicting which variables are associated with larger FNDR transfers. 
The second is to guide the sampling selection process used to decide which municipal actors would 
be interviewed during the second phase. In the next subsections I present my reasoning for case 
selection beginning with Chile, then move into Chilean municipalities and finally the FNDR, my case 
of grant competition.  
 
4.3.1 Case Selection - Chile 
As recognised by the literature, the term “case study” encompasses multiple types of 
research design (Thomas, 2011). In some of these designs the researcher selects a small number of 
cases (or sample) to be analysed, and then extrapolates the findings obtained to a much larger 
universe or population. In these cases, the link between sample and population involves a rigorous 
mechanism to secure the process of causal inference.   
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Since my research objective is to elucidate the features of a specific case, the complexity of 
case selection is minimised (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Although my research goal is eminently 
descriptive, the relevance of my analysed phenomenon allows me to contribute to the field mapping 
practices and realities experienced by other public administrations.  
According to my research objective my meta case of study is Chile and within Chile I 
performed different sampling techniques in each strata to finally select the municipalities (and 
officers) to be analysed. All these techniques are detailed below.  
 
Case Selection - Chilean municipalities 
Chilean municipalities present a rich case of grant competition due to the institutional and 
historical setting in which competition takes place. Municipalities are almost forced to compete for 
funds because only a small number have enough resources to invest (Section 5.3.2 provides an 
overview). To exemplify this, a recent study conducted by the OECD (2017) found that on average 
only eight percent of the yearly municipal budget is spent on local investment whilst the remaining 
budget is used to cover current expenses.    
This lack of self-revenues fosters municipal dependence on centrally controlled sources of 
finance. According to the World Bank (2013) one of the metrics to measure decentralisation across 
countries is the comparison of subnational own-source revenues against the total national revenues. 
In highly decentralised countries like Finland, Sweden and Singapore this figure exceeds 30% whereas 
among decentralised countries like United States, Japan and Germany it is above 20%. Those around 
15% are still considered to have an adequate level of decentralisation: here we find countries like 
Spain, Colombia and Costa Rica. Finally, cases with a figure close to 10% are classified as only slightly 
decentralised. Chile has only a 6% of subnational own-source revenues, ranking as one of the lowest 
in the international comparison.  
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This would be one of the main reasons why nearly 70% of municipalities in Chile encounter 
severe funding problems (Bernstein and Inostroza, 2009). The acute need for funding motivates 
fierce competition. This need has allowed me as a researcher to capture the effect of competition 
between municipalities. Added to this, my personal experience and knowledge of Chilean 
municipalities contributes to making my data collection easier and aids access to key stakeholders. 
 
4.3.2 FNDR selection  
Having established the relevance of local grant competition among Chilean municipalities, 
and after reviewing the main grant competitions around the world, the Chilean FNDR stood out for 
two reasons. First, the FNDR scheme has the freedom to fund almost any locally-run project of 
investment. In the words of a municipal officer, the FNDR can be described as the “do or die” in local 
investment. Thus, analysing this grant has increased my chances of capturing the essence of grant 
competition. The second reason was linked to the data availability. To be funded by the FNDR, 
projects need to be entered into an electronic platform dependant on the Ministry of Social 
Development which oversees this process. This data is available upon request by Chilean 
transparency law, enabling easy access to it.   
 
4.3.3 Data analysis 
Once my case study and grant were selected I started the construction of my data base for 
the quantitative analysis. To begin, I requested that the Ministry of Social Development provide the 
list with all the bids submitted to the FNDR by local authorities between the years 2008 to 2014 with 
their corresponding scoring and amount allocated (if any).  
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I decided to select the 2008 to 2014 time frame for two reasons. First, prior to 2007 the 
Chilean territory was divided in thirteen regions instead of the current fifteen. So, to establish 
equivalent comparisons across years, I decided to analyse competition taking place after the addition 
of the last two regions. Second, this time frame was long enough to include one presidential and two 
local elections, allowing me to control for political variables.  
My request was returned in an Excel file with more than 26.000 observations, where each 
one represented a locally submitted bid. Bearing in mind the vast amount of data available, I decided 
to start with a descriptive analysis of the FNDR to establish a base-line that could serve as a 
foundation of my research.  
To run the descriptive analysis, I added observations for the municipal demographic variables 
which I had downloaded from the Service of Municipal Information. Then, I added the municipal 
election results requested from the Electoral National Service. Once the data was set up I exported 
it to STATA to begin the analysis.    
In the descriptive analysis I split my sample by municipal size (measured by the mean 2008 to 
2014 of each municipal population) and poverty (measured by the percentage of people living above 
the poverty line). Once the data was categorised I presented some general statistics about the 
number of projects submitted by each subcategory and the FNDR funds allocated locally.  
The descriptive analysis suggested that municipalities with more poor citizens tended to 
perform worse than those that were less poor. This fact works against the FNDR equity objective and 
is a burden to deprived municipalities. To test this further, I decided to examine which were the main 
predictors of FNDR payment per head and to assess if there was any association between FNDR 
success, and a set of local capacity-related variables and controls.  
Because of the nature of the local landscape in Chile, I hypothesised that municipalities with 
better capacities and resources would be more successful than the ones with less, and that this effect 
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would intensified in regions far from Santiago (the capital). Due to its mechanism of allocation, in 
which several stages relied on the municipal capacity to write a bid, I expected to see a positive 
relationship between local capacity and FNDR funds allocation per capita.  
In this relation the outcome and dependent variable is the FNDR amount per capita allocated 
yearly in Chilean pesos and the independent variables are the municipal capacity measured by five 
indicators: percentage of affluent citizens, municipal budget per capita, investment budget, common 
fund dependence and percentage of skilled staff. These are seen as positive indicators of capacity, 
apart from common fund dependence which is seen as a negative indicator of capacity. 
I choose to run a linear regression to calculate the association between municipal capacities 
and funds allocation (Johnston and DiNardo, 1972). I also included a set of control variables to include 
the effect of some variables that could influence success in FNDR funding. These were: area in square 
kilometres of the municipality, distance to the regional capital and the match between the party of 
the Mayor and that of the President. 
For the regression model the units of analysis were the 342 Chilean municipalities that 
engaged in FNDR competition during my studied period. After running a model for all 342 
municipalities I decided to split my observations between central and peripheral regions. This division 
responds to the demographic composition of Chile where roughly 70% of the population lives in one 
of the 6 central regions (as depicted in figure 7). I then ran separate models using the same variables 
for municipalities in the central set and in the peripheral set.  
Through a Chow Test I examined if the single national model had a better fit than the separate 
central and regional subsamples. The test indicated that the two-model solution had a better fit than 




Once the statistical analysis had been carried out, I moved to the second phase. To compose 
my purposive sample of municipalities, I listed the ones with the best and worst records during 
competition. That information, in conjunction with the set of demographic variables previously 
requested, comprised the data from which I selected the municipalities to analyse in the second 
phase. These second phase procedures are detailed below. 
 
4.4 Phase Two 
 
A conclusion from the literature review was that there was a gap in the study of competitive 
grants that I wanted to bridge (Entwistle et al, 2016). Most studies of grant competition tend to put 
their analytical emphasis solely on determinants of grant payment without acknowledging contextual 
or institutional factors. While distribution depicts a key part of grant competition I argue that there 
are still other areas with potential to be explored. The FNDR allocative patterns were used to guide 
the selection of my purposive sample. By doing this I was able to assess municipalities with both 
successful and unsuccessful grant outcomes, looking for particularities in their narratives and 
examining the causes behind the allocations.  
In the course of my sample selection I also wanted to cover another gap in the literature by 
structuring a cross-institutional approach. My aim was to understand the vision of FNDR grant 
competition by including the voice not only of local but also regional and central officers. Having all 
those voices I aimed to open the procedural black-box and look for commonalities and discrepancies 
between different governmental tiers. The objective of having different groups of interviewees also 




4.4.1 Semi-structured Interview  
To collect my qualitative data I decided to use semi-structured interviews. The questionnaire 
was designed to capture the procedural elements of the project-bid formulation and to capture the 
interviewees’ personal opinions and feelings about the competitive process and the other 
protagonists. My aim was not only to understand the protocols of competition but also to examine 
the pre-conceptions and beliefs present in the central-local relationship embodied by the scheme.    
For these purposes the use of semi structured interviews was the best strategy, because it 
gave me some flexibility with the emerging topics. According to Van Manen (1984): “The point of 
phenomenological research is to borrow other people’s experiences in order to understand the 
deeper meaning of it in the context of the whole human experience. Most interpretations of the 
phenomenological method “borrow” this experience by eliciting descriptions of it from informants in 
non-structured or semi-structured interviews”(p.62). 
Qualitative methods are generally selected by researchers looking for inductively-discovered 
themes or topics where the researcher is immersed in the data without any preconceived theory. 
That is the main goal of methods such as grounded theory where codes are open and naturally 
interconnected, fostering an exploratory scrutiny of the data (Strauss and Corvin, 1994).  
Due to the nature of my research question, I decided to set up a conceptual base from which 
I could built my questionnaire. Grounded theory recommends an immersion in the social 
phenomenon with no preconceptions, but given the nature of my research and my prior knowledge, 
this idea seemed unsuitable. Instead, my instrument was based on the NPM attributes of grant 
competition. That was my point of departure and from which I expanded my analysis to new 
attributes that I wanted to explore and some emerging topics. 
As seen in the literature review, NPM is composed of a myriad practices instead of a formal 
paradigm, although scholars have concurred that, at least normatively, grant competition has four 
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main attributes (Brennan et al, 1998). According to these attributes, grant competition would: give 
best value for money, foster innovation, increase local empowerment and foster public-private 
partnerships. From these four attributes the first three were used to structure my interviews whereas 
the last one (partnership) was left out. That final topic was not included in the questionnaire because 
in Chile, as in many other countries, forming partnerships is not a formal bid requirement.   
Along with those three attributes I also incorporated two other concepts that I wanted to 
explore: the perceived fairness of the system and the effect of competition on inter-municipal 
relations. Altogether these five concepts build the foundation from which I aimed to capture my 
interviewees’ perceptions of grant competition, leaving also enough room to new concepts that may 
appear (Both selections can be seen in Table 1). 
 
  
4.4.2 Pilot stage 
Before going into the data collection stage, during December of 2015 I piloted my interview 
instrument in Chile. The main idea was to test interviewees’ understanding of questions and identify 
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any problems with its phrasing or meaning. For the pilot I interviewed a central and a local officer, 
both with considerable experience of the FNDR grants system.  
During interviews competition was found to be a difficult concept for public officers, so I had 
to consider how to ask about it in simple terms. I used both interviews to test several questions and 
also take field notes that later were used to construct my topic selection and final questionnaire. 
The pilot made me realise that officers were keener to talk about the operating systems part 
of the questionnaire as opposed to the more conceptual and less concrete areas. The process of bid 
construction was a topic where officers had more to say due to their familiarity with the scheme. 
Acknowledging this, I decided to start with a section devoted to the procedures, where respondents 
felt more comfortable, before going into more complex and abstract questions.  
With the knowledge gained through the pilot I decided to modify the phrasing of some of my 
questions to ease understanding. Finally, once the questionnaire was finished I moved into the case 
selection stages; these processes are detailed below.   
 
4.4.3 Case selection 
Given the characteristics of the Chilean local landscape, the ideal setting would have captured 
the 15 regions and 346 municipalities scattered around the territory. However, the geographical 
distance, time and budget constraints impeded such distribution, so I had to limit my selection 
according to my resources. 
Given the purposeful selection of my interviewees I did not have to select a large sample to 
make it representative. Instead I decided to interview 16 municipal and 5 regional officers. By doing 
so I could round my corpus of analysis to 20 interviews of one hour each. That seemed enough to 
capture the narratives across the competitive practices and leave space for new and unexplored 




Regions were the first strata of my selection. I selected two of the 15 Chilean regions to spread 
the sample as much as possible. The ones selected were the Metropolitan (XIII) and Bio-Bio regions 
(VIII).  
The Metropolitan region has 52 municipalities and Bio-Bio has 54; together, they account for 
nearly one third of the total municipalities in Chile (106/346). That proportion gave me enough room 
to make my selection and replace any drop-outs. At the same time, given their number, I could 
choose a mixed sample of municipalities with different characteristics, needs and realities. Finally, 
there was the potential that the large number of jurisdictions within each region would entail fierce 
competition for grants.   
 
Municipalities 
Once the two regions were selected I moved into the municipalities strata. Unlike the regional 
strata where regions were purposefully chosen, this selection was led by the data obtained in Chapter 
Six. For this, I used the record of municipal success in FNDR competition and the previously collected 
set of demographic variables to guide the selection.     
Competition can be seen as binary, defined by its results between successful and unsuccessful 
bidders. I aimed to incorporate both groups into the analysis to widen the scope of my findings. To 
avoid a selection bias, I decided to choose municipalities similar in every demographic aspect, except 
their FNDR grant per capita. In doing so, I would explicitly isolate contextual features from 
competition results.  
Since I had several demographic variables to control for, there were two statistical techniques 
that could serve my purpose: cluster and factor analysis. A description of each one and my selection 
is depicted below.  
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Factor and cluster analysis 
Factor and cluster analysis are used for data reduction and segmentation but differ in their 
overall objective. Factor analysis aims to describe the covariate relationships between several 
variables in terms of a few underlying but unobserved quantities called factors (Kline, 2014). In this 
method, factors represent underlying constructs responsible for the correlations between variables, 
echoing a theoretically prescribed structure.  
On the other hand, the aim of cluster analysis is to group objects (variables or items) based 
on certain measures or distances between variables. According to Johnson and Wichern (2004) in 
cluster analysis no assumptions are made about the number of groups or underlying structures and 
grouping is done based on the similarities or distance (dissimilarities) between observations.  
In cluster analysis, the inputs required are similarity measures or data from which similarities 
can be computed. In this regard Johnson and Wichern (2004) argue that: “In most practical 
applications of cluster analysis, the investigator knows enough about the problem to distinguish 
"good" groupings from "bad" groupings. Why not enumerate all possible groupings and select the 
"best" ones for further study” (p.671). 
Based on the rationale behind both techniques, I decide to run a cluster analysis to group my 
municipalities and select my sample of interviewees. I anticipated that the knowledge gained by the 
previous statistical analysis may help me to differentiate between clusters and select the ones that 
better serve my overall purpose.  
Using the 22 version of SPSS package, I ran a cluster analysis in each region, grouping 
municipalities according to their population, budget per capita, percentage of poor citizens and 
dependence on the common municipal fund. Normally, the number of clusters is freely decided 
based on the grouping method; in my case I decided to fix the number of clusters deliberately at 
seven. By doing so, I ensured that my sample was not over spread into several small clusters, allowing 
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me to have enough cases in each cluster and enough clusters to select and replace in case of drop 
outs.  
Once I ran the analysis I selected the municipalities with the largest and smallest FNDR grant 
per capita in each cluster. By doing that I sought to isolate as far as possible all the confounding 
variables that could impact the municipal success ratio. Whenever possible, I also selected adjoining 
municipalities to indirectly control for their geographical location.  
In the Metropolitan and Bio-Bio regions from the initial seven clusters I selected four to be 
contacted and interviewed following the method of “best” cluster selection. The selection was guided 
by the homogeneity of the demographics, the contrast in the FNDR funds per capita and the distance 
from where I was based. In each cluster I decided to contact the ones with the best and the worst 
FNDR records. When this was not possible I expanded my selection to the next jurisdiction listed in 
each cluster. Finally, in six out of the eight clusters selected I was able to contact the jurisdictions at 
each extreme of the FNDR allocation (successful and unsuccessful). Only one cluster per region was 





Participant selection – local and regional officers  
Once the clusters were set and the municipalities selected I had to choose my interviewees 
in each municipality. My aim was to capture the practices and narratives created around grant 
competition, so I had to restrict my search to officers with at least four years of experience working 
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with the FNDR. Locally, this task was usually carried out by officers working in the planning 
department of the municipalities or SECPLA in Spanish. Given the difference between jurisdictions, 
planning offices had staff numbers varying from just a few officers to a team of more than 30. Among 
them I decided to select the most experienced officers. 
To establish the first contact, I wrote a letter in which I presented myself and my research 
objectives. The letter had the logo of the University of Birmingham and the Chilean Ministry of 
Education as the heading, and it was professionally designed by a graphic designer. The letter was 
attached as an image in the body of an email and it was sent to all the potential municipalities to be 
interviewed to an email address listed on their web page (It can be seen in Appendix 1).   
The email proved to be reasonably successful and allowed me to arrange three interviews in 
the Metropolitan region but none in the Bio-Bio region. The lack of response came as no surprise 
given the large amount of emails daily received by local officers and my previous experience working 
with municipalities. To overcome this problem, I called all municipalities who had a phone number 
on their web page, referencing the email previously sent. The email gave me a cue from which I 
started conversations with municipal officers and their secretaries, who proved to be key to access 
to an officer’s schedule. After several calls, secretaries began to recognise my voice and research 
objectives, allowing the setting up of interviews.  
After two months and several phone calls, emails and visits I was able to interview 16 local 
officers from 15 different municipalities.   
To contact regional and central government officers I had to use a different approach. Since 
these officers do not usually meet the public they were harder to contact. In these cases, I relied on 
local officers help to establish the first contact. Municipal officers were extremely valuable in this 
situation and acted as gate-keepers to the inner bureaucratic mechanisms of the FNDR. Thanks to 
their help, I was able to contact and arrange meetings with five senior executives from different 
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departments. All of them had overseen FNDR competition for at least four years and had deep 
knowledge about the competitive mechanism of fund allocation. The questionnaire used in these 
interviews was a shorter version than the original one. Since this group of officers were not involved 
in local bid formulations only the second section of the questionnaire was needed. 
 
4.4.4 Interviews 
Before interviews took place, I presented my research objectives and questions. A verbal 
consent form was read, agreed and recorded in every case. Interviews ranged from 30 to 90 minutes 
and were recorded and stored using a mobile software designed for that purpose (Coggi). Interviews 
were held at officers’ personal offices or common rooms within the municipality. 
Based in my pilot interview experience, all interviews started with some warm-up questions 
associated with procedural practices and administrative responsibilities. Those topics were normally 
used to introduce the subject and make respondents more comfortable with the research objective 
and myself as interviewer. After that introductory section, I led the discussion into abstract 
perception of competitions to capture their underlying feelings and reflections.  
Officers were comfortable talking about procedures and their role in the competitions but 
sometimes struggled to evaluate the system’s effects and goals. Under these circumstances the semi-
structured questionnaire proved to be a good instrument to allow the exchange of information to 
shift from concrete facts to personal opinions and feelings.  
 
Data analysis 
Once the interviews were transcribed, I performed a thematic analysis to aggregate and 
analyse the topics that emerged. Thematic analysis is one of the most frequently used techniques to 
analyse qualitative data and its main objective is to find patterns or traits of meaning in a given 
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dataset (Joffe, 2012). My semi-structured interview was constructed based on five topics, three of 
which were theory driven while two were chosen based on my personal experience. From there I 
expanded some of the ideas that appeared throughout the interviews.  
Epistemologically, my analysis was pragmatic and followed a mixed approach in congruence with my 
research framework. Following the dichotomy made by Braun and Clarke (2006), I combined 
essential/realist1 and constructionist approaches. For Braun and Clarke (2006) within the realist 
approach: “you can theorize motivations, experiences and meaning in a straightforward way, 
because a simple, largely unidirectional relationship is assumed between meaning and experience 
and language” (p.85). One of the objectives of the interviews was to understand the practicalities of 
the competition process (times, procedures and incentives) and for that purpose a realist approach 
clearly served my plan, revealing the inner mechanisms of the project design and appraisal.  
On the other hand, in the constructivist approach: “meaning and experience are socially 
produced and reproduced, rather than inhering within individuals. Therefore, thematic analysis 
conducted within a constructionist framework cannot and does not seek to focus on motivation or 
individual psychologies, but instead seeks to theorize the sociocultural contexts, and structural 
conditions, that enable the individual accounts that are provided” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.85). My 
conceptualisation of grant competition was also linked to a constructionist approach because I aimed 
to identify how grant competition was part of a bigger conception of the central-local relationship. 
The stories and narratives articulated by the interviewees indirectly revealed their level of local 
ownership and depicted the relation between the different governmental tiers. In Chile municipalities 
have historically been framed as the less powerful among governmental institutions. My interviews 
tried to test whether that feeling permeated grant competition processes and how that feeling 
impacted officers’ visions toward the competition and local development more generally. 
                                               
1 Braun and Clark refer to the post-positivist approach as realist or essential 
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Since only the second section of the questionnaire was administered to central and regional 
officers the analysis was slightly different. Without the procedural part, the analysis was focused on 
the effects of competition and their reflections about it. During the analysis, I differentiated between 
officers’ tiers to contrast their narratives and look for similitudes and differences. 
The qualitative analysis was initially framed under the three attributes of grant competition 
identified in the literature; value for money, local empowerment and innovation (Brennan et al, 
1998). These three attributes were used as meta-coding structures and composed of several 
subtopics. Within the topics, local, regional and central perspectives were mixed in a grid of multiple 
voices, where successful and unsuccessful jurisdictions were interlocked. Besides these three 
attributes, I purposefully include two more topics that I wanted to test; the fairness of the system 
and its impact in local collaborations. Finally, I built another code rooted in several emerging topics 
(Topics and sub-topics can be seen in Table 3). This new code represented the local appropriation of 




4.4.5 Analysis Chapter  
Once the quantitative and qualitative data were analysed, Chapter Eight presents the final 
stage of the analysis commonly denominated in the literature as data integration. 
This idea of fleshing out the relation between the two data sources is supported by Cresswell 
(2014) who argues that: “After the researcher presents the general quantitative and then qualitative 
results, a discussion should follow that specifies how the qualitative results help to expand or explain 
the quantitative results” (p.225).  
As previously seen, the quantitative analysis fed my sample selection and stressed some of 
the topics that were later included in the questionnaire. This kind of integration occurred within the 
data analysis and facilitated a more robust approach to the phenomenon studied. Nevertheless, the 
link between the two sources of data still left space available to explore. Because of that, I devote the 
last analytical chapter to integrating the contextual, quantitative and qualitative chapters of the 
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analysis into one independent unit. According to Creswell et al (2003) the most common case of 
integration is the one that occurs at the analysis and interpretation stage after both sources of data 
have been collected.  
In Chapter Eight, the links between findings are grouped by themes; in them I present how 
allocative patterns could be understood in terms of practices and conceptions of competition. I also 
incorporate historical and institutional elements to compose my reflections and give an overarching 
perspective.  
Chapter Eight follows a general order of ideas beginning with conceptions of grant 
competition to then move into an NPM conceptualisation and finishes with the particularities of the 
Chilean case. In this phase of the analysis I link my different sources of data to present interconnected 
findings. This process proved to be a fruitful one, contributing to the articulation of ideas about 
grants, competition and local government administration.  
   
4.5 Research ethics  
 
Conducting ethical research demands a reflection about the role taken by the researcher, 
interviewees, the data gathering process and the protocols followed to ensure privacy.  Below, I 
present the steps that I followed to secure an ethically informed research.  
The contextual and quantitative chapters of this research were composed by reference to 
secondary sources of public data, so they did not raise any ethical considerations. In contrast, in the 
qualitative phase I had to take measures to secure the confidentiality of my interviewees. While my 
subject of study was not especially sensitive, the continuous reference to other figures of a public 
organisation or the public organisation itself made me aware of the importance of privacy. 
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At an early stage the project received the ethical approval from the University of Birmingham 
Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee, showing that my research procedures 
were in conformance with the strict rules determined by the University and the Department 
(Appendix 2).  
From the first contact via email or phone, to the face-to-face interviews I followed the same 
protocol when presenting myself and my research objectives. Before interviews took place, I allowed 
a few minutes to introduce my role as student-researcher and my objectives. Then, I verbally gained 
informed consent from each one of my interviewees. The consent was recorded and stored as the 
first section of each interview.  According to Traianau (2014): “When informed consent is judged to 
be a requirement, the researcher must reflect on how this can be best secured: what is needed if 
people are to be properly informed … and how can one be sure that people are in a position to freely 
consent or decline to be involved in the research?“ (p.64). 
After gaining consent I left a space of time to respond to any query before interviews began. 
I also informed respondents that they could withdraw at any time and were not required to respond 
to any question if they found it especially sensitive or they just did not want to be recorded. 
Once the data was collected, responses were anonymised in all the analyses. Personal names 
were deleted, and all the quotes incorporated in the analysis were referenced by the officer’s position 
and the tier ascribed; local, regional or central without any other recognisable feature. Finally, in the 
application for the ethical approval I detailed how interviews as well as other sources of data were 






4.6 Conclusions     
 
The objective of this chapter was to outline my methodological approach and its capacity to 
fit my research goals. In this chapter I have explained how pragmatism was used as my 
epistemological standpoint from which I selected my methods and research framework. Pragmatism, 
despite not being as grounded in theory as post-positivism or constructivism, has been able to build 
a case for research designs where multiple methods of data collection are available. This approach 
was adequate to assess grant competition where different tiers of government are interchangeably 
involved. The capacity to incorporate allocative patterns as well as personal narratives allowed me to 
deliver better insights and arguments.  
The sequential approach of methodological phases allowed me to incorporate the 
quantitative analysis (phase one) into the qualitative section (phase two). The integration of the 
sources of data was then reinforced in the last analytical chapter where these findings were linked 
with the Chilean contextual setting described in Chapter Five.  
Following that, the data analysis processes were depicted, fleshing out the connection 
between linear regression results and the sample design. Finally, I presented the steps followed to 














The aim of this chapter is to set the thesis within a historic and institutional framework. 
According to White and Adam (1995) understanding the context is essential to capture fully the scope 
of a research subject. Thus, in the following sections I present the actors, policies and institutions 
involved in the process of local grant competition in Chile.   
The chapter begins with a brief characterisation of the political milestones on which Chilean 
municipalities were built. The ideas presented are non-exhaustive and were purposefully selected to 
shed light on the overall objectives of the thesis. I place special attention on the origins of subnational 
authorities (regional and local), tracing their performance across different periods of time.  
Once the historical background is set, the second section defines the role of municipalities, 
describing their organisation, legal attributes and main responsibilities. Here, I detail the sources of 
local funding, addressing the main fiscal issues experienced by municipalities as local administrators 
and service providers.  
The third and final section is devoted to the role played by grants at the municipal level. Here 
I introduce the reader to the FNDR, the main source of local investment and my subject of enquiry. 
Once I flesh out the operational processes of the FNDR I present the main scholarly debates about 
its distribution and effects. 
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5.2 A brief history of Chilean Municipalities   
 
The aim of this section is to address the facts and ideas that historically defined the way 
municipalities work and administer their jurisdictions. The subsections below are chronologically 
ordered and were selected to frame my research questions. Below, I depict the establishment of 
regional and local governments in Chile reviewing their administrative role and interplay with central 
government.  
 
5.2.1 The origins 
Santiago, the capital of the General Captaincy of Chile, was founded on the 12th February in 
the year 1541 by the Spaniard Diego de Almagro. Since then, it has been the centre of commerce and 
administration of the Chilean territory. Despite its geographical characteristics, marked by a 4,000 
kilometre coast line and the Andes mountain range, by the year 1834 only 9.6% of its one million 
population was living in Santiago (Gobierno de Chile, 1835).   
According to Hevia (2015) it was not until the middle of the twentieth century when country-
city migration (largely fostered by industrialisation processes) started to overcrowd Santiago. By the 
year 1970, nearly 40% of the total population was concentrated in Santiago, defining a pattern that 
has been sustained in a relatively stable way until today. 
Although there were other futile efforts, the first formal constitution that built the basis of 
the Chilean nation was written in the year 1833 by the jurist Mariano Egaña. This constitution gave 
clear predominance to the figure of the President who had the ambition to eliminate the emerging 
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“provincial assemblies”2 and concentrate all the functions on the executive power (Campos, 1983). 
The constitution of 1833 had a clear Borbonic influence and resembled the eminent figure of the 
Spaniard monarch who was the sole sovereign and ruler above any popular will.  
Diego Portales, the main ideologist behind the 1833 constitution, played a significant role in 
the institutional configuration of Chile. Among several reforms, he decided to delegate to the 
presidentially appointed figures of the Intendentes, the central government voice in the newly 
formed regions. According to Boisier (2000) Portales was the historical figure who: “consolidated the 
Chilean state as centralist, this influence would extend from 1833 to 1891, but its intellectual 
influence would last until the constitution of 1980. Portales made Intendentes the central piece of 
centralism, making them direct agents of the President, appointed by him, responsible to him and 
committed to execute his orders in the territory under their command” (p.83). 
Municipalities in the constitution of 1833 were responsible for primary public education, 
health and public infrastructure among other remits. Their administration and management was 
nevertheless decided by centrally appointed officers and responded to the interests of the 
Intendentes. So, it was not until 1891, when the law of the Autonomous Comuna (municipality) was 
passed, that popularly elected mayors were designated responsible for the administration of local 
jurisdictions.    
 
The beginning of the twentieth century  
The second milestone in the configuration of Chilean municipalities was the constitution of 
1925. Here, we find the first section is devoted to the decentralised administration of the Chilean 
territory. Although the section was merely normative and without any specific arrangements, it 
                                               
2 These assemblies were held for a short period of time (1825 – 1831) in the regions of Coquimbo, Concepcion and 
Santiago. They embodied a federalist will of self-determination that lost influence with the emergence of a centralised 
estate (Arias, 2010). 
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included the first subdivision of the territory into provinces and comunas3. The configuration of the 
constitution was led by the President Alessandri-Palma and aimed to eliminate any sign of the 
parliamentarist movement initiated at the beginning of the twentieth century. For that reason, the 
constitution had a clear centralist ethos.  
According to Hevia (2015), the constitution of 1925 played an important role in defining the 
municipal scope of action dividing jurisdictions’ administration (exercised by the municipality) from 
their political management and decision-making (led by the Intendente and the executive power). 
The division between local government and administration was decisive and marked a disjunction 
that defined the role of local authorities through history.  
Infante (1973) argued that under the 1925 constitution, Intendentes were entitled to act as 
“small local presidents” overseeing every important decision. The Intendentes’ power was so decisive 
that they could even veto municipal mayors in office and appoint mayors in municipalities with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants. The control they exercised diminished the authority of the municipal 
mayors, who were commonly seen as mere executors of central decisions.  
Between the constitution of 1925 and the military coup of 1973, local development was 
driven by the industrialisation of the thirteen newly-formed regions and the first efforts to execute a 
national plan of development. This period of industrialisation began during the years following the 
Second World War and aimed to expand the capacities of each region. In that respect, some of the 
policies implemented enjoyed relative success, such as the nationalisation of the copper mines, the 
construction of industrial hubs and land reform (Hevia, 2015).  
Since regions were the main subject of the industrial reforms, during this time local 
governments were to a large extent left out of the debate. For Boisier (1984), the process of 
                                               
3 Comuna refers to the geographical space comprised by each jurisdiction whereas municipality refers to the institution 
that led the local authority  
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decentralisation was economically driven and with a decided top-down perspective unheeding of the 
geographical heterogeneity of the country. Moreover, the concentration of investment in a few 
regional capitals fostered country-city migrations, widening the differences between jurisdictions. 
This was especially acute considering the lack of means that municipalities had to respond to the 
influx of citizens coming from the country.  
 
5.2.2 The military coup of 1973 
The morning of the 11th September 1973, General Pinochet, allied with the generals of the 
remaining armed forces overthrew the government of the socialist President Salvador Allende 
through a military coup. From the beginning of his regime Pinochet wanted to re-shape the way Chile 
was territorially governed to secure its control. Therefore, one of the first measures taken was the 
fusion and centralisation of the municipal administration and political decision-making. Pinochet and 
the other generals established what they called a Doctrine of National Security on which 
municipalities were one more link in the hierarchical structure of command.  
Pinochet dismissed the Congress and all the political parties in what has been described as 
the biggest concentration of power ever seen in Chilean history (Diaz, 1993). According to Angell et 
al (2001): “The intentions of the military regime were to strengthen, not weaken, central control by 
incorporating regions and municipalities into a hierarchical system of authoritarian domination” 
(p.79). 
After seven years in power and with increasing international pressure, Pinochet decided to 




The role of municipalities during the dictatorship  
The Generals wanted to de-politicise the role of public administration, setting a system where 
the rules of market were responsible for the delivery of goods and services (Hevia, 2015). This process 
was finally embodied in the constitution of 1980. This constitution, written by the initiators of the 
coup, aimed to secure the legacy of the regime and relieve some of the international pressure raised 
by the documented violations of human rights.  
In this new constitution Pinochet imposed deep neoliberal reforms on the economy and 
public administration fields. Among these reforms he decided to transfer several responsibilities to 
local authorities. According to Vergara et al (1999) the delegation of administrative powers to lower 
tiers of government responded to an instrumental vision of local authorities where: “The global plan 
of the neoliberal model imposed by the coup, did not mind about the causes of social issues and only 
cared about the return to the investment made. In this sense the socio-political management of 
municipalities responded to an efficiency seek of the investment made by the state instead of 
fulfilling a democratic objective. That could explain the technocratic structure given to the 
municipalities” (p.104).   
During this time, municipalities also began to be responsible for (among other functions) 
primary health and public education, local planning, urban regulation and social assistance. Despite 
the relevance of these tasks, municipalities were mere executors of decisions taken higher up in the 
chain of command without enough resources or real possibilities to influence their implementation.  
For Eaton (2004) transferring responsibilities without the adequate resources to pay for the 
services: “was part and parcel of Pinochet’s attempt to shrink the size and relevance of the central 
state and encourage the privatization of social services” (p.230).  
For Valdivia (2015) the delegation of these functions responded to a strategy to isolate and 
atomise the social demands, giving them voice but no vote in a context where municipalities had 
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almost no institutional relevance. One famous quote of General Pinochet embodies this matter 
succinctly: “The administration can be decentralized, the power…never” (Boisier, 2011, p.7).    
During these years, municipalities received resources based on the number of citizens 
enrolled and eligible to receive centrally designed services. This system provided two benefits to the 
military regime. First, central government had total compliance from municipalities, who did not have 
any other alternative to fund their services and respond to social demands. Second, the data locally 
captured was centrally collected and managed as a source of surveillance and control.   
The central transfers devoted to public services were decided by the number of beneficiaries 
registered in each case, so they were not part of the municipal own-budget (were not considered 
self-revenues). Thus, in terms of fiscal reform, the regime designed three different funding 
mechanisms. First, municipalities received a fraction of the land tax, business tax and vehicle tax 
registered in their jurisdiction. Second, all local authorities were part of a horizontal equity fund called 
the Common Municipal Fund. This fund was composed of a fraction of the local tax revenues and 
each year the funds were collected, pooled together and divided by a formula based in the municipal 
poverty level and other demographic variables (this will be analysed further in section 5.3.2). Finally, 
municipalities competed for several funds like the FNDR (this will be explained in section 5.4.2).  
 
Pinochet’s legacy  
The constitution of 1980 established that eight years after its enactment a national 
referendum would be held to decide the future of the regime. In this year – 1988 – a majority voted 
against Pinochet’s regime, so it was decided that for the first time after 17 years, democratic elections 
would take place in the year 1990. In those elections Patricio Aylwin, the candidate opposing 
Pinochet, defeated Hernan Buchi (Pinochet’s representative), establishing the return of Chilean 
democracy.   
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The legacy of the Pinochet dictatorship has been largely debated by academics. For some, the 
measures taken by the dictator were the key to taking Chile out of economic stagnation and paved 
the way to building the so called “Chilean miracle” of growth. This current of thought has been 
supported by economists such as David Hojman, Barry Boswirth and Raul Laban among others. For 
them, Chilean growth can be explained due to Pinochet’s adherence to the classical economic 
development doctrine based on liberalisation, free trade and limited state size (Richards, 1997). 
Macroeconomic data may support the above idea. According to Serven and Solimano (1993) after 
the exchange rate-base was stabilised in 1984, Chile experienced six years of expansion with 
moderate inflation and reduction of the debt ratios. This translated into an annual growth rate of 
GDP of 6.3 percent between 1984 and 1989 (Serven and Solimano, 1993). This set of macroeconomic 
policies was then continued once democracy returned in 1990. Until the Asian financial crisis of 1997, 
Chile had 18 years of continuous economic expansion helping to build the legend of its economic 
success (Valenzuela, 1997).  
Nevertheless this current of thought has been also highly contested by scholars arguing that 
the liberalisation and market-led policies implemented by Pinochet had detrimental effects among 
different groups of the society. Drake and Frank (2004) studied the human underside of the Chilean 
miracle and stressed the harsh inequalities that persisted beyond the growth and low inflation figures 
highlighted under Pinochet’s regime. Drake and Frank use the concept of “Two Chiles” to embody 
the representation of a society segmented by class, where just a few were able to see the fruits of 
economic growth whilst workers’ real wages stagnated and labour rights faltered.  
Indigenous people were also affected during the Pinochet regime. A study led by Richards 
(2013) found that during reforms, the Mapuches (an Indigenous group from the south of Chile) 
suffered political persecution, economic exploitation and racial oppression. Richards argues that 
most of the neoliberal reforms benefited local elites and corporations who damaged the soil and 
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drained the water sources used by the Mapuches. Schneider (1993) also rebuts the shared 
enthusiasm about the economic model implemented by Pinochet. She argues that despite the ability 
of the Chilean economy to yield high economic growth, for most of the working poor the model was 
not miraculous at all. Deepening this idea Schneider (1993) argues that during Pinochet’s regime: 
“The relative inequality of income between the top and bottom fifths of the population increased 
dramatically since the implementation of the new economic model. In 1969 the income share of the 
wealthiest fifth of the population was 44.5% as compared with 7.6% for the poorest fifth. By 1988 
that ratio was 54.6% to 4.4%” (p.5). 
Pinochet’s dictatorship is one of the most controversial topics in recent Chilean history. Along 
with the horrible and systematic violations to human rights, Pinochet’s dictatorship must be recalled 
as the period where Chile’s institutional configuration was set. The economic development of the last 
years of the regime built the foundations for the most successful period in Chilean history. These 
accomplishments, nevertheless, have been overshadowed by the rising inequality and regional 
underdevelopment that emerged as a side effect of the forcefully implemented reforms (Works, 
2003; Gonzalez and Van Treek, 2018).  
 
The return to democracy 
After Pinochet’s defeat in the 1988 referendum and the subsequent election of Patricio 
Aylwin in 1990, Chile finally returned to democracy. Nevertheless the transition was accompanied by 
the close supervision of the armed forces that, before leaving power, established a system to secure 
their legacy and legal impunity4. The reinstalled political parties fought to make several amendments 
                                               




to the constitution of 1980, trying to unblock the authoritarian ties left by the coup. Local 
administration nevertheless was one of the areas which remained mostly unaltered.  
One of the first constitutional amendments that was passed, established that mayors would 
be democratically elected instead of being appointed by the President. Along with this, Regional 
Governments were subject to several modifications. As previously noted, the figure of the Intendente 
has been present in the Chilean administration as far as 1833. During the dictatorship Intendentes 
were installed as the presidential voice in the regions.  
In the democratic re-instalment the Intendente was maintained as the government 
representative of the region, leaving the new regional council as the region’s administrators. This 
reform had a deep impact on the institutional framework. Orellana et al (2016) argues that 
Intendentes act as presidential representatives with no incentive to act for the benefit of the region 
if this could entail a problem with Santiago. De-coupling political management from regional 
administration restricts municipalities in their capacity to raise local issues to a regional scale. 
During the negotiations of the constitutional reforms, the regional and local governmental 
tiers were stripped of any power to levy their own taxes, or even modify the tax rates decided 
centrally. According to Hevia (2015) this restriction was made by the Congress while they were 
working on the constitutional amendments. As Hevia puts it (2015): “One of the reforms sent by the 
executive power to the congress established that within the legal frameworks, certain taxes could be 
levied by regional and local authorities. But in the law finally approved, the word levied was change 
by the word applied. This change was made with the clear purpose of making them passive tax 
recipients, fostering an administrative decentralization and impeding a political decentralization” (p. 
50).  
For Boisier (2011) the Chilean political establishment have never been in favour of political 
decentralisation, if it means the decentralisation of decision-making power. He argues that the 
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arrangements made after Pinochet have been devoted to oiling the administrative machinery 
without questioning who is the one behind the wheel. Moreover, the lack of political and fiscal 
powers makes subnational authorities unable to establish their own models of growth and constrains 
them to follow centrally-constructed and standardised plans.   
The last milestone analysed in this section is the reform implemented by President Michelle 
Bachelet on 2009. This package of reforms was the fruit of nearly nine years of political negotiation 
in Congress but regardless of this long time frame, it did not dramatically change the situation 
previously presented (Hevia, 2015). Besides some minor modifications the key aspect of these 
reforms was the democratic election of the regional councillors. Regional councillors represent the 
administrative arm of the regional government. They play an important role allocating FNDR funds 
and discussing the regional plans of development with the Intendente and the local mayors. But, due 
to the “symbolic” relevance of the regional plan, the role of regional councillors is restricted to the 
FNDR allocation. The effects of this limited action are described in section 7.2.3.  
 
5.2.3 Chile and NPM  
After this brief review of the history that shaped local governments, in this next section I 
describe how NPM was adopted by Chilean public administration. I argue that because of its 
structural and historical characteristics, Chilean public administration installed NPM as one of its main 
paradigms, strengthening the role of competition across jurisdictions. 
Under General Pinochet’s rule, the Chilean territory was divided into thirteen regions to 
enable their control and surveillance. As contradictory as it may sound, Pinochet transferred central 
functions to regions and municipalities to enhance central planning and control. Under this system 
each administrative level was seen as a link in the strict chain of command (McGinn and Street, 1986).  
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The reforms implemented during the eighties by Pinochet’s regime had a strong economic 
and financial component aimed at dismantling the role played by the state during the socialist 
government of Salvador Allende. This set of reforms had an enormous impact on the public 
administration system: reducing its size, redefining its fields of action and diminishing its impact. 
Consequently, public administration found itself in second place compared with the role played by 
the market and the forces of privatised services (Araya and Cerpa, 2008).  
Pinochet’s regime established the idea that the state was inefficient and politically dangerous, 
so little effort was put into increasing its performance or capacity. According to Olavarria et al (2011) 
the priority of the military regime was to reduce the size and role played by the state. Subsequently, 
they relied on the advice of a group of young economists recently graduated from the Chicago school 
of Economics to lead the reforms.  
The group of scholars, colloquially called the “Chicago Boys”, were inspired by Milton 
Friedman and advocated the privatisation of the state and the reduction of its size and scope. As seen 
in section 2.2 of this thesis, the Chicago school of Economics was a main hub for rational choice 
theorists and NPM supporters. This probably permeated the decisions made by the Chicago Boys and 
the following implementation of the first NPM reforms in Chile. 
During these years, Pinochet privatised most of the services delivered by the state and 
opened Chile to the global market. He also enacted the municipalisation of primary education and 
health, shifting state responsibilities from central government to the recently-created municipalities 
(Diaz, 1993). As expected, deprived and small municipalities were economically incapable of 
administering the devolved services, so they usually had to rely on central government transfers to 
avoid declaring bankruptcy. Since then, municipalities have been often seen prejudicially as being 
bad administrators and are considered to be incapable of administering external funds to central 
government standards.  
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Once democracy was re-installed the Chilean political elite, probably inspired by their years 
living in exile, decided to replicate Thatcher’s initiatives to modernise public administration. 
According to Armijo (2000) the influence of NPM and the UK experience was clearly visible in Chile 
where: “The processes experienced since 1994 seek to introduce new logics in the way public 
institutions act, emphasising a managerial character in detriment of a procedural one including 
efficiency and quality as the main guidelines” (p.19).  
This adaptation nevertheless was not as smooth as the senior officers predicted it would be. 
The years of relegation and the dismantlement of civil service careers had had an important effect 
on Chilean public administration. According to the World Bank, (2003) when they are not carefully 
implemented NPM reforms in developing countries may impose high transaction costs that may 
outweigh efficiency gains. The World Bank (2003) proposed that the problem with NPM is not 
deciding the objectives to achieve but how to actually get there. For them the solution for this issue 
would be: “choosing and sequencing public sector reforms carefully, in line with initial capacities, to 
create firmer ground for further reform. Pragmatic, incremental reforms in weak institutional 
environments— strategic incrementalism—can alleviate, if not fully resolve, accountability problems 
while creating the conditions for deeper change by modifying incentives and building capacity to 
respond to the next stage of reforms” (World Bank, 2003, p.194). 
The danger of implementing NPM reforms in weak administrative systems is that they could 
increase efficiency at the cost of equity (World Bank, 2003). As Haldenwag (2005) suggests, NPM 
measures do not improve efficiency by themselves; they need more changes in the incentive 
structure to be successful. Olavarria et al (2011) argues that NPM reforms in Chile were introduced 
after the period of President Aylwin (1990-1994) and were led by a group of enthusiastic senior 
officers that influenced the institutionalisation of the reforms under the rule of President Frei. 
However, these reforms were steered by an elite group but never rooted in the public administration 
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system or shared with the political parties or other stakeholders. Therefore, after the period of 
President Frei (1994-2000), NPM reforms lost traction in the political agenda, hampering their 
consolidation, and remained as a system of single and disconnected measures. This situation 
according to Olavarria et al (2011): “shows that in the Chilean case there wasn’t a high rationality in 
the efforts to modernize (public administration) but instead they were led by the circumstances, 
making us think that the reforms were not following a plan” (p.76). 
To sum up, NPM reforms in Chile were introduced by force. Then, these reforms were led by 
senior officers unable to install a comprehensive plan without stakeholders’ support and based on a 
weakened public administrative system. Under these conditions, competition was installed and has 
become one of the main paradigms of Chilean public administration. 
The aim of the previous subsections has been to explain briefly the development of 
subnational authorities in Chile. Due to the vast quantity of data I purposively selected the topics that 
could shed light onto the configuration of local authorities. This first section of this chapter has served 
as an introduction to the thesis featuring some of the theoretical debates that will be discuss later 
on.  
Since its origins, Chile has been defined as a centralist country. This is in part explained by the 
Spanish-Borbonic legacy of a central and monolithic figure of power embodied by a sole and absolute 
ruler. The Spanish influence was absorbed by the political figures of the time and translated into the 
constitution of 1833, trying to bring order into an institutional chaos.  
The influence of 1833 constitution was deep and institutionalised the role of the Intendente 
as the regional advisor and sole deputy of the political power to the detriment of local authorities. 
The dissociation between government and administration, despite being installed long ago, was 
never reversed, leaving local authorities without a significant voice.  
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The efforts made to industrialise and deconcentrate the economic development fell short 
under the Pinochet dictatorship. The Junta installed a mixed model where government was 
centralised, and service delivery was decentralised among local authorities. This model of 
management was then influenced by NPM and served to fulfil the goals of the military Junta who 
wanted to delegate operation whilst maintaining control.  
The model implemented by the Junta was so impeccably designed that even after 30 years of 
democratic governments it has not suffered severe changes (Garreton and Antonio, 1999). 
Moreover, until today, National Congress and the executive power do not have any incentive to 
increase local powers and change the current set of regulations if that could diminish their local 
functions, so institutional asymmetry prevails.                
 
5.3 Local authorities and their (lack of) fiscal powers  
  
As seen above, the contextual particularities of Chilean history are important in 
understanding the role of local authorities. Following that line of thought, the objective of this next 
section is to detail municipal functions and responsibilities and to flesh out the relation between the 
different tiers of government. The section begins by describing the Chilean subnational framework 
comprised of regional and local tiers of government; it then moves into the fiscal capacities exercised 
by local governments and their different sources of funding. Due to its relevance, I also detail the role 
played by the horizontal equity fund (Common Municipal fund). Finally, I briefly describe the current 




5.3.1 Local Powers   
Municipalities in Chile are recognised as self-governing entities, autonomous and with their 
own legal personality and assets/resources. According to Law Nr 18.695 local governments in Chile 
have several statutory competences which can be broadly divided between exclusive competences 
and non-exclusive competences. Among exclusive competences we can find municipal zoning plans, 
local development, local transport regulation, urbanism and construction norms and hygiene; in all 
these, municipalities are solely responsible. Non-exclusive competences are shared responsibilities 
where municipalities act as agents of central government. These responsibilities include: public 
health, primary and secondary education, social housing, sanitary infrastructure, citizen safety, 
training and economic development, traffic regulations, tourism and culture (Ministerio del Interior, 
2006).  
As well as these, new tasks are often given to municipalities, increasing their already tight 
workload. In this regard the OECD (2017) argues: “Municipalities are sometimes identified as ‘service 
supermarkets’. This situation tends to increase the burden on municipalities as they do not have 
adequate human, technical and financial resources, raising questions about the efficiency and quality 
of the municipal services” (p. 15).     
Chilean municipalities are tied to the territory they govern, commonly referred to as 
“comunas” (a loose translation of county). Each municipality is governed by an elected body 
composed of a Mayor and a council; both are renewable after a period of four years. The local council 
is composed of six, eight or ten councillors, depending on the number of inhabitants living in the 
comuna. As discussed in the previous section, after Pinochet’s regime, the first elections where 
mayors and councillors were democratically elected was held in 1992.  
Mayors in Chile are the executive body of the municipality and lead the plan of territorial 
development. Councillors on the other hand, are a collegiate body in charge of overseeing the 
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performance of Mayors and approve the annual municipal budget as one of their main 
responsibilities.  
 
The regional government GORE 
The regional government (known as GORE by its initials in Spanish) is the second tier of the 
Chilean public administration. It is composed of the Intendente, who acts as its president, and the 
collegiate regional council who represent the territorial interests. The Intendente is appointed by the 
President whereas the regional council has been democratically elected since 2013 for a renewable 
four-year period. Previously councillors were appointed by the municipal council.  
The Intendentes play a double role as heads of the regional governments and representative 
of the national government in each region, but as Martelli and Valenzuela (1999) suggest: “when 
these two roles come into conflict, it is the latter that tends to prevail” (p. 12). One of the main 
particularities of the regional government is that they do not have independent tax raising powers 
and instead must rely entirely on the funds that are budgeted for them in the centrally decided annual 
budgeting process (Eaton, 2004). 
GOREs are responsible for the creation of two plans. The Regional Development Strategy 
which defines socio-economic objectives and the Regional Urban Development Plan that describes 
the land use for each region. Despite their normative importance none of these plans is legally 
binding for subordinate land use of local planning (OECD, 2017). 
According to the OECD (2017) GORES in Chile have very limited autonomy and act mainly as 
vehicles of central transfers to municipalities. In these transfers, national ministries control the 
specific orientation and technical aspects whilst GORES are involved in how and where to locate the 
resources (OECD, 2009). Among the four different sources of funding that GORES can regionally 
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administer the FNDR represents 65% of the total (OECD, 2009). Due its importance the FNDR will be 
analysed independently in the last subsection of this chapter. 
   
5.3.2 Local funding sources 
In this section I describe the different local funding sources. Some parts of the section are 
more developed than others according to their relevance to the thesis.  
Despite being the only subnational tier of government allowed to tax its residents and charge 
for services, municipal capacities to define rates and introduce new taxes is almost non-existent. As 
in many other countries the main source of local tax revenue is the property tax. This tax is levied at 
a centrally determined rate and has several tax rebates and surcharges which limit local decision. The 
second local tax is levied on car licenses. This tax is detached from the owner’s residence, so it can 
be paid in any municipality, increasing the competition to attract new tax payers.     
The third source of revenue comes from local charges. Business licenses are paid by 
commercial activities undertaken in the comuna and represent the second main source of local 
funding. Along with these, local authorities can charge for services of garbage collection, urbanisation 
and construction permits, advertising publicly displayed, transfers of vehicles and many other minor 
sources. 
The fourth source is the locally collected tax called the Common Municipal Fund. This fund 
acts as a horizontal equity scheme that redistributes revenues from rich to poor municipalities and it 
is financed by a proportion of the revenues obtained by local taxes. The operation of this fund is 
detailed at the end of this subsection.   
The final source of local funding is constituted by grants and transfers from central 
government. These come in two types: firstly, earmarked grants, which are paid based on the number 
of citizens enrolled in public schools (primary and secondary) and primary health institutions. These 
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funds are subject to multiple increases depending on the risk factors that citizens/customers may 
present.  
The second type is centrally allocated grants. These are commonly divided regarding their 
magnitude. The Programme for Urban Improvement (PMU) and the Programme for Neighbourhood 
Improvement (PMB) are small grants designed to tackle infrastructure and water deficits. Finally, the 
National Fund for Regional Development (FNDR) is responsible for funding all local investment 
projects of middle and large scale. All different sources are depicted below in Figure 3. 
 
Main debates on local funding 
Having set out the sources of local funding, I discuss below the main debates on subnational 
expenditures. For simplicity, I address the core debates in two parts: first I describe subnational 
expenditures and then analyse their effects on local jurisdictions.   
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Chile’s municipal expenditure per capita is among the lowest of the OECD countries, standing 
at USD 648, which is nearly ten times less than all the 32 remaining countries (OECD, 2017). Looking 
at this figure as a percentage of total public expenditure and GDP sheds more light on this matter. 
While the average of the OECD subnational expenditure accounts for 40% of the total public 
expenditure and 16% of the GDP, in Chile it reached 13.3% of the total and just 3% of the GDP. This 
could be due the lack of regional tax capacities and the local dependence on centrally decided 
funding. As a result, the OECD in 2017 reported that Chile was one of the most centralised countries 
in the world. 
Regionalisation policies implemented in the second half of the twentieth century fostered the 
emergence of two main poles of development, one located close to the copper mines in the north 
and another located near the political and administrative power at the centre. Despite their effect, 
none of the measures taken has been able to moderate these historical differences so they have 
remained stable.  
Locally speaking, Chile has been commonly defined as uneven; this can be explained by the 
geographical physiognomy of the territory and the irregular distribution of resources. In terms of 
magnitude, in 51 of the 345 municipalities in Chile the population is more than 100,000 whereas in 
47 it is less than 5,000. Regarding poverty we can find municipalities with poverty rates ranging from 
0.3% (Vitacura) to almost 60% (Alto Bio-Bio) and overall, one out of five jurisdictions have a poverty 
rate over 30%. In 39 municipalities, the per capita expenditure is 800 USD or more whereas in others 
this sum is less than 150 USD. Despite these differences, and according to the law, all municipalities 
share the same responsibilities and follow the same norms.  
Part of these differences can be explained by the local funding mechanisms, which rely on the 
taxation of wealth-related assets such as properties, cars and businesses. Municipalities generate 
their own revenue (outside grants) through business licenses (34% of the total), property taxes (32%) 
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and car licenses (11%) (OECD, 2013). The dependence on these assets for revenue generation 
reinforces the income gap between municipalities with rich and poor citizens.  
 
Local tax collection 
Among scholars the local tax system has been characterised as rigid, centrally determined 
and insufficiently developed (Pineda et al, 2018; OECD, 2017). Locally, municipalities have almost no 
capacity to influence tax bases and set tax rates so their autonomy is highly questionable.  
The territorial tax is a clear example of the latter. Municipalities in Chile cannot set the rate 
of this tax, nor can they influence the long list of total and partial exonerations that are provided by 
central government. In 273 out of the 346 municipalities 95% of the households are exempted from 
paying the territorial tax and overall only 22% of the households are subject to it (Razmilic, 2014).  
Households of an assessed value of less than £23,000 are exempt from the territorial tax, 
eroding the capacity of the municipalities to collect revenues and resulting in a loss of over one third 
of the potential tax collection (OECD, 2017). Thus, the households exempt from the land tax are 
concentrated in the poorest comunas of Chile, which affects these comunas’ capacity to deliver their 
much-needed services.  
The disconnection of tax agreement driven by the tax exemptions also has a political effect, 
as the OECD (2017) suggests: “The tax is not only a matter of financial tools; it is also a vital link 
between citizens and the community… the disappearance of the fiscal link (via exemptions) dilutes 
the tax agreement, a prerequisite to the proper functioning of a modern and developed society” 
(p.27). 
The transfers from central government are insufficient to cover the loss of the exempted 
proprieties so municipalities with the poorest citizens and greatest needs have the smallest tax bases 
from which to generate revenue.  
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Regarding the business tax the situation follows a similar path. In this case municipalities can 
set the rate between the 2.5 – 5% of the value of the company’s capital which is centrally recorded. 
But despite this, local authorities have little space to operate and there is no incentive in place to 
prompt an even distribution. Because of this, nearly 80% of income from municipal business permits 
is concentrated in municipalities mainly located in Santiago (OECD, 2017).    
Vehicle tax is nationally determined so there is no local variation. Regardless of this, more 
than two thirds of the revenues are redistributed via the Common Municipal Fund. The remaining 
fees and services tend to be modest and concentrated in major urban municipalities.  
 
The Common Municipal Fund 
The Common Municipal Fund functions as a redistributive source of locally collected 
revenues. In it, all jurisdictions contribute with part of their revenues (between 50 and 60%) that are 
then redistributed nationally according to poverty indexes. The contribution of central government 
is modest (around 4% of the total) so the fund is almost entirely locally-raised.  
The variables that compose the distribution formula of the fund do not incorporate any tax-
effort or capacity related variables so there is a lack of incentive to stimulate tax collection or fiscal 
responsibility (Bravo, 2014). According to their contribution, municipalities can be classified as donors 
or recipients depending on their net balance once the funds are distributed. Whilst 13 municipalities 
are defined as donors there are 317 who fall under the category of recipients. The significance of this 
fund varies according to the size and revenue capacities of each municipality. According to Ropert 
(2011) in 77% of the municipalities this fund represents more than 50% of their annual revenues 
whereas in 44 municipalities this proportion goes up to 80% or more.  
Finally, in the Chilean municipal system there is an over-reliance on the transfers of grants 
and subsidies which represent 51% of the total municipal revenue (OECD, 2017).  
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The central government transfers are shown to be insufficient to cover the costs, so 
municipalities have been forced to cover the gaps. According to the Service of Municipal Information 
these transfers covered 8.4% of the total expenditures in local education and 15% of the health sector 
expenditures5.  
Not surprisingly, municipalities have little resources to invest. Since debt is forbidden by law 
municipalities must rely on their own revenue generation, but as noted above this option is quite 
limited. In the year 2015, from the total local expenditures only 6% was direct investment whereas 
93.4% was spent on current expenditure. This figure could also be smaller because it includes direct 
investments that could be channelled through ministries. The OECD (2017) acknowledges this 
situation and states: “The insufficient level of own-source revenues, resulting from a poor municipal 
taxation power, do not allow municipalities to generate self-financing revenue for investment. As a 
result, in a context where municipalities are prohibited from contracting long-term borrowing, 
municipalities have to rely almost entirely on capital transfers and subsidies for their investments, 
which are largely insufficient and lack coordination across sectors and actors” (p.158). 
Municipalities must respond to several responsibilities but have little room to adapt. This is 
especially relevant in a system so diverse and uneven. Due to its shortages, municipalities must rely 
on central government assistance to fulfil their local plans of development. This situation favours 
central and large jurisdictions with enough electoral leverage to build their case. On the other hand, 
the low capacity to levy and collect local taxes has a deep impact on local authorities, making them 
closely dependent on central government grants. In the next and final section of this chapter I explore 
the role played by competitive grants with a special focus on the FNDR, my main phenomenon of 
study.      
 
                                               
5 Data for year 2015, retrieved from http://www.sinim.gov.cl/ 
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5.4 Chilean competitive grants  
 
Having presented the historical context and fiscal situation of subnational authorities, the 
purpose of this final section is to examine the theoretical discussions on local competition and 
competitive grants in Chile.  
As previously reviewed, Chile has a diverse local context with capacities and resources 
unevenly distributed. The lack of resources and service standards forces municipalities to act as single 
units trying to balance their overstretched budgets with the necessity to compete for central 
government funds. 
According to Orellana (2009) the local segregation observed in Chile: “illustrates the 
disequilibrium among municipalities in the process of wealth generation. This would be deepened by 
the absence of a regional government or institution that could regulate efficiently and autonomously 
the excess of municipal competition, led by the market action and centralised policies” (p.107). 
Orellana (2012) proposes that in Chile all municipalities are forced to compete; however, the 
possibilities to be successful depend on the capacities, resources and the autonomy to invest.  
Intermunicipal competition emerged as a response to the centralist design of Chilean 
institutions, the uneven distribution of wealth and the incidence of NPM policies. These conditions 
together were a fertile ground in which grant competition was installed and adopted. Below, I present 
the range of competitions in which local authorities are involved and then I detail the process of FNDR 




5.4.1 Local grants in Chile 
Municipalities in Chile are typically involved in three competitive grant schemes. In one, 
municipalities compete against each other for central government monies. In this case central 
government imposes some geographical or financial conditions to ensure that the bids are aligned 
with their objectives and goals. Funds like the FNDR and the PMU/PMB fall under this category 
promoting the interregional competition for investment funds.  
In the second scheme, municipalities mediate between central government resources and 
local communities. In this case, municipalities act as brokers channelling locally-constructed bids to 
the respective central government office. Finally, some municipalities can also act as grantors for 
intra-municipal competitions. In this case municipalities set the specific rules and evaluate and 
distribute the grants among the local community. 
Below, I briefly present PMU and PMB competitive grants and then move into the FNDR 
detailing its mechanism of allocation and the main debates about its design and effect.  
 
PMU/PMB 
In conjunction with the FNDR, municipalities are engaged in two other grant competitions, 
both with similar scope and magnitude. These are the PMU and the PMB. These two grants were 
originally designed to tackle minor local shortages of pavement and water supply but are now 
extended to other areas such as park renovations and other small interventions.  
Since none of the bids submitted to these competitions can surpass the £50,000 mark they 
are destined to fund small interventions. Due to their reduced cost bids submitted to these 
competitions are not subject to any technical appraisal. Instead, they are centrally allocated from 
Santiago raising questions about their transparency and central determination. 
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Because of its discretionary allocation mechanism, the PMU and PMB have been examined 
by scholars to see if there is a political targeting behind their local allocation. Acuna et al (2017) 
support the previous findings of Llodra (2013), Corvalan et al (2017) and Cuevas (2013), showing that 
there is a political bias in the PMU/PMB grant allocation which favours incumbent mayors from the 
same coalition as the President. The above authors conclude that since they are centrally allocated 
PMU/PMB grants can be easily channelled to favour some municipalities and fall into clientelist 
practices.  
 
5.4.2 The FNDR  
The National Fund for Regional Development (FNDR) was created in the year 1975 (OECD, 
2009) to compensate for the infrastructure disparity among regions. As previously seen, 
regionalisation policies fostered the concentration of resources in two clusters, one in the north and 
one in the centre, promoting an unbalanced territorial development. Thus, it can be argued that the 
FNDR emerged as the response to those imbalances allocating a fraction of the national budget to 
each individual region on a yearly basis. Over the years the FNDR has been subject to several 
modifications and expansions integrating areas such as education and culture to the original offer of 
roads, hospitals and schools.  
As previously seen, municipalities have little resources to spend on local investments since 
94% of their budget is spent on current expenditures. According to a study conducted by the 
Universidad Autonoma (2012) in the year 2011 the municipal participation in public investment was 
a mere 0.6% of the total. The study shows that locally, 56.9% of investments are channelled through 
ministries and 42.5% through the the FNDR.  
Normatively speaking and according to the Chilean Municipal Law (Ministerio del Interior, 




- To finance investments facilitating the regional development in social, cultural and 
economic areas 
- To achieve an equitable and harmonious regional development  
- To make particular emphasis on the local compensation and regional development   
  
The inner mechanism of the FNDR has remained largely unchanged over the years although it has 
been updated several times. The mechanism comprises two stages. In the first stage, the FNDR is 
distributed among regions and in the second stage, each region’s funding is distributed among the 
region’s municipalities.  
 
Regional distribution of the FNDR 
Once the FNDR annual budget is set, the procedures of the regional distribution establish that 
90% of the total amount is decided by a formula considering two indexes detailed below: poverty 
and territory. The remaining 10% is centrally decided by the Ministry of Regional Affairs based on a 
possible natural emergency (5%) and regional efficiency (5%). Regional efficiency is calculated based 
on the proportion of the budget spent in the previous year. By central government standards, 
efficiency is achieved if all the resources nationally allocated were locally spent.   
The poverty index is composed of three variables:  
1. Percentage of poor people living in the region (40%)  
2. Percentage of rural poor population living the region (10%)  
3. Percentage of poor households with a single mother (10%).  
 
The territory index is composed of four variables:  
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4. Regional percentage of the nation territory (30%),  
5. Cost of paving (5%)  
6. Cost of house construction (5%)  
7. Rate of rurality in the region (5%). 
 
Some criticism has been raised over this distributive scheme because the size of the region is 
highly weighted in the formula with the effect that geographically small but needy regions are 
sometimes worse off than large and wealthy ones. That is the case of the Magallanes region where, 
despite having only 1% of the Chilean population and the lowest poverty rate, the region receives 
more than 4% of the yearly distribution. 
  
Local distribution of the FNDR 
Once each region’s budget has been decided it is time to be distributed among the 
municipalities. As seen in figure 4, four actors are involved in this process: municipalities, the 
Integrated Project Bank, the Intendente and the Regional Councils. 
The process is initiated by a municipality that, based on its local plan and echoing the regional 
strategy, formulates a bid. If the bid costs surpass the £50,000 threshold (highly probable) and the 
bid seeks public funding it must be sent to a centrally-run project bank to get technical approval.  
The project bank is part of the Ministry of Social Development and its task is to determine the 
ex-ante social return for the bid. The project bank is composed of evaluators, each one with an 
expertise in a different area of public investment. The job of the evaluators is to decide if bids are 
socially cost-effective based on a technical appraisal mechanism. The evaluation contrasts the 
benefits against the costs of the bid considering the social discount rate and the social value of labour, 
time (in transport projects), petrol (in transport projects) and exchange rate of each region. In this 
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stage each municipality must also provide alternative solutions to tackle the social issue previously 
identified and show how the locally proposed solution is the most cost-effective and therefore, the 
most worthy of funding.  
Once the evaluation is finished the local bid will be marked either with a high social return (in 
this case a budget is calculated), with observations or with a low social return. Any outcome outside 
high social return means that the municipality needs to amend the bid, re-calculate it and send it 
again to the project bank to be re-evaluated.  
Once the bid receives a positive evaluation it returns to the municipality which now must send 
it to the regional Intendente. The role of the Intendente is to establish the regional priorities based 
on the bids received and mirroring the regional and national strategies. Finally, the Intendente 
presents the portfolio of prioritised bids to the regional council. The council, based on the 
prioritisation made by the Intendente, decides which bids will be funded. Once the regional council 




5.4.3 The main scholar debates on FNDR  
As seen above, the FNDR is the main grant for locally-decided investment in Chile. In the 
following subsections I present the scholarly discussions on the FNDR, placing special attention on its 
design, distribution and its effects on local authorities. 
 
An uncertain competition 
An important topic in the literature on the FNDR is devoted to its process of evaluation.  Since 
the selection criteria used by the Intendente and regional councillors are not open to scrutiny, the 
selection has been commonly described as opaque. This sets a clear contrast with the first stage 
where bids are technically assessed.  
For Horst (2008), regardless of the technical and political assessment mechanisms, there is a 
lack of planning during the FNDR process and day-to-day operations dictate the final allocation of 
resources. Other authors have analysed the length of the FNDR process and found that it represents 
a burden for municipalities who cannot afford to be part of it (Acuna, 2009). Municipalities are 
subject to financial stress because they must rely on their internal capacities to compose highly 
technical bids with no certainty about when they will be finally funded (Valenzuela, 2010).  
Moreover, the lack of local funds and rigidity of the FNDR scheme have an impact on the 
capacity of municipalities to attract and retain technically well-prepared public officers, a vital part 
of the bid formulation.  
 
Single measures for multiple issues   
According to the OECD (2009; 2013) the FNDR follows a ministerial logic in which every bid is 
implemented independently without any territorial coordination, acting in a silo type of strategy. In 
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this regard, they argue that: “OECD experience suggests the importance of moving away from 
sectoral subsidies toward integrated place-based development projects… In Chile this would require 
adapting the national investment system to a territorial logic that makes it possible to finance 
integrated multi-sectoral projects. Initiatives from subnational governments that seek to take a 
regional approach are hampered by the sectoral orientation of the financial system” (OECD, 2009, 
p.159).  
Livert and Gainza (2017) share this diagnosis and recommend the introduction of an 
independent planning office for regional investment to set up more stable finance mechanisms. They 
argue that an independent office could foster long time investments because: “Multi-year budgeting 
could be a valued fiscal policy because it can give local government greater certainty about future 
funding, which enables them to plan and manage their expenditure more effectively” (p.11). 
Financial uncertainty and lack of regional or national standards hampers the development of 
strategic plans and promotes a fragmented vision of the territorial development where ministries act 
as non-coordinated entities. This situation would be fostered by the competitive ethos of the system 
that disincentivises horizontal cooperation between local jurisdictions.   
 
A planning paradox 
In the FNDR three different strategies are put into play: the municipal, the regional and the 
national, and each one has its own agenda. Since none of the plans are mandatory requirements of 
the grant, funds are finally distributed on an ad hoc basis. This has an effect on the planning strategies 
because: “There is no necessary link between regional and municipal strategies. Neither the 
Intendente nor the different actors that operate in the investment process are required to follow the 
guidelines established in the municipal or regional development strategies… this creates a 
disincentive for regional and municipal planning” (OECD, 2009, p.159). In a more recent study the 
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OECD (2013) found that FNDR is commonly used to cover local shortages without following any of 
the plans previously stated.  
Livert and Gainza (2017) argue that the FNDR allocation is highly influenced by the central 
government agenda because: “Applications must match nationally defined guidelines, municipalities 
may not receive funds if proposals are not aligned with the National Budget Office’s priorities” (p.5).  
The above idea distorts the policy objective, forcing local authorities to adapt their needs to 
central government guidelines. Horst (2009) strengthens the idea of a mismatch between central and 
local priorities of investment where ministries and municipalities act as independent organisms with 
their own agendas. She considers that not only competition, but also the intricate design of political 
agreements and technical evaluations of the FNDR act against its objectives. She argues that because 
of the large number of strategies and people involved, there is no guarantee that the selected bids 




The OECD recommends further study of the formula used to distribute the FNDR funds 
regionally. The OECD considers that regional size (as measured in squared kilometres) is not a 
reasonable variable to capture infrastructure needs and could work against small regions with 
significant socioeconomic disadvantages.  
Munoz (2014) studied the FNDR intra-regional allocation from 1997 to 2012 and in line with 
the OECD (2009; 2013) found that regions do not follow a national plan and instead set their own 
allocation strategies. He also shows that the FNDR is effective in fostering inter-regional but not intra-
regional equity so suggests a further revision. This idea has been contested by Franken (2005), who 
analysed the change in the FNDR algorithm of 1993 and suggests that the distribution tends to 
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balance the allocation across regions despite their wide differences in size, poverty level, and 
population.  
Horst (2009) on the other hand, considers that the way in which the FNDR is regionally divided 
places incentives wrongly. According to her, the 5% of the FNDR allocated to emergencies cannot 
respond promptly enough so these funds are finally spent in other areas. The bureaucracy of the 
FNDR can also work against a quick delivery which is essential in an emergency scenario.  
Regarding the 5% regionally destined to measure efficiency, Horst argues that resource 
spending is a bad proxy to measure it. According to her, regional councils trying to achieve the full 
spending of their FNDR quota will allocate resources to small bids, which are easier to allocate and 
deliver. This represents a problem to municipalities because it leads to resources being spent in less 
impactful ways and on non-prioritised local projects. She concludes by arguing that the 10% of the 
FNDR regional budget calculated outside the formula is used by central government to impose their 
agenda and to have some leverage on the regional spending of the funds.   
 
Local distribution 
Locally, Valenzuela (2010) analysed the decentralisation process in Chile and critically 
assessed the FNDR competitive strategy. He argues that competing for funds: “conditions the 
resource allocation to the technical capacities to formulate sound bids. This pulls the community 
away from the resource allocation leaving this responsibility at the regional council” (p.5). Based on 
his analysis Valenzuela recommends moving into formula-based lump-sum grants considering the 
vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances between jurisdictions. According to Valenzuela, formula 
distribution gives municipalities more certainty about their future, fostering their planning strategy.  
He also argues that a strategic plan is necessary and that could only be possible with a better 
articulation between local, regional and central government.    
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Horst (2009) agrees with Valenzuela and instead of the current system recommends the 
transfer of lump-sum unconditional grants to municipalities. The argument behind this is to increase 
the flexibility of municipalities and reduce the bureaucratic process of evaluation and selection. She 
proposes that: “60% of the FNDR budget should be directly transferred to municipalities for their 
investment projects… with this, municipalities would be responsible to administer 900 thousand 
millions more which can be translated in and increase of 60% of the total resources that they 
administer in 2007. With this measure the municipal participation in the total government spend 
would increase from 12.5% to 17.6%” (p.24).  
Nonetheless, the point raised by Valenzuela and Horst ignores the fact that local capacities 
are uneven and without an external appraisal mechanism local bids may be subject to mild revisions 
and probable suboptimal outcomes. As theory states, without proper incentives lump-sum 
unconditional grants could foster social waste so Valenzuela’s and Horst’s recommendations should 
be taken cautiously.     
In another revision, The IDER (Institute of Regional and Local Development, 2009) analysed 
the funding strategies of local governments in Chile and found that the FNDR allocation mechanism 
is inefficient and extremely bureaucratic, with a lack of transparency and norms. Rodriguez (2010) 
supports this arguing that the FNDR is inefficient mainly because: “60% of the bids have a small scale 
impact, with costs of less than £100,000” (p.15). He also found that on average, every bid takes two 
and a half years to prepare for completion and identifies a central bias in its distribution.  
The FNDR scheme is too general to differentiate between bids so all of them are subject to 
the same process regardless of scale and magnitude. Piña and Avellaneda (2017) studied the 
distribution of local investment funds during 2005 – 2013 and concluded that success is positively 
influenced by political factors and municipal revenues.  
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Finally, Etcheverry (2009) found that in the absence of internal resources to invest, 
municipalities are de-facto using the FNDR as a subsidy to cover budget shortages in health and 
education. He also found that in many deprived municipalities FNDR funds have been used to repair, 
replace and improve infrastructure, something which is forbidden by law   
 
Political bias  
The last element considered in this section is the political bias of local grant allocation. Munoz 
(2014) measures the effect of having a Mayor from the same political coalition as the President and 
tests whether that resulted in any allocative preferences. After testing several regression models, he 
did not find any association, thus rejecting the hypothesis of a political targeting.  
Livert and Gainza’s (2017) work contests this idea, showing that belonging to the central 
government coalition was associated with 10% more FNDR public investment. They also found that 
better-off municipalities were favoured and that there was a political budget cycle where investment 
increased by 10% during municipal election years.   
Due to the fiscal constraints and budgetary shortages experienced by local authorities, grants 
represent a key source of funding. Local public investments represent less than 1% of the total so 
local authorities must engage in grant competitions to fund their initiatives. In this context the FNDR 
appears to be the only source where municipalities have a chance to invest in their comunas.  
The FNDR is a mixed system of grant competition where technical and political elements come 
into play interchangeably. In its execution the FNDR also overlaps local, regional and national 
strategies with no direct link in an intricate mechanism of distribution. The silo-mentality fostered by 
the single application process and its competitive essence diminishes the overall impact of the grant.  
The competitive process is also so long and costly that only municipalities with enough 
resources or staff can engage in the process, fostering a restricted form of competition. In this 
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situation some scholars have proposed the unconditional transfer of resources to speed up the 
process of resource allocation. I argue that without the proper incentives and technical supervision 
central transfers can increase local budgets but foster social waste. Lastly, the FNDR as a mechanism 
is too rigid to discriminate between bids so instead of bridging the regional unbalances they would 
be widened by its action.  
 
5.5 Conclusions  
 
The origin of Chilean municipalities was marked by two elements; the remaining influence of 
the Spanish empire and the unification of political power in the central figure of the President. The 
geographical characteristics of the territory with two poles of development has also allowed the 
concentration of power in a few limited metropolises.  
Chile has been historically a unitary and centralised country where regions were formed with 
the only purpose of representing the capital’s will outside the metropolitan region. In this setting 
municipalities were a secondary institution in charge of minor tasks such as cleaning the streets and 
collecting the garbage. This situation changed dramatically during the dictatorship of General 
Pinochet who, in an attempt to de-politicise governmental action, transferred several functions to 
the newly formed municipalities. These transfers nevertheless were merely instrumental and aimed 
to transform municipalities into agents of centrally-designed service delivery without real power or 
influence.  
Once democracy was re-established mayors and councillors were democratically elected, but 
the local situation changed only slightly. Despite a few amendments to Pinochet’s constitution 
municipalities are still trapped in the same problems as they were 30 years ago. They execute more 
than 75 social programmes but can intervene in almost none of them; they also have extremely 
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limited tax-raising capabilities, so rely almost entirely on central government transfers, while the lack 
of powers of regional governments to alleviate the intermunicipal disparities has promoted a highly 
skewed distribution of wealth.  
It was under these circumstances that competition was introduced as the paradigm of funds 
allocation. Operating in this context the FNDR works as an intricate net of political and technical 
decisions situated above three different plans that are not necessarily linked. However, due to the 
lack of available resources, municipalities engage in these competitions since it represents their only 
source of investment.  
Competition, understood in these terms, promotes single-approach solutions in contexts of 
multiple necessities through a long and highly bureaucratic system of allocation. The lack of flexibility 
of the bid appraisal mechanism contrasts with the chain of subjective decisions triggered once the 
bids are technically sound, increasing its complexity.  
Despite the relevance of the FNDR nearly all the research on this topic has taken a top- down 
approach looking at the FNDR’s scheme of distribution and bureaucratic procedures. These findings 
have contributed from a normative standpoint but neglect the role of municipalities during the 
competition process.  
This situation opens a research opportunity to explore the effects of a grant with more than 
40 years of history and an extensive influence in how municipalities work, plan and deliver their 
services. The next three chapters aim to bridge this gap and deepen the analysis of FNDR distribution 









6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter analyses the distribution of the FNDR, the largest competitive grant locally 
allocated in Chile. As set out in Chapter Five, Chile is a deeply centralised country where 346 
municipalities coexist in an uneven landscape. It is argued that centrally decided policies strengthen 
the inequalities between municipalities where, despite being part of the same nation, jurisdictions 
have widely-differing budgets, problems and capacities (Orellana, 2009).  
In this context municipalities with poorer households are the most pressured by demand for 
public services despite their small tax base, causing a de facto predetermination in which deprived 
families live in poor municipalities and receive poor services.  
This chapter assesses the main trends in the success in FNDR bidding across jurisdictions. 
After depicting the allocative patterns of the grant, I test whether municipal capacity affects the 
amount of grant received. If capacity does affect this, it would widen the gap between municipalities’ 
resources and impact FNDR policy objectives. This is particularly problematic in Chile where local 
resources are often inadequate.  
This is the first of my two-phase analysis. Here I analyse the top-down allocation of the grant, 
looking at the award of grants to grantees, that is, what affects success in bidding for FNDR. A key 
factor is that of whether a bid is made, but in addition some bids are more successful than others 
depicting different success ratios across jurisdictions.  
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The objective is to gain understanding of the trends and tendencies of the grant competition. 
After this, in the subsequent chapter, I move into the narratives that emerged during this process 
analysing the voices of its protagonists as collected in my interview work.  
Under this framework, competition is understood as a process where different interactions 
and expectations come into play. This approach of assessment through statistical analysis and 
interview research is argued to be a novel contribution to the field, enriching knowledge about local 
grants competition and local and central administration. 
This chapter is organised as follows. After a brief recap on definitions of grants I describe the 
general trends in the allocation of FNDR. This first section serves as an entry point to the discussion 
establishing some core ideas about the FNDR. In the second section, I firstly discuss the tensions 
between central and local administrations regarding devolution of power and competences. Then, I 
analyse the influence of local capacity on the success in FNDR bidding. In doing this, I examine the 
contrast between the stated objectives of the grant and the results of the action of the competitive 
process as measured by the amount of FNDR grant actually received per capita. Finally, I conclude by 
presenting the main findings and some policy recommendations.    
 
6.2 The FNDR, a descriptive overview 
 
Recapping the prior discussion, grants are payments from a donor government to a recipient 
organisation or an individual (Beam and Conlan, 2002). Lump sum grants, like the FNDR, are 
determined in two main ways: via formula or on a competitive basis.  
Formula-based grants based on measurement of need promote social equity, especially when 
the allocation formula weighs indexes such as the poverty level. Competition, on the other hand, 
attaches more importance to performance accountability, forcing grant bidders to reveal information 
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that mitigates agency problems. Formula distribution is more equitable as it takes need directly into 
account, but lacks incentives for grantees to explain the benefits of proposed spending in a way that 
is clear to central authorities. Whilst allocation through competition can work to increase the self-
reporting of need, and it can also penalise most needy grantees if that need is also reflected in a lack 
of staff or staff suited to constructing sound bids.  
Below I examine how the competitive FNDR system copes with equity and efficiency 
objectives. In the next subsections I define the aims of the FNDR and then present a descriptive 
analysis of my studied variables.   
 
FNDR definition and variations  
In Chile the FNDR is the main public source to finance investment in locally-run projects 
(Brakarz, 2003). As described in section 5.2 the payment made under this grant is determined by 
successful bidding in which municipalities compete regionally to receive funding for their local 
investments. Operationally, in the FNDR grant system, local project bids need to get over the hurdle 
of a technical appraisal mechanism and then be prioritised by two political institutions, the 
Intendente and the regional council, before being funded.  
The FNDR system do not establish bid priorities, standards or municipal patterns of allocation. 
Due to the way in which the system is set up, municipalities have different success ratios according 
to their grantsmanship to secure FNDR allocations.  
According to the Chilean Municipal Law (Ministerio del interior, 2006) the FNDR has three 
declared aims:  
- To finance investments facilitating the regional development in social, cultural and economic 
areas 
- To achieve an equitable and harmonic regional development  
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- To make particular emphasis on the local compensation and regional development  
  
In the next sections I examine how far these FNDR aims are accomplished in practice, 
scrutinising its allocation among successful jurisdictions.  
 
FNDR variables 
My original data consisted of 19,212 observations where each represented a locally 
submitted project bid to the National Project Bank between the years 2008 and 2014. These 
observations recorded each bid’s evaluation mark (positive, negative or lack or information) the 
amount of funds requested, and the funds granted (if any).  
I created a new data set aggregating all the bids from each municipality. This provided a data 
set where for each of the 342 observations/municipalities between 2008 and 2014, total funds 
requested, bid marks and total funds granted were recorded.  A set of demographic variables 
depicting the main municipal features was added. Demographics presented slight changes through 
the years, so to condense that, the variables are presented as means for the studied period.  
My data incorporated only new bids because partially funded projects had higher chances of 
being funded again, creating a difference between bids. The data was collected from two sources. 
Local demographics were downloaded from the National Service of Municipal Information (SINIM) 
whilst FNDR allocation was requested from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Table 4 presents the 




Having defined the variables studied, Table 5 presents their descriptive statistics. The 
variables are means over the years 2008 to 2014 and the table summarises the data, by presenting 
the minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation and variance for the municipalities.   
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Descriptive analysis 
In line with prior analyses (OECD, 2009; 2017) Chilean municipalities depict a wide variation 
across all the presented variables. In this sample, the percentage of affluent citizens ranged from 63% 
to 98% whilst skilled staff fluctuated from a mere 9% to 61% of the total municipal staff. Common 
fund dependence on the other hand, ranges from 15% to 98% depicting the lack of self-revenues and 
high reliance on this horizontal equity fund in a group of jurisdictions.  
In terms of investment budget municipalities had between 5% to 66% of their total revenues 
available for this item. Population varied from 250 to 794,000 inhabitants; in line with that figure the 
number of local officers varied between jurisdictions ranging from just 12 to 2,537. This high 
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fluctuation is also depicted in the variable budget per capita with a variation from 6,0006 to 1,077,000 
Chilean pesos for the whole period studied.  
Regarding FNDR variables, the number of bids per year varied from just one to 64 and, 
comprising the whole period (bids whole period); this figure ranges from one to 421. The percentage 
of projects positively marked per municipality (positive appraisal), on the other hand, varies between 
0 to 90% with 62% on average. FNDR grant per capita averaged 265,000 with a variation between 0 
to 3,541,000 pesos. Finally, the bid success rate ranges between 0 and 97% with an average of 12.4% 
for the seven-year period. Being so, Including only positively marked projects, on average just one 
eight of the funds requested via FNDR were finally allocated. 
The ex-ante appraisal mechanism set by the Ministry of Social Development constitutes an 
entry barrier that on average 40% of the bids submitted cannot fulfil. But, even when they surpass 
the evaluation, only one eighth of the project’s costs are covered by the FNDR according to this data. 
This low fruitfulness of submitted bids can be explained by three factors. First, despite being 
positively appraised bids are not politically prioritised. Second, the FNDR do not have enough 
resources to fund all the positively-marked bids. Third, municipalities may divide large projects into 
a set of small bids believing these have a better chance of success.  
To further explore these intermunicipal variations in the next section I divide the sample of 
municipalities according to their FNDR records and demographic characteristics.   
 
The impact of poverty and population in the distribution of funds  
As seen above, municipalities are diverse and have different success ratios in competitions. 
In this section I describe the data, grouping municipalities by two variables: population and affluent 
                                               
6 As a reference 1 GBP = 875 Chilean pesos CLP 
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citizens. Averages hide the inner differences between cases, so I have decomposed the data looking 
at how these two variables shed light on the allocation.  
I divide the municipalities in to three groups based on the variable affluent citizens. 
Municipalities with 0 to 80% of affluent citizens were categorised as high-poverty jurisdictions. 
Municipalities with 80% to 90% of affluent citizens were categorised as medium-poverty jurisdictions. 
Finally, municipalities with 90% or more of affluent citizens were categorised as low-poverty 
jurisdictions. I also split observations for municipalities into three groups based on their population 
between; low-population (0-15,000 citizens) medium-population (15,000 – 75,000 citizens) and high-
population (75,000 or more citizens). 
To establish relevant comparisons, I contrast municipalities with similar populations but 
different percentage of affluent citizens. For this analysis I made two assumptions, first, that the 
percentage of affluent citizens serves as a proxy for municipal needs. This assumption is supported 
by Fernandez (2010) who found a strong correlation between these two variables in Chile and it is 
also evidenced by other authors such as David et al (2018). My second assumption is that 
municipalities with similar populations would face comparable challenges. This assumption can be 
sustained considering the presumed economies and diseconomies of scale experienced by 
jurisdictions with different populations.     
The description of each group and N (the number of municipalities in the category) is presented in 





Once the observations were divided into the three categories I made a cross tabulation to see 
the performance of each group looking at the variables previously presented in Table 4: positive 
appraisal, projects whole period, FNDR grant per capita and bid success rate.  
The variable positive appraisal varied between each cohort. In the low-population category, 
municipalities with low-poverty had 63% of their new bids positively marked this figure decreased to 
60% among medium and to 58% in high-poverty jurisdictions. Among medium-size municipalities the 
results were 62% for low-poverty, 64% for medium and 61% for the high-poverty category. Finally, in 
high-population municipalities, the percentage of projects that received positive appraisal was 64% 
for low and medium-poverty and 66% for high. 
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Moving into the variable bids whole period, low-populated jurisdictions were consistent 
across the different poverty levels. Jurisdictions in the low-poverty category submitted 51 bids whilst 
the medium-poverty category submitted 48 and high-poverty 51. Among medium-populated 
jurisdictions bids whole period was positively correlated with poverty level. Low-poverty 
municipalities submitted 64 bids, a figure which increased to 80 among middle-poverty and rose to 
93 in the high-poverty category. This pattern was then repeated among high population 
municipalities. Low-poverty jurisdictions submitted 103 bids whereas middle and high-poverty 
submitted 133 and 155 bids respectively.  
Looking at the variable bid success rate the results were the following. Among low-population 
jurisdictions the ones on the low-poverty category had 14% bid success rate; this figure decreased to 
11% in medium-poverty and rose to 12% in the high-poverty category. A similar trend is seen in the 
middle-populated municipalities where low-poverty jurisdictions had 15% bid success rate, which is 
higher than the 12% in middle and 11% in the high-poverty jurisdictions. Finally; among highly 
populated municipalities the low-poverty group had a bid success rate of 16%, this figure then 
decreased to 11% in middle category and rose again to 24% in the high-poverty category. These 





The final variable analysed was FNDR grant per capita. Among low-populated municipalities 
low-poverty is associated with more FNDR grant per capita. Municipalities in the low-poverty 
category received 541,000 pesos for the whole period; this figure then decreased to 441,000 in the 
middle-poverty group and finally to 331,000 in the high-poverty. This pattern changes as we move 
into middle-populated jurisdictions. There, the low-poverty category received 157,000 FNDR grant 
per capita, middle-poverty 191,000 and high-poverty 164,000.  Finally, in the highly populated 
category FNDR grant per capita was 60,000 for the low-poverty group, 64,000 for the middle and 






As seen in Table 5, there was a mean of 62% for positive appraisal of the bids submitted by 
municipalities. The cross tabulation of data reveals that low-populated and high-poverty jurisdictions 
were the least successful of the sample with 58% of positive appraisal. In this category the appraisal 
mechanism looks like a regressive mechanism especially difficult for jurisdictions that do not have 
the funds or grantsmanship to formulate sound bids.  
Moving into the number of bids (bids whole period) there seems to be a positive association 
between this variable and poverty level. Within middle and highly-populated jurisdictions higher 
poverty levels correspond to more bids whole period. Arguably, needs would be larger among poorer 
jurisdictions and that would translate into more bids. This result goes in line with the egalitarian and 
redistributive goal of the FNDR but interestingly, this association is not seen among low-populated 
jurisdictions. Entry barriers could be too high to low-populated jurisdictions so, despite the different 
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levels of poverty, the number of bids whole period submitted remained relatively constant, whilst for 
middle and highly populated categories, poverty seems like a good predictor.     
On the other hand, the variable bid success rate does not follow the same pattern as bids 
whole period. Regardless of being the category with lower number of submitted bids, low-poverty 
jurisdictions are the ones with the largest bid success rate among low and middle population 
categories. Nonetheless, this pattern is reversed within highly-populated jurisdictions. In this 
category high-poverty jurisdictions have the highest bid success rate (24%), which represents nearly 
double the average for the whole sample.  
Finally, looking at the variable FNDR grant per capita, there is a linear decrease in the FNDR 
payments as municipalities become more populated. This may seem unsurprising because in highly 
populated jurisdictions funds are divided across more citizens. But, what is more revealing is that 
looking across equally populated jurisdictions (and regardless of the bid success rate) medium and 
highly-populated jurisdictions seem to receive a relatively similar amount of FNDR grant per capita 
for the whole period studied. Low-populated jurisdictions, on the other hand, show a different 
trend.In  this category, municipalities received the largest sum of FNDR grant per capita within the 
whole sample. Interestingly,there is a considerable decrease in the amount of FNDR grant per capita 
to low-populated jurisdictions as they become poorer. In this category low-poverty jurisdictions had 
41% more FNDR grant per capita than high-poverty jurisdictions.  Regardless of its declared 
objectives, FNDR allocation seems to be associated with low-poverty levels.  
A mean of nearly 40% of the bids submitted to be appraised do not pass that stage. This may 
indicate the rigours of the system but the variation across categories suggests that some jurisdictions 
are more affected than others by the evaluation. The number of bids whole period may reveal the 
needs experienced locally, but does not predict FNDR grant per capita, or the bid success rate. Low-
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populated municipalities received the largest FNDR grant per capita but there seems to be a powerful 
correlation between this variable and low levels of poverty. 
Based on the proportion of costs against funds allocated, the FNDR seems to be unlikely to 
cover all the bids submitted. This may suggest a lack of resources or political misalignment to 
prioritise bids. Another cause may be the large number of bids submitted locally versus the money 
available.   
The declared objectives of the FNDR do not seem to be fully in line with its mechanism of 
allocation as it favours municipalities with fewer poor citizens (and therefore fewer needs).. To clarify 
these findings further, in the following section I fit a linear regression to test whether there is an 
association between capacity-related variables and funds allocation. 
 
6.3 Local capacity and grant competitions  
 
The previous section described some broad allocative patterns of the FNDR. Firstly, the 
presentation of the data showed that all the variables had a large range of variation depicting wide 
differences between municipalities. Secondly, split into categories the data suggested that a high 
percentage of poor citizens could have a negative effect in the FNDR grant per capita especially within 
low-populated municipalities. The objective of this second section is to test empirically the impact of 
local capacity in the FNDR competition. Below I analyse which variables are associated with larger 




Chilean local capacity 
As today, nearly half of all Chilean citizens with a higher education degree live and work in 
Santiago (Wainssbluth and Arredondo, 2011). Regions far from Santiago struggle to retain their 
skilled labour force against the better opportunities offered by the capital.  
Municipalities, despite being an institution highly valued by citizens (Centro Politicas Publicas 
UC, 2016) are considered an unattractive employer because of their lack of resources, rigid scale of 
salary and heavy workload.  
In Chile, central government authorities share the belief that municipalities are not capable 
of managing the devolution of any new powers (Fernandez-Richard, 2013). Governments, doubting 
local capacities, have historically requested a deep performance evaluation before transfering further 
competences and resources to municipalities. Municipalities on the other hand, fiercely supported 
by their unions, have rejected any staff evaluation that may lead to the redundancy of tenured 
officers. Municipal tenure was introduced in Chile shortly after Pinochet left office when public 
administration was still in a shambles (as depicted in section 5.2.2). Once tenure was established only 
20% of the local officers in Chile with this status had a higher education degree (Valenzuela, 2007). 
Over the years, municipalities improved the qualifications of their staff, hiring skilled officers on a 
yearly-contract basis. This situation nevertheless fosters job casualisation and, due to the higher costs 
of this type of informal contract, works against capacity.    
Wainsbluth and Arredondo (2011) describing the Chilean local landscape argue: “In Chile 259 
(out of 345) municipalities have less than 50,000 inhabitants and 10 have more than 250,000. The 
municipality of Maipu has 2,972 public officers whereas Timakuel has only 3. Obviously, the 
population is much smaller but the amount of services that Timakuel have to deliver is the same as 
Maipu” (p.11).  
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Despite the wide variance in the number and capacities of municipal staff, Chilean authorities 
have historically allocated the FNDR, the main local infrastructure grant, on a competitive basis. 
Without a policy to properly level their capacities, municipalities must formulate bids with the staff 
and capabilities that they already have or (when they can) hire officers on a casual basis. Below I test 
how these circumstances influenced the distribution of FNDR exploring the impact of local capacity 
on the allocation of FNDR grant per capita. 
 
Determinants of the FNDR distribution 
The units of analysis are the 346 municipalities of Chile. From the total, eight jurisdictions 
were not considered in the analysis because they did not apply or receive any funds from the FNDR 
during the period studied. With the remaining jurisdictions I used a linear regression model to 
examine the effect of municipal capacity on the municipality’s FNDR amount received per capita 
(FNDR grant per capita). To obtain that figure I added all the FNDR funds a municipality obtained over 
the study period 2008-14. Then, I divided them by the municipality’s population mean over the same 
period. That study period was long enough to incorporate a presidential election and change of ruling 
coalition. In 2010 the centre-right candidate Sebastian Pinera was elected after 20 years of centre-
left presidents. Also, during that period, a local election took place where municipal majors and 
councils were elected (2013), allowing me to capture a possible change in the political party of the 
authorities. 
The observations are restricted to the following characteristics. As discussed earlier, I only 
incorporate new or first stage projects into the analysis. Entry barriers are much higher to new 
projects than to those which have already received funds. Since part of the funds have been already 
spent, central authorities have a greater incentive to fund existing projects establishing a difference 
between new and old projects that makes them difficult to compare. I also discarded from the 
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analysis any projects that did not receive funds during the studied period or received a negative 
technical appraisal.  
Therefore, from the full data base of more than 19,600 projects only 3,240 fell under this 
classification and were included into the OLS model. 
 
Explanatory variables 
Local capacity has been described in the literature as the sum or combination of human 
capital, policy experience and financial leverage (Carley and Fisher 2015). Since there is no single 
indicator able to measure those elements I collected five variables that can be used as a proxy.   
The variables used to measure local capacity are described above in Table 6 and were 
obtained through the Municipal Information System run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The first 
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variable is Skilled Staff. Higher education degrees in Chile are awarded after approved courses of four 
or more years of study. Therefore, I expected that the variable Skilled Staff would have a positive 
impact in the quantity and quality of bids formulated and hence on FNDR grant per capita.  
Similarly, I hypothesised that my second and third variables, investment budget and budget 
per capita, due to their depiction of municipal wealth would be also positively associated with FNDR 
grant per capita.  
The fourth variable is affluent citizens. As seen in section 5.3.2 of this thesis municipal 
revenues are determined by their citizens’ wealth. So, I hypothesised that a municipality with a large 
proportion of people living above the poverty line would have a better financial situation, less 
pressure on public services and subsequently higher capacity to formulate sound bids.   
The fifth and last variable is common fund dependence and measures the percentage of the 
yearly municipal budget composed by transfers from the horizontal equity fund. Recapping the 
analysis made in section 5.3.2 the Common Municipal Fund is a horizontal equalisation fund where 
every municipality contributes yearly and then receives a transfer based on their demographic 
indexes. Because of how it is calculated, dependence on the common fund be an indicator of lack of 
local capability to generate self-revenues. Therefore, I suggested that higher dependence would have 
a negative impact on FNDR grant per capita. 
It could seem that the number of municipal officers per head could be used as a good 
indicator of capacity. However, in Chile this figure is fixed by law according to the population living in 
the municipality. Thus, inclusion of such a variable would only indirectly reflect the population of the 
municipality, and since the dependent variable is measured per capita, it would be redundant to have 




Control variables  
In my model I included three variables to control for potentially confounding factors, 
unrelated with local capacity, but possibly related to FNDR grant per capita. I have labelled the first 
ruling party and it is a dummy variable showing the match between the political party of the mayor 
and the president (0= different party; 1= same party). Zambrano (2010) and Munoz (2014) tested 
this variable in other analyses but did not find a significant impact on funding. However, given the 
different time frames I decided to include it in my model. To construct this dummy variable, I 
collected data from the Chilean Electoral Service and made a match between the political party of 
the president and the mayor.  
The second variable is labelled surface and represents the geographical size of the 
municipality measured in square kilometres. The last control variable is labelled distance to capital 
and measures the distance in kilometres between the municipality and the regional capital. Each 
region in Chile has a capital where the regional council meets and where most of the services are 
concentrated. It may be the case that isolation or distance to the capital influences FNDR per head. 





Results – National model 
With all my variables in place I run a regression where: 
𝐹𝑁𝐷𝑅 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡




The results are shown in the National Model Column of Table 3. As shown there it can be seen 
that most of the capacity-related variables of this model had a positive association with our 
dependent variable (FNDR grant per capita). Municipalities with a higher percentage of skilled staff, 
more investment budget, higher percentage of affluent citizens and more budget per capita were 
associated with larger grant allocations.  
The only variable that contradicts this pattern is common fund dependence which was 
hypothesised to indicate low capacity. However, being dependent on the common fund in this model 
is associated with a larger allocation of FNDR funds. Moving on to the control variables, having a 
mayor from the same political party of the president (ruling party) was statistically non-significant 
consistent with the findings of Zambrano (2010) and Munoz (2014). Finally, surface and distance to 
the capital were also positively associated with larger FNDR allocations.  
Overall, the model had a good fit with the data (adjusted R squared .33) but, given the wide 
geographical spread of municipalities, a national model may conceal Chilean inter-regional 
differences. To explore this matter further, I divided my sample into two different areas and ran 
separate models. Chile is a long, tapered stretch of land that runs for nearly 4.500 kilometres. Over 
the years the location of the capital at the centre has fostered a migration to Santiago and its 
surrounding regions. Currently, more than 80% of the population lives between the fifth and ninth 
region scattered in a territory of less than 600 kilometres in length (Frigolet, 2013).  
Believing that circumstances and relationships would be likely to differ strongly I divided the 
sample into two: one for the central regions (central) and one for the regions located at the north 
and south of the territory (peripheral). The criterion for dividing the sample was theoretically driven 
and based on the number of municipalities per region. Regions with more than 30 municipalities were 
placed in the central model whilst regions with less than 30 in the peripheral model. Once the 
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segmentation was done it was noticeable how the more populated regions were focussed at the 
centre, as depicted in Figure 8.  
To examine whether there was a significant difference in the determinants of FNDR grant per 
capita, between these two samples I ran a Chow test to see if this disaggregated model had a better 
fit than the pooled national model. The Chow test assesses if the reduction in the residuals is enough 
to justify a split into two separate models. The calculations are shown below  
 
Chow test 
Firstly, we estimated the pooled national model as set out previously: 
 
𝐹𝑁𝐷𝑅 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠
+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
 
Secondly, we estimated a separate version of the above equation for the centre and peripheral 
model.  
 
𝐹𝑁𝐷𝑅_𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
 
𝐹𝑁𝐷𝑅_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑒 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
 
We then use a Chow test to test a null hypothesis that the coefficients: 
𝛽 , 𝛽 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓, 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 … 𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 , for the central model and the coefficients: 
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𝛽 , 𝛽 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓 , 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 … 𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 , for the peripheral model were the same 
as the set of coefficients 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 … 𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 for the national 
model. Essentially, we tested whether estimating two separate regressions (central and peripheral) 
provides a significant reduction in the overall residual sum of squares compared with the residual 
sum of squares from the single national regression.  
As can be shown in (Dhrymes, 1971):  
 
( (  ))
(  )
   *    
( ) ( ∗ )
( )
 = F 
 
Is distributed as 𝐹 with 𝐾(2 − 1), (𝑁𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑁𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙) − (𝐾 ∗ 2) degrees of freedom, where 
 𝐾 : Is the number of independent variables including the constant = 9 
(𝑁𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑁𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙): Is the total number of observations in the two subsamples = 3240 
𝑅𝑆𝑆  : Is the residual sum of squares from the national pooled regression 
 (𝑅𝑆𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆𝑆 ): Is the sum of residual sum of squares for the central and peripheral 
models 
We can then simplify the above equation and input the data from the three models as follows: 
 
(  )   *     ( ∗ )
 ( )
 = F 
 
After doing the calculations we obtain an F value of 105. This figure is greater than the F 
critical value of 1.88 (p<0.05) hence, we reject the null hypothesis that coefficients across the three 
models are equal. Overall the Chow test proved that our two-sample model has a better fit than the 
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pooled national model.  The results of the central and peripheral models are set out in the second 
and third columns of Table 7 7.  
 
 
                                               
7 It may be that a further increase in fit could be obtained by fitting a separate regression for each of the 15 regions. I did 
that and I ran a Chow test to compare the fit of 15 separate regional regressions with the pooled national model. A Chow 
test did in fact reject a null of equality of coefficients across the 15 regions. However, although the 15 model solution 
showed a better fit, the large number and differences across coefficients made this solution too complicated to interpret. 







Results - Central/Periphery models 
In the central model three of the five capacity-related variables were statistically significant. 
Following the trend seen in the national model, investment budget and budget per capita are 
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positively associated with larger FNDR grant per capita. Unlike those two variables, the percentage 
of affluent citizens in this case is negatively associated with the dependent variable. 
Surprisingly, the control variable ruling party is statistically significant in this model but in a 
counter-intuitive way. Being in the same political party as the president is associated with smaller 
FNDR grant per capita. Finally, the remaining two control variables were positively associated with 
our dependent variable. 
Moving into the periphery model, results were similar to the national one, with all the 
variables showing the same association and directionality. The only difference among these models 
is in the magnitude of some coefficients, Affluent citizens show a stronger association with FNDR 
grant per capita in the periphery model, where a one percent increase in wealthy citizens is 
associated with 27,000 more pesos per capita of FNDR grant per capita. This figure decreases to just 
3,000 pesos in the national model. 
 
Analysis 
As seen earlier the FNDR is the key grant in terms of local investment in Chile. Despite other 
funding sources being available those sources are all decided in Santiago and do not necessarily 
reflect local preferences and needs. Because of this, municipalities place a special importance on the 
FNDR.  
Although the FNDR objectives seek to correct territorial inequalities, compensating regions 
and municipalities that cannot of generating sufficient own revenues, the estimations above suggest 
that such compensation is not being achieved. Thus, it is in conflict with these aims of compensation 
that almost all wealth-related variables in the three models (national, central and peripheral) were 
positively associated with FNDR grant per capita.  
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A one percent increase in skilled staff is associated with 6,000 pesos more FNDR grant per 
capita at the national level and 8.700 in the periphery model. To have Skilled Staff is crucial 
nationwide but it is especially relevant among regions and municipalities far from Santiago.  
The variable Affluent citizens is associated with larger FNDR grant per capita in the national 
and peripheral model and smaller in the central one. In the national model one percent increase of 
Affluent citizens (or one percent less of poor citizens) is associated with 3.800 pesos more of FNDR 
grant per capita, this figure rises to 27,000 pesos in the peripheral model. However, in the central 
model one percent increase is associated with 1.900 pesos less.  
Municipalities with less Affluent citizens are probably less prone to invest in bid writing and 
therefore receiving less FNDR grant per capita. In central regions this trend seems to reverse and 
become progressive but in a smaller magnitude than in the other models.  
The three models showed a positive association between the variable investment budget and 
the FNDR grant per capita. This result might come as a surprise because the objective of the grant is 
precisely to compensate those municipalities without enough funds to invest in their local projects. 
It may be that municipalities with self-funding sources are better able to produce attractive and 
technically sound bids or they might have developed through the years the “grantsmanship” 
necessary to make successful bids.  
The variable common fund dependence was positively associated with FNDR grant per capita 
in the three models. As we saw earlier, the municipal common fund is a horizontal equity fund. Its 
formula is constructed considering the number of poor people living in the municipality and the 
municipal incapacity to generate enough self-revenues. In Chile, more than 50% of the municipalities 
are highly dependent on the common fund (Munoz, 2014) meaning that they cannot self-fund their 
day-to-day operations. The fact that being dependent is positively associated with the FNDR grant 
per capita reveals that the effect of this variable conforms to its redistributive objective. However, 
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we need to take this finding cautiously. Bravo (2014) analysed the common fund distribution and 
realised that its allocation system worked as a disincentive for local tax collection and revenue 
generation. According to her study, municipalities are not willing to undertake tax effort policies 
because they could result in a reduction of the common fund allocation. Municipalities do not have 
an incentive to increase their tax bases and generate more revenues as this would be “punished” by 
the common fund formula. Therefore, this variable could act as a bad indicator of need if 
municipalities are willingly dependent on payments from it. 
The variable budget per capita was positively associated with FNDR grant per capita in the 
three models. This variable is closely related with municipal income and responds to the ability of 
local authorities to generate self-revenues outside central transfers. Like the variable skilled staff the 
effect of budget per capita on FNDR grant per capita is stronger in the peripheral model than in the 
central one. One thousand pesos more in budget per capita is associated with an increase of 1.400 
pesos of FNDR grant per capita in the national model. This figure increases to 2.200 pesos in the 
peripheral model and decreases to just 330 pesos in the central model. It might be that due to the 
smaller number of contestants an increase in budget per capita has a stronger impact in 
municipalities located in the periphery.  
Looking at the control variables it can be said that surface and distance to capital are 
associated with larger FNDR grant per capita. The FNDR allocation process might informally consider 
greater distance from the regional capital as a proxy for municipal isolation and therefore greater 
need. Another probable answer is that it may be that bids far from the centre are comparatively more 
expensive impacting FNDR grant per capita.  
Nevertheless, surface acts as a tricky indicator especially in the south of Chile where we can 
find large but uninhabited areas. It might also be that larger municipalities demand more resources 
to spread them across their territories.  
167 
 
The variable Ruling party was only statistically significant in the central model. It is interesting 
though that the relation was negative between this and FNDR grant per capita. Taking this finding 
and the previous efforts in this area we can conclude that we have not found evidence of political 
bias in the FNDR allocation. In any case we need to take into consideration that FNDR is only one of 
many funding sources available. The fact that regional councillors have the last word in the allocation 
may secure some level of transparency, putting a high price on any political manipulation of the grant.  
Despite its declared objectives, evidence from our statistical analysis indicates that the FNDR 
grant does not respond to social equity. In its allocation, almost all capacity and wealth related 
variables were positively associated with FNDR grant per capita. This fact has been suggested in the 
literature (Piña and Avenaneda, 2017) but this is the first time that capacity is assessed as a multi-
variate phenomenon and regionally segmented for further analysis.   
The strong association of capacity and funds allocation in the peripheral model suggests that 
needy municipalities from outside Santiago struggle to be funded. Without enough resources these 
municipalities have few chances to improve their territories and improve the quality of life of their 
citizens.  
Moreover, and due to its mechanism of allocation, FNDR reinforces intra-regional 
inequalities. Local capacities might be predetermined by factors exogenous to the municipal action, 
such as the number of poor inhabitants or the number of taxable land within its territory. Because of 
this, the association of local capacity and grant allocations raises several questions about its aim and 








This chapter aimed to analyse the allocation of the FNDR, the main source of investment 
locally decided in Chile. Looking at a time span of eight years and more than twenty thousand 
projects, the analysis here performed depicted the main patterns of allocation across municipalities.   
According to the literature review, the competitive selection of grantees favours an efficient 
allocation of public resources (Lamothe, 2015). Since only the best bids are selected, jurisdictions 
would have no chance but to increase their productivity (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The analysis 
performed here found that municipalities with higher capacity are prone to receive a larger allocation 
of FNDR grant per capita. This would suggest that any increase in productivity (if it ocurrs) is not 
evenly spread across jurisdictions, but instead is favouring the ones with more resources and 
capabilities. Due to this, the egalitarian and redistributive aim of the FNDR seems unmatched by its 
actual allocation.  
The Chilean local landscape has been largely described as heterogeneous. Along its 4,200 
kilometres in Chile coexist municipalities such as Timakuel with three officers and Maipu with 2,800, 
and both are required to deliver the same services for their communities.  
This reality has not been properly acknowledged by central government and up until today 
almost all relevant regional decisions are taken from Santiago. Furthermore, the lack of 
communication between central and local government is emphasised by the lack of a regional figure 
who could serve as an intermediate (Orellana, 2009). 
As the first section depicts, poverty (as a proxy of municipal need) is a bad predictor of FNDR 
grant per capita and this is especially true among low and middle-populated municipalities. Highly-
populated jurisdictions with high-poverty had the best bid success rate  when compared withthe 
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other categories in the same cohort but, given their small number, this effect seems more like an 
exception rather than a rule. 
On average the bid success rate across jurisdictions was only 12% for the studied period. This 
could be due the lack of resources or the difficulties of the system to respond to local needs. In terms 
of the FNDR grant per capita the allocation across municipalities seems to favour smaller jurisdictions 
and be fairly similar among middle and highly-populated ones. Low-populated jurisdictions, 
represent more than 40% of the total sample and in that category, low-poverty seems to be a strong 
predictor of funds allocation.   
Municipal need, measured as the percentage of affluent citizens, seem like a bad predictor of 
FNDR grant per capita. To enrich the analysis and explore this trend further, the second section test 
the association of 5 capacity-related variables with the allocation of FNDR grant per capita.  
As the regression models evidence, the amount of FNDR grant per capita is highly associated 
with local capacities and this association is more robust as we move outside central regions.  
Municipalities with fewer affluent citizens, low percentage of skilled staff and small budgets 
are less able to secure larger FNDR grant per capita. The literature suggests that mixed grant 
distribution strategies improve the social equity of fund distributions (Piña, 2017). The FNDR, despite 
using a mixed strategy (regional allocation by formula, local allocation via competition), does not 
seem to reduce the undeniable inequalities between municipalities. It would seem as if entry barriers 
are too high to allow high-poverty jurisdictions to participate successfully.   
If its aim is to foster territorial compensations the FNDR award mechanism should better 
consider that local capacities have a strong positive effect on the likelihood of bid success. This is in 
conflict with the stated aims of FNDR so the implication is that the mechanism of award needs to 
change.  The first step in this direction may be policies to increase the proportion of skilled staff in 
low-income jurisdictions.   
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To increase this proportion, part of the FNDR budget could go towards local bid preparations, 
sending ad-hoc officers to support small and deprived municipalities during the stage of bid 
formulation. This would diminish the amount of projects funded, but would increase the equality of 
the distribution, a reasonable trade-off to achieve FNDR objectives.  
Many local governments are not able to exploit economies of scale because of their small 
budgets and reduced staff. A simple strategy to solve this is through local cooperation. Central 
government could encourage cooperation between small municipalities promoting cooperative bids 
where small jurisdictions could join forces.   
As it is now FNDR grant allocation reinforces local inequalities and increases the gap between 
affluent and deprived municipalities. The pattern evidenced in this chapter may act as a disincentive 
to young and talented professionals to remain in their regions. With limited possibilities to generate 
a significant impact on their territories, skilled officers would probably migrate to Santiago or other 
regional capitals increasing the centralisation of the system and its unbalances.  
To sum up, if the FNDR, and the Chilean government at large, wants to encourage a balanced 
and sustainable development, the FNDR distribution needs to be updated to face the striking 
disparities among jurisdictions. In the following chapter I assess FNDR competition by examining the 
discourses of their protagonists in the second phase of my two-part analysis. Chapter Seven seeks to 
deepen the understanding of the above findings, incorporating the officers’ perspective into the 







CHAPTER SEVEN: THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION, THE CASE OF 
LOCAL GRANTS IN CHILE 
 
 
7.1   Introduction  
 
The statistical analysis conducted in the previous chapter revealed that FNDR grant 
competition favours jurisdictions with better capacities. In this chapter, I aim to explore this process 
in greater depth by analysing the views of protagonists as collected in interview.  
Scholarly attention has been mainly focused on how central government allocates resources 
to subnational authorities. This leaves a gap that I try to bridge by exploring local grant competition 
from a bottom-up perspective, interviewing sixteen municipal officers and five officials from regional 
and central government offices.  
The statistical analysis conducted in Chapter Six was used to feed my sample selection, 
revealing the FNDR funds allocated per capita per municipality (clusters and municipalities selected 
are presented in Table 2 section 4.4.3). Interviews were conducted between April and June of 2017. 
I used thematic analysis as the strategy to collect opinions, stories and experiences during the 
competitive process; I then extracted the main elements of the discourses and aggregated them in 
topics to be further analysed (topics are list in Table 3 section 4.4.4).  
According to my research design, I frame intermunicipal competitions for grants under New 
Public Management (NPM) theory. This is the first point of departure from which I explore the 
discourses of my interviewees. I avoided treating grant competition as a blank slate, tracking three 
attributes previously raised in the theory and embedded in my questionnaire (Brennan et al, 1998). 
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The pivotal attributes8 were: efficiency (or value for money), local empowerment and innovation. 
These three attributes provided a succinct synthesis of many of the reported benefits of grant 
competition and were also broad enough to aggregate a different set of ideas.  To these three topics 
I purposefully added two more to test the impact of competition on intermunicipal collaborations 
and the perceived fairness of the scheme. 
From there, I broaden the discussion to new emerging topics, linking them, when possible, 
with previous analyses found in the literature and relevant theory. I decided to use a 
phenomenological approach to understand the personal experiences of my interviewees with the 
minimum possible preconceptions. According to Baker et al (1992): “The goal of phenomenological 
research is to describe the world-as-experienced by the participants of the inquiry in order to discover 
the common meanings underlying empirical variations of a given phenomenon” (p.1356).  
The semi-structured questionnaire was designed to capture the essence of the administrative 
procedure of competition and the conceptions arising from it. Below I analyse how grant competition 
shaped the way municipalities work, plan and administer their territories. The voices of local and 
central government officers are interwoven as appropriate to construct a comprehensive fabric of 
narratives.   
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first three are composed of the attributes 
brought to light during the literature review. The fourth section comprises the topics purposefully 
selected by me whilst the fifth and final section comprises the new topics that emerged from the 
analysis.    
 
                                               
8 As previously stated the impact on partnerships was the fourth element raised by the literature. Nevertheless, it was 
excluded from this analysis due to its limited UK focus.  
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7.2   Analysis   
 
Before setting out the analysis a few clarifications will be made. To recap the process 
described in section 5.4.2: FNDR competition involves three governmental tiers and four groups of 
officers. Firstly, local officers discern a local need, write a bid and send it to be evaluated. Then, a 
central government evaluator marks the bid according to a perception of its social return. If the bid 
is positively marked, it needs to be prioritised by the (centrally appointed) regional Intendente and 
then voted on by the regionally elected regional council. Funds are only transferred to the 
municipality once these two bodies have judged it as suitable for funding.  
 
7.2.1 Value for money or money for value?  
The first concept to analyse is the NPM attribute that grant competitions may foster a better 
use of government resources. According to theory, jurisdictions in competition have an incentive to 
reveal the true costs of their needs, increasing the efficiency of the system (Colin and Gerber, 2006). 
Behind this idea lies the notion that central government could act as a guarantor of state resources 
and enhance the exchange of low-cost information between grantees and grantor. 
A key element of the Chilean FNDR competitive scheme is the appraisal mechanism as 
designed by the Chilean Ministry of Social Development (MIDESO). This central agency carries out 
the process of evaluation, and if it judges appropriate certifies the bid looking for funding. For the 
purpose of this section, the concept of value for money has been deconstructed into three topics 
that emerged during interviews: municipal capacity, the project appraisal scheme and the irrelevance 
of local needs. These three topics synthesise the discussions about the question of efficiency gains 




The literature review showed that municipal capacity, measured as income, number/quality 
of staff or grantsmanship was a main driver of competition success (Beam and Conlan, 2002; John et 
al, 2004; Carley et al, 2015). This idea was also depicted in Chapter Six where four out of the five 
variables measuring municipal capacity were positively associated with larger FNDR allocations (in 
the national model). 
In the interviews, capacity was mostly understood as the number of officers working in the 
planning department with enough expertise in bid formulation. In Chile, since this number is largely 
driven by the population living in each jurisdiction, and relatedly by the available budget to hire new 
staff, small and deprived municipalities feel that lack of capacity was an unbridgeable disadvantage 
against them. As an officer from a medium sized municipality argued:  
 
“Small municipalities have just a few officers with enough technical capacities and 
that is the reason why they are left behind time and again… and that becomes 
apparent in the development of the comuna”.   
 
This idea was also shared by a central government officer who reinforced this argument 
stating that: 
 
“Rural municipalities just gave up on big projects, because they feel that they don’t 
have any competence or capacity to bid for them”. 
 
Interviewees generally believed that in the FNDR competition there was a problem of scale in 
which medium and large municipalities had an advantage over small ones. This situation supports 
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the argument made by John and Ward (2005) about the limited scope of grant competition when 
entry costs are high enough to discriminate between bidders.    
For local officers the problem of capacity was structural and almost impossible to tackle 
internally. Thus, there was a clear sense of resignation drawn from the discourses of officers who felt 
that under the current circumstances there was nothing else that they could do. As one municipal 
officer said:  
 
“No municipality has the resources to invest in infrastructure…municipal monies 
should be spent on social assistance where with a few resources you can make a lot 
of difference… and help more directly”. 
 
The above quote reflects a feeling that was shared by many local officers who argued that 
direct social assistance was the main local priority to the detriment of infrastructure investment.    
Central and regional officers agreed on the difficulties experienced by local authorities but 
diverged in their view of the causes of these difficulties and the role that local officers should play in 
that context. From a central perspective, the capacity problem was instead caused by poor choices 
made by local officers. Most of the discourse given in this respect rests on the idea that the 
opportunity to be funded was open to everyone and it was just a matter of effort to secure it. As one 
respondent from central government argued:  
 
“It is true that there is a structural problem related with the lack of resources… but 
when there is good local management all this is secondary because you look for a 
good and professional officer until you find him, you take him to your municipality, 
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you convince him, you pay him the best that you can, you take care of him… one day 
he will leave so you need to go and find another one”. 
This quote reflects how for the respondent, context (and its limitations) was irrelevant 
compared with competition requirements. This idea conflicts with the local officer discourses 
according to which investing in a qualified officer is a superficial expenditure compared with urgent 
social assistance.    
Municipalities must rely on their own resources when central government transfers are not 
enough to cover the costs of public health and education. This situation affects their willingness to 
invest in any other area with a longer-term return. Taylor (2002) discussed the impact of NPM in the 
UK in this type of context and states: “New public management cannot be assessed in isolation from 
the pressure on public expenditure and the low morale caused by these policies… the drive for 
efficiency savings and the general erosion of morale in the public sector bore particularly heavily on 
areas where people could not opt out into the private sector” (p.112).  
Municipalities in Chile are in many cases the only service provider that deprived residents can 
afford so they overcrowd public schools and health centres and require resources in the form of 
social assistance. According to a study conducted by the Chilean School of Local Governments 
(AMUCH, 2015) 65% of the public health centres are in the poorest municipalities, further increasing 
the pressure on the already tight local budgets. This situation was addressed by one interviewee who 
argued:  
 
“Because of the capacity of our human resources we cannot move too fast [in the 
project formulation] we have lots of necessities here, we have shanty towns, 
problems with public street lighting among many others… we cannot focus on only 
one thing, we need to cover all these necessities”. 
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In contrast, affluent citizens have the alternative of using private providers and thereby 
relieving some pressure on the public services, allowing their municipalities to invest in a better staff 
and bids to compete for resources. Taylor (2012) makes a similar point for the UK, arguing that: “The 
operation of the market itself intensified social exclusion. Statistics showed a widening gap between 
rich and poor as industrial restructuring took its toll and the introduction of market principles and 
consumer choice accelerated this gap” (p.112). 
Central government interviewees acknowledged these situations but believed that local 
officers could do more despite the difficult circumstances. In the interviews one of the recurring 
means to support the fairness of competition was to constantly refer to success stories. These stories 
usually hinged on demonstrations of exemplary leadership and resilience and served as a 
counterpoint to the harshness of the system. As one central government interviewee argued:  
 
“One good and skilled person can change everything…X used to work in Y 
municipality, she called all the time, she was all over the place, she didn’t leave you 
any peace, coming and asking all the time about her project”.  
 
Another respondent also from central government supported this and argued: 
 
 “How can you explain to me that the Mayor of X won more resources than the one 
from Y [a much larger municipality]? How can that be explained? When you have 
weak leaderships that can happen”. 
 
Literature on leadership has evidence that up to certain extent, the system determines the 
success of a leader. A leader, it is argued, rarely overcomes systems that are not designed for them 
178 
 
to flourish, thus a leader’s overall impact may be modest due to organisational constraints and inertia 
(Wart, 2003). Organisations built upon the emergence of exceptional leaders can also be unstable. 
To succeed over time, organisations must rely on comprehensive approaches where the whole 
organisation is able to cope with stress and difficult contingencies (Daus and Joplin, 1999). 
In contrast, for local officers the road to success in the FNDR was not that clear. They believe 
that the context in which they were working had a substantial impact, and in some cases, it entirely 
determined the chances of obtaining funding. They argue that competition has exacerbated regional 
imbalances, widening differences between municipalities. In this regard an officer from a deprived 
municipality argued:  
 
“An officer from X [a poor and rural municipality] came to see our pool to get some 
advice, and when he came I realised that the differences are enormous; the officer 
came one time per month to the central offices in Santiago and he didn’t know 
which forms to fill in….how could he win anything!! And most of the municipalities 
in Chile are like X…There are some enormous differences and that bothers me… it is 
like a structural inequality from birth. If you were born in this side of the street you 
are from this municipality but if you were born on the opposite, you could have a 
completely different life and that is ruled by law”.  
 
Based on the above we can see that there was a tension between the discourses given by 
central and local officers prompted by the context in which grant competition takes place. For central 
government officers, competition was an unbiased mechanism in which every local authority has a 
transparent chance to succeed. Even when local capacities are, to central officers, admittedly 
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different across jurisdictions, stories of success served to allow central officers to say that, even in 
the toughest context, success is always a possibility.  
Local officers, on the other hand, argued that success in competition is almost always context-
determined, favouring better-off municipalities. Central officers reassured themselves that the 
system is responsive but argued that local officers are sometimes incompetent. Local officers 
reassured themselves that they do good work, but the system is unfair.  
Chapter Six evidenced that better-off jurisdictions had better chances of bidding success. That 
would imply that regardless of the leader (who still is determined by the context) the system is biased 
toward better resourced municipalities. Moreover, the reliance on a leader to overcome adversity 
depicts the fragility of the competitive scheme.  
 
The appraisal mechanism  
NPM shifted the focus of policy evaluation mechanisms from inputs to outputs. This change 
meant that across government institutions recipients of funds were held accountable to specific 
metrics. In the words of Osborne  (1993), this was a necessary shift since: “Most public agencies do 
not have the slightest idea what the real outcomes of their efforts are…Entrepreneurial governments 
have learned to measure the outcomes of what they spend: how clean their streets are, how many 
job trainees get jobs, and what their career tracks look like. They have learned to measure how 
satisfied their customers are with the transit system, the parks, and the schools” (p.354). 
The Chilean government was influenced by these ideas and incorporated them into its 
practice. In the contexts of grant competition, they implemented an ex-ante evaluation mechanism 
for all local projects bidding to be centrally funded by the FNDR. We can set out how the evaluation 
mechanism works. Each of the 15 regions in Chile works with one of the regional offices of the 
Ministry of Social Development that evaluates the local projects. The project appraisal methodology 
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requires the comparison of different alternatives proposed to tackle some infrastructure need 
identified by a given municipality. In each case the municipality is asked to give a range of alternative 
solutions to respond to that need and show how their proposal is the most cost-effective among 
them. According to its area of provision (sports, health, education) each project bid is sent to an 
officer specialised in that specific field but regardless of the field, the number of beneficiaries of the 
project is considered a key part of the mechanism that decides which project is deemed to have a 
positive social return and which not.   
According to local officers, the use of the number of potential beneficiaries as an important 
ingredient in calculating the social return of an infrastructure project had major effects on the 
outcome of the competitive scheme. Small municipalities struggled with the appraisal methodology 
when they realised that the number of potential beneficiaries was not enough to surpass the 
minimum threshold to be positively marked. Facing this situation, officers argued that the only way 
to get the correct figures was by lowering costs (compromising quality). Otherwise they might simply 
discard the bid. This situation was so critical that adjacent authorities applying for the same design 
of project ended up with strikingly different results, just based on their population size. As one officer 
from a medium size municipality argued:  
 
“Almost any project will have a positive social return in a municipality with 100 
thousand people but If you move that same project to a municipality of four 
thousand it won’t, so you have to decrease the quality standards. In this region, 
there are two neighbouring municipalities - one small and one medium size -  both 
evaluate a football pitch but in the medium size, the pitch had synthetic grass and 




The appraisal mechanism was viewed negatively in almost all small size municipalities. They 
believed that in competition, the potential number of beneficiaries again favoured municipalities with 
more inhabitants. This situation caused dissatisfaction with the system, discouraging participation.  
For some officers the appraisal mechanism acted as an insurmountable entry-barrier, 
especially in municipalities with a decreasing population. They felt that it was radically unfair that 
municipalities had to reduce a project’s quality according to the number of people living in the 
jurisdiction. Two officers even suggested that because of that requirement, small municipalities 
might use deception in their applications, making up figures on their forms to get the approval from 
the central government evaluator.  
The metric used to assess projects’ quality is sensitive to scale but too coarse to allow 
consideration of any other needs or to incorporate local circumstances. This was true not only with 
small municipalities but also with large ones. An officer from one of the largest and most congested 
municipalities argued:  
 
“This municipality was high in the ranking of funds allocated and that was the 
reason why in the past we didn’t compete, but the evaluation of the comuna was 
made generally without looking at our particularities. X has 300,000 inhabitants but 
daily more than 2 million people pass through here”.    
 
The smallest and largest municipalities of the sample shared the opinion that competition 
was too sensitive to scale, emphasising the idea that only jurisdictions with enough resources and 
population were able to compete.      
The population requirements of the appraisal mechanism sent a wrong signal for a grant 
which has the aim of generating balanced development across jurisdictions. It can also set up a vicious 
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circle where people migrate to populated areas looking for better services and infrastructure, 
although the exodus of population is one of the main reasons why services were poor in the first 
place. According to an officer who had experience working in small and large municipalities the 
project appraisal method:  
 
“is an instrument of centralisation more than one of decentralisation. Investment 
follows population because first you have concentration of people and then comes 
the investment, through the FNDR it is absolutely impossible… there is no chance to 
motivate a city to escape the lethargy through the FNDR because we don’t have the 
possibility to generate a positive social return in a municipality with a diminishing 
population”.     
 
Buchanan (2001) argued that fiscal inter-jurisdictional disparities are exacerbated by the 
uneven distribution of wealth and the different bases to finance the provision of goods and services. 
Thus, this situation would require the intervention of central government because: “Absent any 
scheme for fiscal equalization among the disparate regions, there is no assurance that the resource 
concentration patterns that will emerge reflect overall economic efficiency, quite apart from any 
equity considerations” (Buchanan, 2001, p.10).  
Adopting Buchanan’s argument, without an equalisation scheme there will be an over-
concentration of resources in the better-off municipalities. Because of this, citizens in high-income 
municipalities may offer fiscal inducements to those in low-income municipalities to remain there. In 
the present case, it can be said that an allocation scheme that favoured worse-off municipalities 
might be beneficial to the citizens living in high-income municipalities. The FNDR competitive scheme 
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fosters a migration to larger and wealthier municipalities, encouraging an unequal resource 
distribution without a clear increase in overall efficiency.       
Moreover, the fact that central officers treat all bids equally does not change the reality that 
differences do exist across municipalities. The FNDR’s pursuit of fairness and transparency seems to 
clash with its objective of horizontal equalisation. In an environment marked by municipal 
heterogeneity, it can be argued that the FNDR should be more flexible and should take account of 
the differing capacities of jurisdictions to better accomplish its equity goal.  
Municipalities with less capacity or decreasing population cannot increase the number of 
project beneficiaries so they must reduce project costs to receive technical approval, compromising 
the overall quality of the proposed project. This situation promotes the delivery of services with 
different standards, causing low populated municipalities to lag behind.  
The number of beneficiaries may be a sound metric to calculate total benefits of local bids, 
but can be counterproductive to address differences of needs. This problem will be discussed below. 
 
Size matters but needs do not 
Being so broad and multiple on its objectives, the FNDR competition system lacks any formal 
protocol for bid prioritisation and indirectly favours big authorities. This situation overlooks the 
Chilean socio-political context marked by the variation of territories and local actors. As seen above, 
the evaluation process is not constructed to make qualitative distinctions between bids and treats 
them all in the same standardised way, calculating project costs against benefits determined largely 
by the number of beneficiaries. This situation fosters transparency but for central government 




“Not everything needs to be equal, for starters municipalities don’t have the same 
capacities… but as in all policies there is no differentiation, they [central 
government] take each region as equal to the rest, take every municipality as equal 
to the others so the system is going to be unbalanced”.  
 
One of the local officers was especially frustrated by the economic ethos of the system and 
argued that some projects should be funded regardless of their social return, in his words:  
 
“It is said that a school with 20 students should be closed…that could be the case in 
Chillan [one of the largest municipalities in the region] where you can close a school 
because you have all the facilities in the world, but if you close a school of 20 
students here, those kids are going to leave their studies, there should be a 
modification [to the appraisal mechanism] to take into account this realities…. If 
they asked the same for an urban municipality of 50,000 inhabitants than for a rural 
one of 6, there should be some compensation mechanisms”.   
 
Okun (1975) explains that unregulated competition could compromise the minimum rights 
on which democracy was originally built. He argues that the disparities of the market need to be 
counterbalanced by aid transfers to those with low income so they can achieve a decent standard of 
living. In Chile, grant competition was installed without considering the uneven distribution of wealth 
and, over the years, government has been unable to ensure a minimum standard across jurisdictions. 
Contrary to this, grant competition has increased the gaps between municipalities in a zero-sum 
game where differences are not acknowledged.  
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The evaluation aims to maximise the social return of the resources invested but has worked 
against jurisdictions with high needs and small populations. Respondents were keen to criticise the 
lack of a long-term perspective on investment. Currently, the evaluation does not take account of the 
projected impact of local investments. On the contrary, it only recognises infrastructure shortages of 
municipalities with enough resources and population to build their case. In following this approach 
the FNDR competitive grant is condemned to act reactively trying to solve present deficits but unable 
to invest in plans with the potential of boosting the future of a jurisdiction.  
The appraisal mechanism is one of the main strategies intended to inform the value-for-
money paradigm of public spending. In line with the existing literature in the field (Stanton, 1996, 
John and Ward, 2004), Chilean local officers are sceptical of an appraisal mechanism reduced to one 
financial dimension.  
The standardised evaluation, in using the number of beneficiaries to assess a bid’s public 
value, secures high quality investments only in populated municipalities, regardless of other needs. 
The FNDR pursuit of efficiency seems to overcome other policy goals such as equality and legitimacy. 
This imbalance is unfitted to accomplishing FNDR objectives and because of this, has generated 
frustration among local officers.   
The objective of this section has been to establish how the NPM paradigm of value for money 
has mapped out into the Chilean case of the FNDR competition. Consistently with the findings of the 
previous chapter, local officers believed that capacity-related variables (such as staff size and budget) 
were key to securing FNDR funds. Despite conceding the relevance of the uneven local context, 
central government officers recounted examples of success against the odds to support their 
preferred view, that winning was a matter of effort and hard work. 
To use potential beneficiaries as a multiplier in calculating total benefit may be technically 
correct but indirectly it has encouraged low levels of and lower quality public investment in smaller 
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jurisdictions. In this context small and deprived municipalities are discouraged from competing for 
FNDR funding, knowing that regardless of needs, project bids would likely fall short when evaluated.    
 
7.2.2 Local empowerment - autonomy 
The previous section depicted how municipal capacity and the appraisal mechanism acted as 
the main entry barriers to municipalities engaging in grant competitions. In the following, I examine 
how the Chilean FNDR grant competition system relates to local autonomy and self-determination.  
NPM scholars have argued that grant competition would enhance local determination due to 
a local hands-on approach in the bid formulation and the limited impact of central government 
decisions (Sager, 2011). The prospect of funding an investment project outside the centrally-decided 
ministerial agenda was celebrated among the interviewees, but they noted a series of issues 
threatening such an outcome. The main discussions are set out below, grouped by narrative 
proximity into five different topics: grantsmanship, the role of the evaluator, trust issues, signals of 
the market and governmental help.  
 
Grantsmanship  
Local officers positively stressed the breadth of the competitive scheme as well as the 
opportunity to improve their infrastructure stock. Competition nationally gave the opportunity to all 
municipalities to improve their local services and some of them seized it, as one local officer argued:  
 
“During the year 2000 in X we set ourselves an investment process taking into 
account our limitations in budget and population, we had 12,000 inhabitants and 
only two officers in the planning department but we got a huge amount of 
investments and since the town was small we transformed the comuna”.  
187 
 
Municipalities with expertise in grant competition or particularly able leaders developed 
strategies to foster their success and in some cases were able to attract large amounts of funding 
regardless of their size. One of the recurrent strategies was to have a portfolio of technically-
approved projects during the first year in office. By doing so, municipalities moved ahead of their 
competitors and suffered less competition when the funds were finally allocated. As one interviewee 
argued:  
 
“During our first year we had 12 projects evaluated with a positive social impact, 
we beat Maipu and Santiago [two of the largest municipalities in Chile] and what 
happened? When the funds were allocated and since there were just a few other 
projects all the monies came here”. 
 
A mayor capable of investing in grant competition and possessing sufficient political leverage 
was able to change the face of their jurisdiction. Among the interviews a few of these cases were 
mentioned but they were seen more as an isolated example than a regular practice.  
Local officers with experience of writing sound bids were in high demand, especially among 
municipalities distant from the capital. FNDR does not allow any incentive structure to the team in 
charge of the bids; therefore municipalities struggled to retain their skilled officers when a raise or 
promotion was impossible. The migration of officers to favoured municipalities willing and capable 
to invest more, was clearly to the detriment of deprived jurisdictions unable to compete with their 
wealthier counterparts.   
In the FNDR, grantsmanship had the potential to attract large investments into a municipality. 
Despite this, the costs of retaining skilled officers was seen as a clear disadvantage for needy 
jurisdictions.       
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The role of the evaluator 
In contrast to what NPM theory asserts (De Valk et al, 2005), local officers saw the 
involvement of central government evaluators as an obstacle to local autonomy. Evaluators are 
centrally-appointed, non-political officers in charge of reviewing local bids and deciding if they are 
accepted or not. For local officers, evaluators needed to be persuaded that the project submitted 
fulfilled all the technical and sometimes aesthetic requirements to get the approval.  
When projects did not pass evaluators’ appraisal they were returned to the municipality to 
be amended. This process could be repeated several times until they were finally approved. It is in 
this iteration between local and central that differences start to come to light.  
Tullock (1975) argues that central government bureaucrats acting for their own benefit are 
prone to develop standards as an expression of their personal inclinations. Local officers agreed with 
this idea as the following quote reflects:  
 
“Analysts want the project to be as they want it to be, everyone in central 
government wants to be able to say ‘that was the fruit of my work’”.  
 
Scott (1998) has provided a more recent but similar perspective on the nature of such central-
local interactions. According to him, officers try to make their environment legible through static and 
standardised measures in an effort to close systems marked by heterogeneity. Scott argued that the 
use of these standardised measures is not just to make their job easier but also to use it as an 
authoritative tune to which the population must dance. Local officers describe encountering this kind 
of authoritarian direction set by the evaluators and believed that the system put a burden on them 




“The system is not equivalent among professionals, despite the idea that we are 
equal, the system puts you in unequal conditions. The professional opinion of a local 
officer many times is not seen to be as valid as the opinion of an evaluator and there 
appears to be a degree of central discretionary power because the system itself puts 
the evaluator’s opinion above the local officers’ opinion”.   
 
Under any dispute, the evaluator’s opinion prevailed regardless of whether they were able to 
understand the particularities of the project. One officer even defined the process as a violent one 
because:  
 
“They [the analysts] treat you as a child; the relation goes from evaluator to local 
officer from a trashy municipality, not from architect to architect. They are an 
eminence and make you feel the difference because they have the power”. 
 
Local officers describe perceiving that they were unrecognised by central evaluators; this idea 
was repeated by most of the local officers who saw the process as discretionary and asymmetrical. 
Central government evaluators used an imposition of their personal views to show that they were in 
control, introducing changes to local projects regardless of the relevance of the changes, with a 
consequent negative impact in local officers’ morale.  
For Kirchgassner and Pommerehne (1993), low-cost decisions are those where the outcome 
is of low impact on the decision-maker. It is possible to see many of the decisions of evaluators as 
being low-cost for them despite their high cost to local communities. Kirchgassner and Pommerehne 
argue that this kind of situation creates a complex scenario in the public sphere, leading individuals 
to behave negligently. Under these circumstances, the main incentives to act responsibly would be 
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career considerations such as promotions and pressure from political and scientific peer groups. In 
the Ministry of Social Development, where evaluators work, there is no strong incentive structure 
towards correct decisions and decisions are singly decided so no pressure is exercised by peers or 
superiors.  
Evaluators act to increase their own benefit to a certain extent because they do not have any 
incentive to act differently. Since their actions end up being someone else’s problem they can 
exercise their authoritative decision at little cost. This situation represents a problem for local officers 
who must comply with all central stipulations regardless of whether they are justified or not, 
increasing their frustration.   
 
A matter of trust  
Contrary to what occurred in most western democracies, where NPM was introduced during 
a post welfare state crisis (Osborne, 2006), in Chile NPM reforms were adopted under a feeble public 
administration that had recently followed 17 years of a dictatorial regime and institutional 
breakdown. As depicted in section 5.3 central government officers saw local officers as being 
unreliable and having poor capacity to administer their jurisdictions.   
This situation permeates the grant system, affecting the performance of local actors and their 
autonomy to decide independently. Central government officers shared a sense of condescension 
regarding the municipal capacities to manage external funding, as can be seen in the following quote: 
 
 “The government has the resources to level the pitch, but what happens is that the 
resources are not always well spent by the municipalities? If I hire you to build a 
sewage plant at of Hualaihue [example] and after two weeks they ask you to enlarge 
the kitchen on the school in Tres Puntas and when you are in both projects they give 
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you another one. You could end up doing the entire municipality… so finally the 
sewage plant ends up late and could end up badly. That’s not the objective”. 
 
There is a sense of institutional mistrust between central and local government well 
illustrated by the quote above. As seen, the central government interviewee does not believe that 
the municipality is acting in good faith based on the number of tasks that the officer hired is doing. 
Interestingly, during the interview there was no mention of the reasons for such behaviour. In this 
way, the act of cheating is discursively isolated into its illegality without any consideration of the 
context behind it and its probable causes.  
Institutionally (and sometimes physically) speaking, the distances between central and local 
officers were so great that the connection between them seemed to disappear, making local needs 
somehow invisible from the central standpoint.  
Local officers explained that they had to bend the rules of the assistance policy because the 
needs were too many. As one local officer argued:  
 
“Small municipalities apply for professional assistance but due to their shortcomings 
the least that they [professionals] do is to dedicate time to that specific project, they 
will be doing administrative tasks, they could even be drivers… they will be 
everything because they will be installed in a place with so much need”.  
 
Central government officers may have well-founded claims against municipalities bending the 
rules of assistance programmes. Nevertheless, the system’s inner imbalances put municipalities in a 
hard position.    
192 
 
Officers also felt that the evaluation was a strategy to oversee what local governments were 
doing with the allocated resources. Local officers perceived that central government did not trust 
their capacities and final objectives, so they have put a system in place to supervise them. As one 
local officer commented:  
 
“The whole thing of making us compete was created because they [central 
government] don’t have faith in us… the Mayor and the councillors, once they have 
paid the administrative bills can do whatever they want with the remaining 
resources…no one controls. A Mayor could spend all the resources on social 
assistance or on parties, there is no evaluation of those investments. This forces the 
appearance of these funding systems to make us focus on local investments”. 
 
The idea has taken root in central government that municipalities are fiscally unreliable and 
not prepared to administer local funds independently. This notion consistently emerged among 
central government officers. Under these circumstances, a municipal officer considered that analysts 
saw themselves as the barrier against waste, as the next quote reflects:  
 
“There is this idea that Mayors don’t manage projects to benefit the people but to 
the benefit of their political goals. They think: ‘What would add more votes in the 
next election?’ Because of this, they design “white elephants” that have no value for 
the community. In the light of this situation the central analysts see themselves as 
the guarantors of the state resources to ensure that every project benefits the 
community, but after all, who is the representative of the community in the end? 




Local officers carry the stigma of being bad administrators. That could be due to personal 
experiences or could be the burden of being part of an institution historically underfunded. Most 
jurisdictions do not have enough resources to deliver their services properly so local officers usually 
take advantage of any opportunity they can. Central government officers appeared to be 
disconnected from this reality and doubtful of local officers’ intentions, fostering a marked contrast 
between both government tiers.  
Griffith (1966) identified the tensions that emerged from central and local administrative 
relations in England. He concluded that the defects of the intergovernmental system were based on 
policies that were insufficiently defined to give enough freedom to local authorities. He also argued 
that there were too many small authorities incapable of doing the required jobs; thus, authorities 
were becoming too dependent on central government.  
From the above we could argue that central–local mistrust is not solely based on the 
difference between knowledge or professional credentials. FNDR rules are not defined clearly enough 
to foster an equivalent relation between officers. Under this situation some authorities try to bend 
the rules and take advantage of the FNDR whilst other unhappily comply with the protocols increasing 
their disaffection.   
Central and local officers mistrust the intentions of the other based on historical prejudices, 
poorly defined policies and local shortages. This mix does not ease the building of fruitful relations 
and has negative effects on the overall impact of FNDR.  
 
Market signals  
Local officers believe that central government plays a significant role in grant competition, 
hampering local involvement in the bid formulation. The severe lack of resources experienced locally 
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puts the Mayor and the municipal staff in a difficult position when they want to show empirically and 
physically the fruits of their period in office.  
The necessity of increasing the infrastructure stock of the comuna before the political period 
is over was one of the reasons why municipal officers were willing to bid for any project that central 
government was offering, following the so-called “signals”. These signals came from central 
government but were not in any paper or programme; rather, they emerged from informal 
conversations and meetings where the Intendente or other officer revealed those areas which would 
be more likely to be funded in each competitive round. As one local officer argued:  
 
“We call them ‘sales’ when the Intendente or other central authority suddenly tells 
us, ‘now we are going to fund exercise machines’ and since in one way or another 
that is good for us we apply for the machines, at the end it is that or nothing… After 
they will say ‘cycle paths’ and we will apply for them too… it is fine, we cannot say 
no to anything because we are not in that position… but we would also like to have 
a say in what we really need”. 
 
Central government officers wanted projects that “scored” in their central government world. 
Whether those projects “scored” in the municipality played a very minor part in central government 
thinking. Following this argument another municipal officer commented:  
 
“One needs to respond to the signals, I’m not going to sell green beans if they are 
buying sweet corn…you have to see what the market says independently of the 




The practice of applying for grants for infrastructure that was centrally prioritised was 
repeated among respondents. Tullock (1975) argued that this situation encourages social waste 
because local projects that had to be centrally-adapted will be worth less to the community than 
their cost to central government. This situation is especially severe if we consider the context where 
it takes place. Municipalities are almost forced to subordinate their needs to central steering because 
in one way or another they need to attract investment to their territories and no opportunity can be 
rejected.  
Municipal officers were aware of this situation and knew the approximate amount that they 
would receive following central government signals. As one officer argued:  
 
“We know approximately our yearly quota of funding, and last year we received 5 
thousand million pesos, in that regard the Mayor said, ‘If they would allow me to 
have the freedom to decide in which areas I can spend that money I would probably 
have invested it in a much more useful way, but since I can’t I had to spend it in 
projects that maybe weren’t that important to us ”.  
 
Under these circumstances, grant competition ignores a key part of the theory of fiscal 
federalism set out by Oates (1972). Local authorities know how to cater for their specific local tastes, 
so any standardised alternative coming from the outside will be less efficient than the one locally 
proposed.  
Central government often provides a paternalistic model of management in which 
municipalities are seen as not capable of administering external funds or deciding which projects 
should be prioritised. Despite this, and due to the lack of resources, local officers had to follow the 
signs to attract investment.  
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Help    
Another, and more subtle, way in which this asymmetry emerged during interviews was 
embodied in the discursive form in which local and central government officers described their 
relationship. Local officers repeatedly referred to the funds received as a form of “help” from central 
government. As an external observer, aware of the complexities of the system, I was surprised that 
despite all the emphasis placed on competition for funding, local officers did not feel that any 
resulting grant was deserved or owned. Local officers did not feel like they were worthy enough of 
that prize and that perception was often expressed during the interviews. One example of this can 
be observed in a quote from a small, rural municipality:  
 
“Some [municipalities] can finance more than others because of their capacities and 
political belief, but if you go there [central government offices] and you sit to talk 
with them [central government] they will help you”.  
 
A central government officer also used this expression to explain the central-local relationship 
as we can see in the following quote:  
 
“The mayor of X used to come every week to see me, until I told him, ‘don’t come 
any more, don’t waste your money what do you want from me?’ So, when he arrived 
with the project I said ‘I have to help this chap’ and I did”. 
 
Contrary to what theory suggests  (University of Bath, 2014), local officers did not feel that 
they deserved the funds even after passing a technical and political evaluation. This could be due a 
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general feeling of hopelessness or because they do not see themselves or their municipalities as 
being on the same level as central government.    
Grant competitions cannot be isolated from their historic and institutional framework and in 
Chile old practices have been transferred into several aspects of the funding allocation. Some of these 
practices can be traced back to the colonial era where metropolitan areas were the guarantors of the 
civilised life and the administrator of the resources (Montencinos, 2005). A regional officer stressed 
this idea, arguing that traveling to the capital (regional or national) was essential to secure funds as 
can be seen in the following quote:  
 
“Historically to solve any big issue you had to go to the capital, that could be the 
court during the Spanish empire or the Vice royal. That still happens going to 
Santiago or Concepcion it is just part of the system”.  
 
This “trips to the capital” effect should not be understated because geography means that it 
can take more than ten hours for an officer in the Bio-Bio region to get to Concepcion, and any visit 
to Santiago would probably require a flight. This places another burden on isolated and rural 
municipalities that cannot afford those travel expenses. Nowadays when telecommunications are 
easier than ever it was surprising to find that a major part of project management was only possible 
in face-to-face meetings. Apparently, this was part of the political culture of the intergovernmental 
relations in Chile, where even the smallest issues need to be treated personally and close to the 
source of political power and decision. 
Chirenje et al (2013) argue that in developing countries top-down decision making has been 
ineffective in terms of achieving sustainable development. The relegation of local communities to the 
position of recipients and implementers alienates them, causing them to disengage from the process 
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of planning and budgeting. This paternalistic relation between central and local officers can be traced 
in the interviews. Municipalities believed and acted as if they were the weakest link in the institutional 
structure, and central government officers generally held that view.  
Because of their dependence on central government monies, municipalities cannot directly 
execute their plans and policies, so they invest their time and money trying to build a case that can 
move the opinions of officers in charge of the funds distribution.  
Most municipalities do not feel empowered or able to deliver appropriate local policy outputs, 
so they attempt to gain central government trust via visits and time-consuming travels. The current 
competitive system inhibits the autonomy of the competitors, making them comply with unwritten 
central guidelines and engage in expensive visits to the capital to present views that could easily be 
communicated remotely . Evaluators are also prone to show their authority as well as other 
ministerial officers for whom the local–central relation is essentially asymmetrical.   
 
7.2.3 Innovation and Delivery  
This third section discusses how grant competitions could be a vehicle to reduce bureaucracy 
and promote innovation among the competing jurisdictions. NPM suggests that one of the main 
features of grant competition is its capacity to reduce red tape, fostering a direct relation between 
the grantor and grantees (Thompson and Riccucci, 1998). This mechanism could promote a leaner 
bureaucratic apparatus where the distance between central and local would be shortened. 
Competition may also encourage local innovation, rewarding jurisdictions with the best plans to 





The capacity of competition to reduce red tape was discussed during the interviews and, 
despite some rare exceptions, it was not mentioned by officers involved in FNDR. Officers from 
municipalities with a good record of success argued that communication appeared to flow easily 
between them and central government, although this did not apply generally across municipalities.  
Regional officers played a substantial role during the FNDR competition, acting as the 
intermediary between local needs and central government resources. Their role was key in the 
process of deciding which project would be funded and they did generally seize it. Local officers felt 
that regional councillors, rather than help or plan, delayed the process of project selection to obtain 
recognition for themselves.  
Being democratically elected, regional councillors had to look after their constituencies 
bearing in mind a future election in situations where their interest was not necessarily aligned with 
the municipal priorities. This situation can be observed in the following quote from a municipal 
officer:  
 
“We had these projects ready and they [regional councillors] didn’t approve them 
because they wanted to do it in the following meeting so they could praise 
themselves in front of their citizens, so… we are going to offset the whole 
implementation so the councillors can have a little more credit… you are finally 
punishing the beneficiary purely for political reasons”.  
 
The role of the regional councillor is more administrative than executive, so the few chances 
that they have to play a part in front of the electors are often exploited, in this case delaying the 
execution of a local project for personal recognition. Another recurrent opinion was that regional 
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councillors delayed the selection of projects to justify their role in FNDR competition. An officer from 
the regional council was vocal about this situation and accepted these practices; for him, delaying 
and prioritising was necessary to avoid running out of projects and jobs. Explicitly he stated:  
 
“We (the councillors) could approve all the portfolio of projects in almost one session 
and that is it… the party is over”. 
 
Municipal officers have good reasons to suspect regional councillors’ role in grant 
competition. As rational choice theory proposes, officers are prone to act in their own interest, 
maximising their utility instead of acting in the public interest. Regional councillors have no incentive 
to be diligent if by doing so they become irrelevant in the process. Under these circumstances, 
competition increases rather than reduces the bureaucracy of the local investment distribution. Since 
regional councillors are popularly elected it can be expected that they seize every available 
opportunity to get credit or recognition.  
Competition may decrease transaction costs when there is a direct relation between the 
actors involved (grantor and grantee). In the Chilean case the addition of another elected officer 
prevents this from happening because councillors’ incentives are not in accordance with municipal 
interests and in many cases, they are contrary.  
Lacking resources or political leverage, the role of regional councillors seems limited. 
Moreover, being democratically elected they have an incentive to favour jurisdictions with more 
voters, exacerbating the imbalances within each region. Central government has good arguments for 
reducing the distance between central and local tiers, and the reform of the regional councillor’s role 




Innovation under uncertainty  
The search for new alternatives for service provision has been one of the main motivations to 
develop theoretical arguments for the use of quasi market strategies such as grant competition. 
Under this premise lies the notion that competitive pressure may foster the writing of new and 
innovative bids. This would end the old practice of repackaging local projects taken “off the shelf” to 
receive central government funding.    
The above idea was shared among central and regional officers for whom the FNDR 
represented the best alternative to fund local projects, as one central officer argued:  
 
“The FNDR is the most important source of resources for municipalities, it can fund 
almost anything… which is good, as opposed to ministries which can only fund 
projects in their own area”.  
 
Since 1991 every region in Chile must have a regional strategy of development to guide the 
investment decisions and act as the road map to fulfil regional objectives. As a requirement that must 
be met for the bid to be accepted, local bids seeking to be funded by the FNDR must explicitly explain 
how they respond to the regional plan. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Brunetti, 2009): 
“The strategies of regional development are the main instrument to regulate, orientate and manage 
the development of a region, in harmony with the national plans and policies and taking into account 
the development of local plans” (p.40).  
However, for local officers the regional plan seemed to be merely an abstract procedure with 
no relation to what is finally executed locally. In the words of a central government officer, regional 
plans are just “music” because they are so generically designed that almost anything can be justified 
by them. Since everything is covered by the plan there is never any certainty over what of kind 
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projects will have better chances of being funded in each round. Local officers know that the FNDR 
is the only funding source for their large-scale projects, but the lack of an effective regional plan and 
the delayed time-frames work against their participation. As one officer from a deprived municipality 
commented:  
 
“We prioritise a stadium but we don’t have any clarity if it is going to be a reality in 
3, 4 years more or even if it will see the light at all during this political period…for 
that reason we cannot plan accordingly”.  
 
According to a regional officer, it takes on average 11 months from when a project receives 
funding until construction commences. He also calculated that it could take a minimum of one year 
to receive a positive technical appraisal. Adding those two processes together, it could take two years 
for a municipality to start to execute a project from scratch, without considering the iterative process 
with the regional council. Two years of work for a Mayor who has four years in office and no 
certainties of success was a highly risky bet.  
Such a slim chance of having a stadium is not politically viable, and voters are unaware of the 
length of the process of investment allocation, punish local authorities who fail to deliver what was 
promised. Mayors have little incentive to embark on large or innovative projects knowing that they 
may not materialise during their term in office. This situation was commented on by a regional officer 
who argued:  
 
“Rural municipalities shun large scale projects, because they feel that they don’t 
have the competences or capacities and that in four years [Chilean political cycle] 
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they won’t be able to deliver them, they just simply won’t be willing to spend any 
hours on that”. 
 
Most municipalities in Chile have a small budget to spend recruiting personnel so every 
decision is carefully considered. From the interviews, and in line with the findings made by Buurman 
et al (2012), I can conclude that local authorities are mostly risk-averse. This could be a reason why 
municipalities are not always willing to engage in competitions and when they do, they try to play as 
safe as possible, which hinders any sign of innovation. As one officer argues:  
“Right now there is no certainty when we have to hire officers. It’s not like I’m going 
to invest in human resources because I have this budget and projects to develop, 
probably now the bet is not to promote the secplacs [planning officers] but promote 
other areas because here [planning offices] I don’t have any certainty that I will 
receive any funds. It is a bet that you are placing, but you don’t know if it is going to 
pay off”. 
 
Competition scares away municipalities who are not willing or cannot afford to take risks. The 
central problem is that the risks are not equally distributed among municipalities, so small and 
deprived ones pay a higher price than big and wealthy ones. For small municipalities, bid costs may 
represent an enormous budgetary burden if unsuccessful whilst the wealthy ones may cope with 
those costs better.   
Entering a bid under these terms appears an expensive bet that many deprived authorities 
cannot afford. For municipalities who struggle to fund their services, hiring an officer that potentially 
could help to win a competition is not a feasible alternative. This situation was acknowledged by a 
regional officer who argued:  
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“Many municipalities do not have that priority [hire planning officers] because they 
prioritise social assistance, the clientelistic view of what people need… and so they 
are more willing to spend resources there. They prefer to share those resources on 
social assistance rather than on generating investment projects”.  
 
In line with Pompa’s study (2013) innovation was rarely seen in FNDR competitions because 
the system puts no value on it. Despite the stories of success mentioned by central government 
officers, most local authorities are risk averse and unwilling to engage in competitions with no 
guidelines or time frames, and when they do, they play safe so they can deliver on time. This could 
explain the low number of bids submitted by small municipalities (an average of 50 bids in an eight 
year period) and the limited scope of competitions.  
The three sections presented above condense the main NPM arguments found in the 
literature that have backed the use of grant competitions as a source of funds allocation.. In the next 
section I develop  two purposefully selected topics and then listed the topics  that arose in discussion 
of FNDR competition and contribute to expanding the debate.  
 
7.2.4 Fairness and Intermunicipal collaboration 
This fourth section presents the two topics that I purposefully selected and were outside the 
three pivotal ideas analysed above. The first is the officers’ judgement of the fairness of competition 
and the second is the impact of competition on intermunicipal collaborations.  
 
Fairness 
As seen, local officers are required to engage in grant competition to attract much-needed 
resources. Locally, needs are usually so profound that officers internalise the rules of competition 
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without question. In this context I was interested to find out if officers considered that the 
competitive scheme was a fair method of resource allocation. 
For several officers the system was not fair because it reproduces the regional imbalances. 
For one officer it was even difficult to believe that they were competing for the same resources, being 
at so much of a disadvantage. In this regard he argued: 
  
“How can we [all the municipalities] apply for the same fund. It is unfair we are in a 
deprived area, we cannot generate development…here there is not even a bank nor 
a single drugstore…”. 
 
Another officer from a rural municipality went further and considered that the process of 
competition was offensive because:  
 
“If the need exists you cannot go into a contest to see if it is going to be funded or 
not…you almost have to ask it as a favour… if the need is there you should not spend 
three years trying to win a project, you go into a competition and wealthy 
municipalities play safe”.  
 
Officers from small municipalities felt hopeless facing a system incapable of making 
distinctions in such a heterogeneous environment. For many, the competitive process was so 
frustrating and unfair that they decided to quit, condemning their territories and citizens to lag 




“I believe that it is unfair because if you live in deprived comuna with a bad team of 
officers it can be the case that you do not receive anything from the municipality… 
that they don’t solve any problem”. 
 
Despite this situation, there was a feeling of conformity among central government officers 
built upon the general goal of competition; regardless of its effects, they believed that the system 
does more good than harm. This can be seen in the following quote made by a regional officer:  
 
“I don’t know if the system is or isn’t fair… that is a good question [30 seconds of 
silence] it is a system that should work, there are elements which are external to the 
system creating these disequilibriums… The FNDR is a funding option to generate 
territorial compensation in the territorial disequilibrium, is that good? Of course it 
is good. Is it fair? Of course is fair…it is not unfair…now that the original idea had 
complexities that make it sometimes unfair that is another thing; the unfairness is 
not only related to the external factors, it has to do with the local actors who made 
the first stage of competition”. 
 
The above quote indicates that competition was seen as a positive scheme regardless of the 
context in which it operated and the effects that it carried. As Orellana (2009) argued, local 
competition was installed above a predefined hierarchy of municipalities and deepened the previous 
inequalities among jurisdictions. The hierarchy of municipalities, according to Orellana, was fostered 
by the central government decision of having different standards of services across jurisdictions and 
leaving the market to determine the geographic distribution of wealth. Thus, since the beginning, 
competition has been a necessary but insufficient means to bridge regional disparities. The regional 
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officer believes that FNDR competition is a good strategy because it helps local government to fund 
some of their projects but does no more than that.  
The FNDR competition scheme functions because, regardless of its declared objectives, 
officers feel that there is no chance that the differences would ever be tackled. The idea of having 
national or regional standards of local services is so unthinkable that officers do not believe that any 
policy would succeed. For this reason, officers do not expect much of the FNDR or any other 
competition. It feels as if differences between municipalities has been internalised and nothing can 
be done about it.            
 
Intermunicipal collaboration 
The next topic analysed in this fourth section is the impact of competition on intermunicipal 
collaboration and service delivery. Scholars have agreed that in most western democracies NPM 
measures have been permeated by hybrid methods of service delivery, including more actors in their 
design and implementation (Osborne, 2006; Löffler and Bovaird, 2004). In the following discussion, I 
discuss why in the Chilean case, collaboration has been hampered due to the lack of incentives and 
the influence of competition.  
Competition has installed a zero-sum mentality in local officers where each jurisdiction acts 
in its own benefit. Municipalities are not willing to engage in collaborative sources of service delivery 
mainly because there are no incentives to make that effort. As one officer argued:  
 
“The only thing that you can bid for collaboratively is roads… if you are planning to 
build a school or a health centre the Mayor of the other municipality will oppose it, 
because the one with the school in its territory will be seen as a king… Roads are ok 
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because they go from one place to the other, but any other public infrastructure is 
practically impossible, or better say impossible”. 
 
Decades of intermunicipal competition had an impact on how jurisdictions work and relate to 
each other. This was acknowledged by a central government officer who believed that municipalities 
were highly competitive and jealous of their work, as they neglect the value of associativity. Some 
officers, on the other hand, were aware that public challenges cannot be solved by acting 
independently. This was clearly portrayed by one officer who argued:  
 
“I believe that we should not only discuss about the project that will be built in the 
corner of your house… problems move from one municipality to other, they migrate 
as criminals do; pollution is not located under one municipality, it is a regional issue, 
so we should take decisions from that perspective”  
 
It seemed that municipal officers were aware that many local issues cannot be tackled 
independently but they also believe that they were incapable of doing anything about it. According 
to Bovaird and Löffler (2015): “Public governance pays a lot of attention to how different 
organisations interact in order to achieve a higher level of desired results – the outcome achieved by 
citizens and stakeholders” (p.9). 
I argue that Chilean municipalities are unable to act collaboratively because competition has 





7.2.5 Emerging topics  
This fifth and final section comprises the debates that arose during interviews and were 
outside my topic selection. In Chile, grant competition embodies a set of feelings and practices that 
cannot be attached to the main scholarly NPM discussions but represent a fruitful area to explore. 
Below I present and analyse these three new topics: are we competing?, intra-municipal competition 
and the politics of the visible. 
  
Are we competing? 
Municipalities in Chile are used to competing. The system installed by Pinochet was crafted 
to encourage fragmentation and the governments that followed did not change that reality 
significantly (Bresser Pereira, 2013). Disparities among jurisdictions are stressed due to the lack of an 
Intendente (or regional Mayor) that could actually represent local needs or a set of minimum 
standards shared horizontally. So, in Chile it is not rare to see adjacent jurisdictions with a completely 
different quantity and quality of public services.  
Municipalities compete to attract investment, businesses and residents because they have 
few other means to generate revenue outside the taxes levied on those assets. This situation is 




Figure 9 above shows an example of how the media inform the wider audience about 
intermunicipal competition. The first image is the cover of one popular newspaper in Chile and reads: 
“In which position is your comuna (jurisdiction) located in the quality of life ranking?” and the second 
one: “Iquique (a jurisdiction) is the champion: it moved up 66 places and it is now among the better 
comunas to live in”. 
Inside, the article presents a ranking of 92 jurisdictions, measuring the quality of the local 
services provided in each case. The ranking works as an aggregation of wealth-related variables and 
does not control for variables such as poverty level, taxable land or municipal income. Interestingly, 
there is no explanation of why some municipalities perform worse than others, making it look as if it 
was just a matter of effort to be in a certain position. Again, and as in the central officers’ quote in 
section 6.2, context is implicitly seen as irrelevant for the published competition results. Local officers 
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know about this kind of ranking and feel that the only way to be in a better position is by competing 
in a zero-sum game.       
In general, local officers agreed that they compete for FNDR monies but were reluctant to see 
other jurisdictions as rivals. Part of this conception was determined by the uncertainty over the 
money to be distributed each year and the areas prioritised by the regional councillors and the 
Intendente. As one local officer argued:  
 
“Municipalities don’t know what the regional office is going to fund in terms of 
infrastructure, so for example, if the government announced, we are going to fund 
50% of the street pavement, then all municipalities will compete because we know 
what we are competing for. Now it is not clear why we are competing… there are 
only general ideas”. 
 
A central government officer agreed with this fuzzy vision of the grant allocation but for him 
the lack of clarity was an opportunity not a problem, in his own words: 
 
 “If you need anything FNDR could be a good alternative”.    
 
Some respondents were reluctant to see officers from other municipalities as rivals because 
they had a negative understanding of the term competition. As one officer argues:  
 




In this quote the interviewee omits the funding mechanism without considering the context 
in which these funds are allocated. Competition is an elusive term probably because municipal 
officers still have difficulties associating private sector practices with the ones installed by the NPM 
into the public administration ethos. Another quote from a small and deprived municipality deepens 
this idea:  
 
“Under my understanding you (other municipalities) are not my rival; I understand 
that the system is generating a distortion against me and in favour of the ones with 
more money but we are not competing”. 
 
Officers also believed that due to the complexities of the system, competition could only be 
seen between the few municipalities capable of surpassing the entry barriers. This idea strengthens 
the image of a restricted competition where small municipalities have relatively few chances of 
winning compared to their larger counterparts, as one officer suggested:  
 
“A small municipality with a small team will always be relegated compared with a 
big one which is more competitive and going to accede faster and more easily to 
those resources… the disadvantages of a small municipality are completely 
disproportionate compared to a bigger one”.  
 
Competition is a practice installed among local governments despite the undeniable 
intermunicipal differences. The media accentuate this idea without considering the impact of history 
and the context in which municipalities must deliver their services. Under these circumstances local 
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officers struggle to accept the NPM idea of local competition but comply with the rules in a rather 
deterministic and hopeless spirit.     
 
Intramunicipal competition 
Competition has also been implemented by several municipalities as the strategy to distribute 
their resources internally, mimicking the central government practice. According to Vidal (2012), 
municipal competitive grants are the main method of engagement with the community in the 
municipality of Santiago. Vidal argues that: “Among the mechanisms of participation and involvement 
in the design of public policies I have found that grant competitions have been the only one actually 
implemented” (p.34).  
Espinoza (2004) conducted one of the few analyses on this matter, and found that when 
municipalities made citizens and civil organisations compete for resources only a couple of politically-
active organisations were favoured, leaving out those without enough resources or social capital. In 
doing this, municipalities are reproducing the same situation that they are subjected to by central 
government. Developing this idea Espinoza argues that: “From the moment when the community 
has his own diagnostic for the problem that the grant tries to tackle, an intervention cannot be 
conceived just in terms of efficiency. Moreover, treating participation as a management problem is 
the main threat for the efficiency and efficacy of the programs implemented” (p.167). 
Competition has influenced the way municipalities understand the relationship with their 
constituencies, echoing the NPM paradigm they were subjected to. The impact that competition had 
in the relation between municipalities and stakeholders is outside the scope of the present thesis 
but, based on the analysis made I can predict that some of the effects described here were also likely 
to have been replicated at a local scale. 
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Public administration in Chile has not been able to include collaborative practices in the NPM 
paradigms introduced nearly three decades ago. This situation results from the lack of institutional 
incentives to put in place collaborative approaches for service delivery and is fostered by the use of 
competition across different governmental tiers.  
 
Politics of the visible  
The last topic of this final section discusses how grant competition has shaped the way 
jurisdictions plan their territories. As previously seen, local officers are mostly risk-averse, so they 
want to bid for projects that could actually succeed given the circumstances. Thus, they adapt their 
bids to central government tastes to receive funding. This situation not only hampers innovation but 
also influences how jurisdictions implement their local plans.  
Grant competition is normally decided one bid at a time. This facilitates the appraisal process 
but also works against multi-dimensional needs that cannot be covered by one single intervention. 
Local officers were aware of this and felt that under such conditions competitions would never be 
able to attack the real causes behind their needs. A couple of officers argued that in FNDR 
competition municipalities bid for solutions without considering the underlying problem and because 
of that, they always fell short in their interventions. 
Mayors use FNDR projects for their own political benefit. This is understandable in a context 
where winning a bid is a costly and time-consuming enterprise from which political authorities would 
expect something in return. This situation, nevertheless gives politicians (and thus, voters) a 




“When you talk about plans, processes and times people are disappointed, my aim 
is to generate development but people don’t want to know about processes, they 
care about results within a political term”  
 
This situation incentivises the focus on projects that are more visible to the median voter. 
Since FNDR establishes no priorities of allocation, urgent but politically unappealing projects are 
relegated. Supporting this idea one officer noted:  
 
“Have you realised that in the FNDR portfolio, despite its importance, there are 
almost no projects of rainwater collection? That is because you cannot see them 
and, what political benefit can you obtain from something that people cannot see? 
The Mayor puts high priority on visually appealing infrastructure”.    
 
To rely on the popular will to establish infrastructure priorities can be a risky endeavour. This 
is especially true in contexts when technical knowledge is scarce and needs are multiple. Under these 
circumstances, grant competitions have a major impact on how municipalities plan their territories 
and respond to their constituencies.  
Local plans guided by popular will run the risk of being captured by short-term projects 
selected to please a particular group of voters and these frequently ignore the most urgent needs 
and the length of the competition process.   
To summarise, local officers feel that grant competitions are an unfair but necessary source 
of funding. Local shortages and lack of hope in the system converge, making the FNDR a useful but 
insufficient way to improve their current situation. Moreover, competition has been installed as a 
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practice that hampers horizontal collaboration. This practice has been deeply internalised by 
municipalities and reproduced among their own citizens as a method of resource allocation.  
The installation of this paradigm and the length of the political cycle influence how 
jurisdictions plan their territories. Under a competitive scheme, Mayors trying to respond to popular 
demands have clear incentives to focus on short-term, highly visible projects instead of long-term 




The aim of this chapter has been to describe the effects of grant competition primarily by 
listening to the voices of the main participants. Chapter Six described the main statistical 
determinants of the FNDR distribution. This chapter has examined the accounts of participants in the 
grant process gathered through interviews.  
Following my research framework, my interview instrument was constructed grounded in the 
NPM ideas of value for money, local empowerment and innovation. These three core ideas were then 
supplemented by two purposefully selected topics and a structure of emerging traits that surfaced 
during the interviews.  
In Chile, the state implemented market strategies during a post-crisis period and the marks 
left were deep. Locally, the plan of increasing efficiency (or value for money) through competition 
was considered debatable. Local officers believed that local capacity was the main predictor of 
bidding success and there was nothing they could do to change funding results under those 
circumstances. Central government officers, on the other hand, blamed municipalities for being unfit 
to compete, and quoting stories of success, argued that the FNDR scheme was transparent and the 
chances were the same for everyone involved.  
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The bid appraisal mechanism was a good strategy to secure return on investment, but its 
standardised mechanism was unable to consider intra-region inequities, discouraging bidding by less 
well-resourced municipalities. Central evaluators do not have enough incentives to offset their low-
cost decisions. Without proper incentives evaluators use their power at will regardless of the impact 
of their decisions locally. This has a clear effect on the morale of the local officers involved in the 
process. 
Local involvement (or empowerment) during competition was compromised with municipal 
subordination to centrally-dictated guidelines and informal signals about the areas to be funded. The 
asymmetry between central and local officers was rooted in the institutional culture and emerged 
during the interviews as a source of mistrust and dependence. Innovation was hampered and marked 
by standardisation of processes and high entry barriers to competing, lack of incentives and too many 
uncertainties about what would be funded and when.  
Chilean municipalities refrain from seeing other jurisdictions as rivals even though they are 
accustomed to competing and unwilling to collaborate in bids that will be located outside their 
comuna. The engagement in FNDR competition has had an effect on how municipalities see the 
relation with their citizens, marked by the replication of the competition mechanics in which they 
were involved. All of this had a direct impact on how municipalities plan the development of their 
territories and deliver their services to the community.  
Locally, although competition was a sound strategy to increase efficiency the foundations on 
which it was installed were too fragile and unbalanced to make it work as the theory proposed. Grant 
competitions involve taking risks and betting on probable outcomes, but for local officers, the risks 
were often not worth taking.  
Central government on the other hand, does not have an incentive to change the current 
situation. During competition the Intendente (centrally appointed) and the central evaluators 
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exercise a substantive role in the process of project appraisal and funds allocation. The lack of a 
regional officer (or Intendente) who could actually represent local interests leaves municipalities 
competing against each other and trying to please central authorities at the same time, in an almost 
intolerable situation.   
As seen in the previous chapter, competition fosters territorial inequalities and local officers 
are clearly aware of that. There is a feeling of hopelessness and docility experienced by local officers, 
fed by the asymmetry in their relationship with central government and the sense that despite their 
efforts, nothing will ever change.  
















CHAPTER EIGHT: ANALYSIS 
 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
Privatisation and competition have been used by many governments as a means to increase 
efficiency and reduce costs in public service provision (Seidenstat, 1999). The split between policy 
designer and provider and the inclusion of competition forced agents to reveal the true costs of 
service provision. Nevertheless, the use of competition in public administration has been also 
criticised because of the difficulty of measuring policy outputs and the prioritisation of efficiency over 
equity, among other issues (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). 
In this chapter I address the case of intergovernmental competition by looking at the FNDR 
grant. Throughout the chapter I link my analysis with existing theory and the empirical results of the 
thesis to connect the debates. To present the topics I follow a deductive order of ideas moving from 
a general conceptualisation of competition to the existing situation of NPM and then finish with an 
analysis of the Chilean case.  
The first section of the chapter is devoted to the role of competition in public administration, 
examining the concept of efficiency as an objective of grant competition. The second section follows 
the evolution of NPM. Firstly, I review urban and public administration analyses of the evolution of 
NPM. Then, based on my review I argue that NPM reforms were later progressively influenced by 
new governance theories that prompted collaborative agreements between public and private units. 
Finally, I outline how that influence, over time, permeated into grant competition, changing the 
design and scope of grant competition arrangements.  
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The third section examines the Chilean case. Based on a historical and institutional review I 
depict how the Chilean adoption of NPM diverged from other international implementations. In that 
section I explain why in Chile, competition has prevailed over intermunicipal collaboration. Then, 
after reviewing how NPM reforms were adopted, I look at three effects triggered by its 
implementation. These are: the trade-off between equity and efficiency in Chilean subnational 
authorities, the role of regions in competitions and the effect of grant competition on staff 
motivation. 
My main argument is that NPM was unsuited to performing well in Chile and this has resulted 
in a number of unwanted effects. Chilean public administration was unable to include competition 
without compromising the weak balance between jurisdictions inherited from post-colonial times. 
Thus, municipalities had to cope with what turned out to be cream-skimming competitions where 
central government played a central role. Grant competition in Chile was affected by internal 
shortages of bid-writing resources and lack of political will, limiting the efficiencies gained through it. 
 
8.2 Grant competition and the pursue of efficiency 
 
This first section of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of grant competition and its 
capacity to foster efficiency in the delivery of public services. As seen in section 2.3, competition has 
several attributes that can increase efficiency, improving the quality and quantity of public services. 




8.2.1 Benefits of competition  
Recapping the debate presented in section 2.3, it can be argued that competition can improve 
the delivery of public services by three means. First, by fostering a transparent relation between 
competitors due the setting of clear rules and guidelines. Second, by promoting professionalisation 
at both sides of the service exchange (design and provision) allowing central officers to steer rather 
than to row. Finally, competition would force vendors to reveal more in their bids than they would 
otherwise do, fostering efficiency (Domberger, 1998).  
On the other hand, grant theory revealed that lump-sum general grants tend to encourage 
public expenditure above optimal levels, fostering soft budget constraints among grant recipients. At 
the same time, the use of need-related indexes in a formula-based distribution, promotes the status 
quo among grantees who do not have an incentive to improve their situation if this diminishes the 
transfer received (King, 1984). Therefore, central government as grantor has clear incentives to use 
competition as the strategy to allocate funds. Below I link these ideas with the performance of the 
FNDR mapping the main areas of debate.  
 
8.2.2 Transparency and professionalisation in the FNDR  
As depicted in Chapter Six, FNDR objectives are loosely stated and are not matched by the 
outcomes it achieves. Once a bid passes the technical evaluation, the FNDR does not have any system 
in place to guide the allocation or inform bidders about the probable time frame for receiving 
funding. Moreover, the lack of service standards (regionally and nationally) fosters an ad-hoc 
allocation of resources.  
This is in part caused by the FNDR grant system’s feeble conceptualisation of efficiency, 
understood as the spending of the yearly allocated budget. As seen in section 5.4.2 there is a 5% of 
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the FNDR regional allocation based in the capacity of the regional government to spend the resources 
allocated the previous year. So, to comply with this requirement, regional governments have a strong 
incentive to allocate all the resources regardless of a particular bid’s proposals and local needs.  
Lack of information opens opportunities for discretionary decision-making which are 
captured by central officers and evaluators. I argue that uninformed jurisdictions and central officers 
would not engage in transparent exchanges of information if the system is set to enhance ad-hoc and 
asymmetrical relations.    
Lacking standards to follow or benchmarks to achieve, FNDR allocation seems disconnected 
from local municipal preferences but instead prioritising a regional goal of full budgetary spending. 
This situation was depicted by a quote from a regional officer presented in the previous chapter. The 
officer when questioned about the fairness of the FNDR replied: 
  
“I don’t know if the system is or isn’t fair… that is a good question [30 seconds of 
silence] it is a system that should work, there are elements which are external to the 
system creating disequilibriums.. The FNDR is a funding option to generate 
territorial compensation in the territorial disequilibrium, is that good? Of course is 
good!! Is it fair? Of course it is fair…it is not unfair…now that the original idea had 
complexities that makes it sometimes unfair that is another thing; the unfairness is 
not only related with the external factors it has to do with the local actors who made 
the first stage of competition” 
 
The regional officer was initially unsure about the fairness of the competition and probably 
aware of the lack of mechanisms to ensure it. Moreover, the association between capacities and 
income exacerbates this situation, skewing the allocation of the grant. The officer argued that the 
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system was good and fair because it aided jurisdictions to get funds that they would not get by their 
own means. Despite this being true, it seems like a relatively modest objective considering the 
importance of the grant and the shortages experienced locally.   
The lack of information acts as a disincentive to small and deprived jurisdictions unwilling to 
invest without much idea of which bids will be successful in receiving funding. The pursuit of a policy 
of efficiency understood in these terms does not consider local differences and particular preferences 
affecting other democratic goals such as equity and fairness.  
Transparency is absent from the FNDR scheme because after bids are evaluated the lack of 
standards and protocols leave discretionary opportunities which are captured by central government 
officers. Below I examine this issue, setting out a debate about efficiency and the tension that 
emerges when central government is in charge of assessing it. 
 
8.2.3 The search for efficiency; who is the customer here? 
In FNDR competition, efficiency is enhanced by the ex-ante evaluation performed by central 
government which acts as the grantor and decision-maker for the funds allocated. As in any 
institutional setting, central government is not an ethereal figure but a group of officers located in 
Santiago, who have particular political leanings and agendas.  
This thesis suggests that in the FNDR, competition seems to serve central officers’ agendas 
instead of addressing local needs. I argue that efficiency in this scheme becomes a debatable concept 
that FNDR does not address properly, hampering the benefits of using competition as an allocation 
strategy.  
Fiscal federalism has been vocal in its support of decentralisation as a promoter of economic 
welfare, as Oates (1999) argued: “Development policies that are sensitive to particular regional or 
local needs for infrastructure and even human capital are likely to be more effective in promoting 
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economic growth than are centrally determined policies that largely ignore these geographical 
differences”(p.1143). Following Oates, efficiency should be driven by policies that are sensitive 
enough to capture regional and local preferences.  
Chapter Seven found that jurisdictions are prone to adapt their expression of needs towards 
centrally-delivered policy signals. It follows that competition will then lead to the pursuit of the wrong 
objective: competition to satisfy central officers’ preferences rather than local ones.     
It has been commonly argued that local jurisdictions know best about needs experienced 
locally (Oates, 1972). In Chile, as in many other countries, municipalities act as delegates of the local 
will legitimated by periodic and fair elections. In local elections, citizens vote and express their 
preference for the projects that most closely represent their needs and public expectations. 
Therefore, grants with a local focus are well suited to reflecting those local preferences through the 
exercise of their elected leaders and representatives.  
One of the key findings of this thesis is the common mismatch between central and local 
perspectives on local development. Due to the harshness of the competitive system, municipalities 
(despite being the closest political institution to the citizen) struggle to fund their local bids. So, to 
overcome the entry-barriers of competition, jurisdictions are willing to compromise their original 
demands. The seeking of efficiency in these circumstances reflects a situation where local 
jurisdictions’ preferences are supplanted by central government priorities. 
The FNDR as currently implemented serves central government officers, who remain in 
control of the public spending via grant appraisal and selection. As seen, they do not have incentives 
to change the way competitions are set, if that would involve yielding authority over the funds and 
local planning decisions.  
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As identified in Chapter Six, on average one in eight  project  was funded   by the FNDR during 
a time span of eight years. With more projects than funds available, resources are always insufficient 
to cover all local needs. This gives central officers a strong hand over local determination. 
Central officers allocate FNDR grants following their tastes or may decide to accept the bids 
that represent less work for them. This finding is particularly relevant considering that the FNDR is 
designed to achieve horizontal equalisation. 
The lack of FNDR plans or policy targets hampers the emergence of transparent exchanges, 
opening discretionary spaces dominated by central officers’ agendas. Moreover, central officers do 
not have the necessary incentives or capacities to promote professionalisation among deprived 
jurisdictions. It seems as if central officers are steering strongly but municipalities do not have the 
capacities to row, and when they do, it may be away from their original needs.  
The literature has built a strong case for using competition as a strategy to select among 
service providers (Domberger, 1998) but how far does this argument apply to selecting amongst 
bidders for grants? This research suggests that if incentives are not properly placed, competition 
outcomes may be heavily based on central officers’ tastes, diminishing local agency and thus fostering 
suboptimal investments.  
In the next section I present how scholars and governments, probably aware of the difficulties of 
inter-governmental competition, modified NPM based policies and incorporated collaborative 
agreements in the provision of public services. 
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8.3 Competing with allies, NPM evolution and the emergence of governance 
theories 
 
Grant competition incentivises the revelation of grantees’ needs and their real costs. Above I 
argued that a centrally-conceived version of efficiency could foster a restricted competition with high 
entry barriers. This type of scheme would be limited to only the better prepared and wealthier 
jurisdictions, diminishing the overall policy impact.  
This section has two goals. First, I re-examine the current state of NPM, placing particular 
attention on the reform of grant competition. In doing this, I review the evolution of NPM concepts 
in public administration and urban theories. Both literatures inform the debate about the influence 
of NPM in the management of subnational authorities. Secondly, I describe how NPM concepts have 
been influenced by collaborative governance theories, tracking their impact in the design of grant 
competition.  
  
8.3.1 NPM evolution and analysis 
During the last 30 years, there has been a rich debate about the impact of NPM among 
scholars and practitioners from different fields. Unlike the beginning of NPM reforms, which has 
commonly been dated around 1980 in the UK, USA and New Zealand (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994), the 
present state of NPM has become much more complicated to define. Because of this, the aim of this 
section is to synthesise the academic debates about NPM development, tracking how NPM concepts 
were adapted to new theories and emergent challenges.  
The theories described below shed light on the conceptual debates triggered by NPM 
reforms, presenting new forms of service delivery. These ideas will be used in the chapter to 
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conceptualise the changes introduced into grant competition and the particularities of the Chilean 
case.   
Below I divide the theoretical debates into two fields. First, I present the theories that 
emerged following NPM reforms in public administration, and then I move into urban studies.        
  
Public administration 
Here, I present three theories referenced by public administration scholars as the 
continuation or alternatives to NPM reforms, namely: New Public Governance, Digital Era 
Governance and Public Value Management. After a brief presentation of each I assess how these 
theories address some of the critiques previously made to NPM reforms. 
The first theory that emerged from NPM is the New Public Governance (NPG). Fredrickson 
(2005) defines governance as a type of relationship between government and civil society where 
public services are not just delivered by public organisations, but by a myriad of public, NGOs and 
for-profit organisations in a network-like structure.  
The core idea behind NPG is that public policy challenges cannot be solved by one 
organisation so they require cooperation and collaboration. According to Greve (2010) in NPG: 
“Governments began to redefine themselves as ‘facilitators’ engaged in ‘value chains’ and working 
through markets rather than autarkic ‘doers’ who owned, operated and produced everything 
themselves” (p.8). The new character of NPG would be given by the institutionalisation of 
relationships within society, focusing the attention on joining up services and on innovative forms of 
working together to tackle pernicious social issues.  
The second theory is the Digital Era Governance (DEG). This theory was supported by a group 
of scholars from the London School of Economics who considered that e-government was something 
more profound than just a supportive tool for NPM reforms (Greve, 2010). Due to this, digitalisation 
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was proposed to replace NPM as the paradigm in public administration. For Dunleavy et al (2006) 
DEG’s core developments were about re-engineering back office, rolling back agencies, reinstating 
central processes, client based reorganisation and the digitalisation of processes. Instead of being a 
means to solve government-customer problems DEG is portrayed as a governance strategy that 
would open government to create a less complex institutional and policy landscape (Dunleavy et al, 
2006).    
The third and final theory is Public Value Management (PVM). PVM emerged from the 
Kennedy School of Government of Harvard led by Mark H Moore (1995) who, acknowledging the 
conditions of public managers, made a model analogue to private sector value creation.  
According to Moore (1995) public managers are in a strategic triangle of public value creation, 
formed between a legitimising and authorising environment, an organising environment in their 
focus and an environment of results. For Greve (2010) PVM has different things to offer from NPM 
and based on an Alford and O’Flynn study (2009) he summarises: “NPM focuses on results, PVM 
focuses on relationships, NPM defines the public interest as aggregated individual preferences, PVM 
sees collective preferences as expressed, NPM’s performance objective is managing of inputs and 
outputs to ensure economy and responsiveness to consumers, PVM sees how multiple objectives are 
pursued, including service outputs, satisfaction, outcomes, trust and legitimacy, NPM’s accountability 
is upwards via performance contracts and outwards to customers via market mechanisms, PVM sees 
multiple accountability systems”(p.10). 
After having been implemented by several public administrations, NPM reforms seem to be 
have been adapted into different and hybrid forms of service delivery in order to respond to a new 
set of challenges. Some features of NPM are still recognisable such as quasi-markets, client-citizen 
orientation and the disaggregation of agents of service delivery; however, the theories presented 
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above help to depict how new actors and methods have been included in the design and delivery of 
public services.  
For Greve (2010) there is a new agenda in public administration composed of broader 
challenges such as public service motivation, NPG, co-creation of services and transparency among 
other challenges. He studied what happened with NPM and argues that public administration 
debates are now more focused on capacity building than on immediate results, considering long term 
perspectives of processes instead of just short term outcomes. 
If we cannot say that NPM has disappeared from the public administration field there are 
nevertheless some hints to indicate that the original NPM reforms have been moulded and adapted 
to multiple and broader challenges. The emergence of new technologies and citizens/customers 
willing to engage in the process of policy design has changed the way governments are now delivering 
their services. To strengthen this idea, below I address this topic through the urban studies literature.  
 
Urban studies  
In the field of urban development NPM was adopted into three different theories or schools 
of thought, namely: Localism, Regionalism and New Regionalism. Below I briefly present each of these 
theories. 
The first theory is called Localism and according to Crowder (2014) is a descriptive and 
normative governance theory based on the pursuit of consumer choice and efficiency. Similarly to 
NPM, localism has been criticised for its intrinsic support to middle and upper-class areas or what has 
been described as the “favoured quarter”. These would be areas with the largest tax base and able 




Localism has been attacked due to the inability to deliver the same quality of services across 
jurisdictions in clear detriment to the underprivileged areas, fostering a landscape composed of rich 
and poor communities with no connection between them.  
The second theory is called Regionalism and emerged in response to the fragmentation 
proposed by NPM reforms. Regionalism scholars argue for informal cooperative arrangements to 
jointly manage activities within a region (Crowder, 2014). For Briffault (2006) regionalism pursues: 
“rules and arrangements that permit, encourage, or require regional approaches to issues of growth, 
quality of life, and inequality but that do not destroy local autonomy” (p. 5). In the US, the lack of a 
comprehensive plan to implement regional agreements and their voluntary nature has impeded the 
success of regionalism as a theoretical approach.  
The third theory is called New Regionalism and emerged to solve equity issues through land 
use planning. This movement according to Orfield (2007) focuses on: “the dimensions and 
implications of city/urban competition, particularly the problems that it creates. New regionalists 
advocate measures to reduce growing inequality, discourage the detrimental fiscal competition 
between local governments within a metropolitan region, and remove fiscal barriers to cooperative 
land use planning” (Orfield, 2007,p.92). New regionalism, despite being vocal in its goals, fails to 
deliver for the same reasons that (old) regionalism did. This is because New Regionalism is eminently 
an academic ideal instead of an applicable theory. New Regionalism was unable to become a 
grassroots movement because the measures proposed were not embedded in the communities 
subject to the intervention and much of the scholarly conversation concerned what should be done 
rather than how to achieve it (Crowder, 2010).  
As seen above, a Localist approach based on NPM reforms supports the freedom of pursuing 
each jurisdiction’s wellbeing but hinders the achievement of common standards. New and old 
Regionalism, on the other hand, holds that benevolent regional entities should be the guarantors of 
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common good, securing a more equitable service across jurisdictions. Both theories nevertheless fail 
to deliver because of their normative approach and the lack of practical policies to build their case.  
Urban studies seem to rely on regional governments to overcome some of the unwanted 
effects of NPM. This is in contrast with public administration scholars who advocate the incorporation 
of different voices into the design and delivery of services. Urban theories of Regionalism rest their 
arguments on the emergence of a benevolent regional office that could secure horizontal balances. 
Localism on the other hand defends local preferences and self-determination.  
Nowadays it is hard to find cases where NPM is developed in its pure form but many of its 
concepts and measures still prevail in any of the theories presented in this section. As depicted above, 
NPM reforms have been adapted through the years to incorporate multiple actors and tackle some 
of the equity issues raised by their implementation. In the following section I move from NPM into 
grant competition, tracking how these changes were incorporated.   
 
8.3.2 Grant competition after NPM 
Having set out the theoretical debates, here I analyse how grant competitions (influenced by 
the above theories) were modified to tackle some of the critiques and respond to new challenges.  
After the implementation of grant competition in the UK and US, there was a considerable 
amount of research questioning its aims and design (Foley, 1999). As seen in the literature review, 
the research however did not converge and was usually case-specific, hindering the formulation of a 
robust theory about the effects of grant competition. Additionally, over the years, local grant 
competitions were modified or suspended and lost contemporary relevance. Entwistle et al (2016) 
confirmed this situation arguing that: “Although high in political salience, this competitive or rivalrous 
account of public management is surprisingly under theorised” (p.7).  
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In the UK New Labour replaced competitive tendering with a Best Value regime in the year 
2000. As seen in the above section, this strategy aimed to foster innovation in the delivery of services, 
embracing a collaborative approach between private, public and the third sector. As Prime Minister 
Blair (1998) declared: “It is in partnership with others – public agencies, private companies, 
community groups and voluntary organisations – that local government’s future lies”(p.13). 
Grant competition in the UK was commonly subject to some form of partnership, but since 
the early 2000s this element has been more relevant than ever. For some scholars, this change 
marked a detachment from NPM into new governance theories (Martin et al, 2003). According to 
Vigoda (2002), NPM increased pressure on state bureaucracies to become responsive to their citizens 
or clients. This situation nevertheless hindered citizen involvement in the public sphere, promoting a 
growth in passivism. Vigoda (2002) argued that citizens’ retreat from the administrative-democratic 
turmoil: “will lead to growing and serious risks of citizens’ alienation, disaffection, scepticism, and 
increased cynicism toward governments. Such trends are already intensifying, and only a high level 
of cooperation among all parties in society may guard against these centrifugal forces” (p.530). 
It appears that with time, market-led policies were found to be inadequate to serve new and 
emerging public purposes. Stoker (2006), argued that the shift experienced by public administration 
at the beginning of the year 2000 was to reincorporate politics into a customer-based system. For 
Stoker (2006), NPM confined politics to initial inputs and final judgement, discarding processes of 
deliberation. In his words, politics is a valuable mechanism of social coordination because: “It enables 
people to cooperate and make choices on the basis of something beyond the individualism of the 
market... Second, political decision making is flexible; therefore, it can deal with uncertainty, 
ambiguity, and unexpected change... Finally, politics can move beyond a distribution of benefits—a 
rationing function also offered by markets—to establish a process of social production in which 
interests are brought together to achieve common purposes. Politics can influence the basis for 
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cooperation by changing people’s preferences and creating an environment in which partnership is 
possible” (p.47).     
As time went by citizens/customers were increasingly interested in participating in the 
process of policy design, especially in the areas that affected them more directly (Turnhout et al, 
2010). So, at some point during the early 2000s grant competition seemed to lose the academic and 
political traction that it previously enjoyed.  
This does not mean that grant competition was eliminated as a policy. For some authors the 
extent of change was one of degree rather than one of shifting paradigms (Lodge and Gill, 2011). 
Also, new measures can be seen as incremental instead of a completely new start.  
NPM reforms, such as grant competition (Sager, 2011 ; Pugalis, 2017), were modified to 
encompass different actors and more integrated public solutions, but they are still a prevalent 
element in public administrations. Grant competition included collaborative practices in an attempt 
to democratise the process of public decision making and delivery. Below I address some of these 
changes and link them to the Chilean case.  
 
8.3.3 The emergence of collaboration 
It would be wrong to argue that partnership or public–private collaboration is a recent 
phenomenon in public administration. In the UK partnerships were always an element in the activities 
of post-war governments (Stoker, 1998) and in the US they have been noted as far back as 1930 
(Beauregard, 1998). So why are so many authors and practitioners arguing for a movement from 
competition to collaboration and more importantly in this case, arguing how this changed the way 
grant competitions were designed? These are the questions that I examine below. 
One of the main elements of governance theories is the incorporation of different voices to 
tackle political issues. This process is fostered by the participation of civil society, private firms and 
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governmental bodies (Osborne, 2006). Governance theories, as a tool of service planning and 
delivery, are not a new trend but have been present in western democracies for a long time.  
Collaborative governance has flourished aided by central government, supra-national 
organisations and the participation of a civil society that is now more informed and willing to engage 
in local policy decision-making. To Lowndes and Sullivan (2004) the increase in local partnerships 
emerged as a strategy implemented by local authorities to secure the trust and wellbeing of their 
communities as well as a way to fulfil centrally demanded requirements. The OECD (2002) supports 
this idea arguing that: “Local actors now wish to participate more systematically in the design of 
development strategies for their area. While a few years ago, the civil society, as represented by its 
community-based groups and NGOs, was alone in proposing the partnership concept, today it is 
approached and positively considered by a wide range of actors. The business community feels it 
important to participate in the steering of public programmes locally in order to address their own 
concerns about fuelling economic growth” (p.3). 
Globally, most western democracies have encouraged the implementation of intra- and inter-
institutional collaborative agreements, and the OECD (2013) has been vocal in its support to 
partnerships, advising an integrated approach to tackle national and subnational goals. 
The European Union as a supra-national entity has also influenced the establishment of 
collaborative agreements. In its funding guide for the 2014–2020 period the EU listed more than 19 
different competitive programmes and in the majority of cases, the participation of partners from 
more than one member state is often required (European Commission, 2013).  
Geddes (2000) develops this idea and states: “Partnership is being introduced not only into 
the language, but also into the structures, practices and processes of EU policy-making as a key part 
of the attempt to counterbalance fears of fragmentation with notions of integration, and as a means 
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of mobilizing agencies and actors behind economic and social policy goals. A local partnership 
approach has become a standard feature of many EU programmes and initiatives” (p.784). 
Grant competition evolved in line with these trends and was adapted to include more voices 
in its execution. In the UK, the largest grant competitions were adapted from local competition to 
more partnership-based deals such as New Deals for Communities (1998–2011) and the more recent 
City Deals. City Deals and previously, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) were the embodiment of a 
new agenda which stressed the value of greater local autonomy in economic development and 
infrastructure policy (Waite et al, 2013). Similarly, the US has been following this path, fostering 
collaboration as a requirement to receive national or state funding (Agranoff and McGuire, 2004).   
The objective of this section was to present the theoretical discussions and policy 
modifications that emerged after the implementation of NPM reforms. Whilst urban scholars largely 
rely on the idea of a regional authority to equalise local imbalances, new theories of public 
administration incorporate different actors and novel technologies to deliver more locally-responsive 
services. Both cases embody a dissatisfaction with the action of NPM, describing it as disconnected 
from local preferences and favouring standardised top-down decisions.   
These critiques seem to be addressed by grant competitions which, over time, gradually 
incorporated more partnerships and collaborations into their requirements. The rise of collaborative 
agreements has been also encouraged by supra-national entities in an effort to tackle local issues 
from a global and collective viewpoint.   
In the following section, I analyse how the Chilean case stands apart from the situation 
depicted above. In an historical and institutional analysis, I argue that in Chile grant competitions 
evolved into independent efforts carried out by municipalities acting for their own benefit. Due to 
this, grant competition has acquired a specific and particular relevance among Chilean municipalities, 
shaping their relation among peers and central government entities.   
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8.4 The implementation of grant competition in Chile   
 
In this chapter I have assessed how the definition of efficiency mattered in the measurement 
of local policy outputs during grant competition. Then, in the second section I reviewed two 
theoretical modifications to NPM and described how collaboration emerged as a strategy to tackle 
some of their challenges.   
Finally, this third section is devoted to analysing the contrasting Chilean case. The aim here is 
to expand the topics that surfaced in previous chapters and connect the findings into four different 
topics. Firstly, I track the institutional decisions that affected the implementation of NPM in Chile. 
After this, I develop three topics that emerged during the interviews and data analysis. These are the 
leadership (or lack of) of a regional officer, the tension between equity and efficiency and finally, the 
effect of competition on local officers’ motivation.    
 
8.4.1 NPM in Chile – the rules of competition 
As previously seen, globally grantors have adapted their requirements to include collaborative 
approaches into bid formulations. This decision was influenced by supra-national entities and central 
government institutions seeking to form synergies to respond to interconnected social issues. As 
years passed, orthodox quasi-market strategies seemed to be unable to respond to many of the new 
political challenges marked by overlapping communities and better informed citizens.  
In this final section of the thesis I aim to explain why Chilean government was incapable of 
following the trends set by scholars and European countries. Instead, local governments in Chile are 
stagnant under a competitive scheme, hampering the development of a democratic system where 
all municipalities can thrive.   
237 
 
Isolation as a local policy 
As seen in Chapter Four, NPM measures in Chile were implemented during the dictatorship 
of Pinochet and then reinstalled during the first governments of the successive centre-left coalitions. 
Before Pinochet, the government of the socialist Salvador Allende promoted the installation of 
several local organisations coordinated by unions, political parties and local committees. Once in 
power, Pinochet sought to secure total control over the nation, so he eradicated all subnational 
organisations that could represent a threat.  
Pinochet dismantled all the networks of politically-active organisations, hampering any form 
of intermunicipal collaboration. At the municipal scale Pinochet’s housing policies fostered the 
creation of homogeneous municipalities with a marked class-dependence. During the seventies and 
eighties, very large numbers of poor families were re-accommodated into working class suburbs 
which had been recently constructed at the periphery of Santiago (Özler, 2012). Once poor families 
were expelled from the wealthier comunas, central government seized the lands and sold them to 
the highest bidder (Tapia Zarricueta, 2011).  
Local authorities at this time were systematically de-politicised and transformed into 
administrative units responsible for channelling centrally-designed social policies. According to Diaz 
(1993) Pinochet dismantled the grid of politically active local organisations and replaced them with 
functional units subject to his decisions. These local units were mere receptors of centrally-decided 
policies, coordinated by municipalities and prone to clientelist practices.  
The relation between the state and the citizens was targeted directly to the citizens in great 
need who received the minimum to survive. A dependent and unidirectional relationship was then 
forged between the state and citizens where each case was assessed individually, preventing any 
organised or communitarian representation. Any political role played by municipalities during this 
time was scrapped and intergovernmental relations, as in the armed forces, followed a vertical chain 
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of command. During these years municipalities were transformed into agencies for central policies 
with very limited scope for decision. Intermunicipal agreements were also unnecessary since no 
dissent was possible and all public institutions were centrally controlled by appointed mayors.  
Once democracy was re-established, mayors were once again democratically elected, and the 
first intermunicipal agreements started to appear. To strengthen the communication between 
jurisdictions municipal associations were promoted by central government but their political power 
has been modest (Arias et al, 2017).  
NPM reforms in Chile followed a top-down implementation and left municipalities acting as 
single units in charge of the challenging task of enhancing public engagement and multilevel 
collaborations without any power to modify the predefined structures in which they operate 
(Montecinos, 2005).  
Chilean scholars have agreed that, despite the changes introduced under democracy, the 
governance model implemented by Pinochet has not been contested. Because of this, the 
foundations of intergovernmental relations have remained as if the traumas from the past had not 
been overcome (Jara Ibarra, 2016).  
 
Collaborating with the enemy 
The literature in the field supports the idea that after Pinochet, Chilean public administration 
sought to deepen NPM reforms, guided by central government officers influenced by NPM rhetoric 
(Tello Navarro, 2011). Once these reforms were implemented, the system inherited from Pinochet 
hampered collaboration and imposed competition as the main strategy of intermunicipal 
management.  
In Chile, quasi-market strategies had a strong impact on the relationships forged by 
municipalities, stressing their vertical dependence and horizontal isolation. The impact of these 
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policies was analysed by Diaz (1993) and summarised as having three effects. The first effect is the 
exacerbation of municipalities’ individualism promoted by the competition between units. Under 
competitive pressure jurisdictions are configured as rivals, which hampers the creation of collective 
action.  
Secondly, under competition, jurisdictions produce an independently-led experience where 
no coordination of knowledge is established. To Diaz, the atomisation of local knowledge prompted 
a vertical relation between grantor and grantee, diminishing the joint impact of the grant. The last 
element is the patronage relationship fostered by competition where better-off units are 
transformed into clients of the centrally determined offer.  
Together, the three elements depicted by Diaz provide a strong indication of how competition 
impeded the establishment of intermunicipal agreements between Chilean jurisdictions. Since the 
re-organisation of local authorities under Pinochet, partnerships have been absent from grant 
competition and once democracy returned, this situation did not change. Municipalities were 
configured as atomised units developed in a competitive environment.  
As seen in the previous section, grant competitions across the globe have incorporated 
partnership requirements to encourage collaborative approaches to public service provision (Bache, 
2010). Moreover, total competition has been depicted as an inadvisable strategy to allocate service 
in uneven contexts (Lowe et al, 2016).  
NPM policies such as competitive grants were implemented in Chile in spite of the 
institutional past, historical context and the will of stakeholders. According to Carroll and Steane 
(2002) NPM policies are: “determined very much by the situational context in the country concerned, 
demanding modifications as the complex process of bargaining and negotiation occurs in the effort 
to achieve policy acceptance, legitimation and implementation. In contrast, if the underlying 
principles or assumptions are not adopted then mere rhetoric is involved” (p.197). 
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Chilean municipalities were absent from discussions when NPM reforms were designed. Since 
the system was introduced by force, municipalities had to comply silently with the reforms. It follows 
that the lack of local feedback facilitated the implementation of centrally designed and standardised 
solutions in diverse local contexts. This approach has had a detrimental effect in the overall 
performance of NPM reforms.  
The particularities of the Chilean case influenced how competition was carried out and 
evolved over the years, separating it from the US and most European cases. In Chile, the 
implementation of full-scale competition between uneven units did not deliver the promised benefits 
for everyone and its effects have been substantial, and not confined to the mere allocation of funds 
(Orellana et al, 2012). Once the historical features of the Chilean case have been set out below I 
address three topics that emerged from my data and empirical analysis.   
 
8.4.2 The regional debate  
The differences between jurisdictions in Chile are a function of a myriad of elements. Whereas 
some of them are exogenous (such as the geographical composition of the territory) the majority are 
concerned with the institutional settings and political distribution of power. As seen in Chapter Five, 
the range of differences between jurisdictions is peculiarly high, reflecting an uneven patchwork of 
independent units. Moreover, the interviews showed that one of the main issues experienced by 
local officers was their disconnection from central government.  
In most unitary countries, where subnational authorities do not have enough tax capacities 
to self-subsist, central government intervenes by transferring grants to secure a minimum standard 
of services across the territory. In Chile, since the Pinochet years, this connection comes directly from 
central government to the citizen-beneficiary, diminishing the role of municipalities during the 
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Scholars and officers agree that the regional authority is noticeably absent in the chain of 
policy delivery between central and local governments (Mardones, 2007; Waissbluth et al, 2007). 
Regional governments in Chile are led by an officer appointed by the President (the Intendente) who 
is seconded by a college of regionally elected councillors. Since neither of these figures has enough 
leverage or resources to invest in municipalities their contribution is merely procedural, with them 
acting as brokers of central policies.  
Without any taxation power or own-revenues, regional officers act as an arm’s length 
institution of central government, unable to generate synergies or represent local jurisdictions. The 
Intendente is the regional head of office in charge of two different (and usually opposed) tasks. He is 
responsible for the representation of the regional interests articulated through the municipalities, 
and also acts as a presidential delegate in charge of the regional management of national policies. 
When these two tasks collide, the Intendente takes sides with the person who appointed him to the 
detriment of the jurisdictions he represents. The Intendente also acts as a buffer, widening the 
distance between decision takers (central government) and implementers (municipalities).   
This thesis suggests that due to the lack of regional mechanisms to plan, invest and administer 
local territories, competition has become the most relevant strategy to allocate services and goods 
across municipalities. According to Orellana (2009) competition has been the prime force of 
municipal interaction because municipalities do not have the resources or capacities to tackle 
municipal disparities. The lack of a regional officer who could address the territorial inequalities 
present in Chilean cities would also force municipalities to compete to self-subsist.  
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As a scholar of urban studies, Orellana et al (2016)  brings to light the need for a regional 
officer in a context where: “Each municipality generates its own land use plan for urban development, 
many times without spatial continuity with neighbouring municipalities, thus generating fragmented 
land use and public spaces” (p.440).  
Without an institution that can plan the development of a region and incentivise a 
coordinated governance, the municipal borders limit local management. Local officers stressed this 
problem during interviews, arguing that local bids were commonly planned in a vacuum with no 
territorial coordination.  
 
Plan-less 
The lack of a plan that could effectively orientate the local agenda towards specific targets or 
goals had internal and external effects. Externally, the day-to-day competitive process hindered any 
form of joint venture, limiting the impact of the project bids to a strictly local scale. No municipality 
was willing to put effort into collaborative bids because they did not know how to split the benefits. 
Regardless of the benefits of sharing, local authorities wanted ownership and that was impossible for 
them if projects were located in another jurisdiction.  
Internally, officers were frustrated by the impossibility of implementing an articulate plan of 
development that could respond to local needs. Moreover, the lack of contact with external 
organisations limited the role played by local officers who saw their work as being constricted and 
isolated from the complexities of local development, thus increasing their frustration.  
A recent review led by Hooghe et al (2016) comparatively measured the regional authority of 
83 countries using individual regions as the unit of analysis. In the review, regional self-rule was 
measured using ten dimensions, from fiscal autonomy and representation to borrowing control and 
law making. Every dimension had a specific score and once aggregated, regions could range between 
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0 (no authority) to 30 (almost complete authority). Chilean regions in this analysis had a score of 3, 
being the lowest of South America and among the lowest of the whole sample. Regional units of 
Unitarian countries commonly performed much better than Chile (Appendix 4), illustrating Chile’s 
weak position. 
Dispossessed of real powers regions act as a filter between the lower and the central tiers of 
government. Central government is justifiably afraid of directly transferring resources to 
municipalities lacking sufficient technical capacity but, without regional advice, municipalities have 
little chances of improving their situation.  
In a recent report, the OECD (2018) assessed the role of regional policies and one of its key 
messages was: “Instruments used to promote regional development in regions and cities should 
reflect territorial specificities and be adapted to different contexts, such as the degree of subnational 
autonomy, market conditions, or institutional capacities. Avoiding one-size-fits-all policy responses is 
crucial. More flexible policy mechanisms can respond more effectively to different needs, thereby 
ensuring that resources are more efficiently used” (p.9).  
I argue that regional governments in Chile should increase the capacities where they are 
scarce and manage a plan where all municipalities are considered regardless of their shortages. 
Currently, municipalities are self-centred and do not see the value of a regional development, which 
is why regional governments are so relevant to improve this situation.  
 
8.4.3 Equity versus efficiency in the Chilean case 
Following Tiebout’s (1956) theory, it can be argued that local competition should enhance 
the delivery of different quantities and qualities of local services to the consumer-citizens who, in 
turn, would be able to select the jurisdiction that better suits their needs. Municipalities in this 
context have the incentives to deliver more and cheaper services in an effort to attract more citizens, 
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increasing the welfare of the whole region. As this thesis suggests, this situation is hampered by the 
context and particularities where the competition takes place.  
During grant competition, each jurisdiction presents its bid in the most attractive way 
possible, trying to build a case that could make it stand apart. The process of bid construction is costly 
and it could take several years before the fruits of the work are finally seen. As seen in Chapter Six, 
the technically best equipped municipalities are in a better position to compete. Thus, the positive 
impact of competition may be restricted to the jurisdictions capable of coping with the costs and 
timings of competition.  
This is especially sensitive in a unitary and centralised country where local authorities are 
involved in the execution but absent in the design of the policies implemented. In the interviews, 
regional officers declared that municipalities submit a relatively small number of bids compared with 
their needs, illustrating how the complexities of the system play against them.  
Chilean central officers involved in grant competition probably did not foresee the impact of 
their decisions on intra-regional equity. Since the appraisal mechanism was centralised, evaluators 
were emotionally and geographically too far from the source to ease the participation of small and 
badly equipped municipalities.  
According to Collin and Gerber (2008) competition-dominated environments (as in Chile) are 
likely to result in allocations guided by capacity and not by need. They argue that jurisdictions with 
more capacities can propose more complex and expensive projects regardless of their need, thus 
attracting more grant funding. This situation may occur for two reasons: “First, grantors can use the 
professionalism and complexity of proposals as a heuristic to reduce search costs associated with 
screening out applicants with the highest risk of failure... Second, grantors have incentives to allocate 
funding to larger proposals because this reduces monitoring costs by reducing the number of grant 
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contracts. As needs are not likely to be commensurate with administrative capacity, need – response 
matching is likely to be biased against some applicants” (Collin and Gerber, 2008, p.1132). 
We therefore find that evaluators are likely to favour bids coming from bigger and wealthier 
jurisdictions, thus negatively affecting the chances of small and deprived ones. Okun (1975) argued 
that competition is not an advisable mechanism in the absence of a minimum standard shared by the 
competitors. In Chile, differences in revenue generation directly impact the capacities to compete 
across jurisdictions. Without standards of service provision competition stresses the already high 
intermunicipal differences.  
Competition may seem a sound strategy to increase efficiency, but in democratic regimes it 
is advisable to consider what jurisdictions are competing for before calculating its benefits. If, in the 
same competition, jurisdictions are bidding to have drinkable water (as we saw in the previous 
chapter) whereas others are bidding for building an Olympic pool, efficiency has clearly overstepped 
equity in an unhealthy manner. This topic will be discussed below.  
 
The unfairness of an equal treatment 
Central officers argued that FNDR competition fairness was achieved by the fact that all 
municipalities were treated equally. This idea led central officers to discount suggestions of 
unfairness in the allocation of funds across bids and jurisdictions, seeing the system as being 
transparent with no privileges.  
The fact that differences do exist among individuals (and also among municipalities) has been 
used as an argument to design systems where these differences are incorporated rather than 
overlooked. Although it may sound contradictory, the more egalitarian measure in systems marked 
by different talents and capacities is to not treat them equally. Only by establishing differences across 
units might a system actually be fair. As Hayek (2014) wrote: “it is just not true that humans are born 
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equal;… if we treat them equally, the result must be inequality in their actual positions…[Thus] the 
only way to place them in equal position would be to treat them differently. Equality before the law 
and material equality are, therefore, not only different but in conflict with each other” (p.9). 
In his “Theory of Social Justice” (2009) John Rawls imagined a social contract constructed by 
self-interested agents ignorant of the talents or status inherited at birth. Under this situation a just 
society would be the one in which these unembodied entities would agree to be born into, 
acknowledging that they may have more or fewer capacities than the others.  
Hayek’s and Rawls’ ideas were thought to address general theories of justice, but their ideas 
are useful in understanding the theoretical underpinnings of grant competition. The FNDR system’s 
idea that all municipalities are equal undermines the fairness of the system by disadvantaging 
municipalities with less capacity. In a system marked by heterogeneity of capacity, using the number 
of beneficiaries as a key indicator of total benefit from a bid at the same time condemns small 
municipalities to lag behind larger and wealthier municipalities. In an imaginary Rawlsian redesign of 
the system it seems likely that if “unborn” municipalities did not know whether they would become 
high or low capacity bodies they would wish for a FNDR system that gave more help to low-capacity 
municipalities.   
Local governments in Chile rely on FNDR competition to finance public investment in their 
comunas. The final allocation follows a pattern favouring wealthier and better equipped jurisdictions. 
The fact that differences do exist between municipalities and they are in many cases caused by 
factors out of their control suggests that the FNDR should help to compensate for disadvantages.  
In the last topic of this section I analyse how FNDR and intermunicipal competition have 




8.4.4 Public officer’s motivation and competition 
Most local officers were critical of the FNDR, regardless of their size and capacities of their 
municipality. According to local officers, the context in which competition took place largely pre-
determined its outcome. This feeling affected local officers' morale and made them believe that the 
current situation was never going to change.  
Officers with more municipal experience had almost become resigned to a low chance of 
change and believed that local jurisdictions were, in practice, managed by central government 
officers, making their work as local officers somewhat redundant. Younger officers on the other hand, 
acknowledged this but were more optimistic about the future of the system.  
 
No incentives 
Due to the rigidities of the system, officers who were able to read through bid requirements 
and write a sound bid represented a valuable asset. However, due to the local administrative law, 
such officers are not allowed to receive any monetary incentive or reward, even if they secure a large 
bid.  
For local officers, grant competition was just another part of their work so no reward was 
expected. The only alternative to recognise an officer’s performance was through a promotion but 
this represented a highly bureaucratic and costly process. A typical occurrence, therefore, was that 
officers with competitive-bidding skills were after some time often hired in a different municipality 
to where they started, with a higher salary than before. 
Municipalities cannot reward highly-skilled officers since their wages are fixed by law and no 
part of a project fund can be spent on the municipal team. Municipalities also cannot prevent their 
skilled officers leaving if they are offered a better salary somewhere else.  The competition process 
provides no monetary recognition to the team that formulates a successful bid, thus disincentivising 
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their work and making them prone to move to another municipality as soon as the next opportunity 
appears.  
In the private sector, winning a competition or being chosen by consumers creates a surplus 
that increases the value of the firm. A firm thus has a clear incentive to reward staff who contribute 
to that process. In contrast, skilled local officers are not rewarded by achieving success in grant 
competition. Since there is no system of incentives in place, the only incentive for them comes from 
public commitment to the jurisdiction, in what has been called public service motivation.  
 
Public sector motivation 
NPM concepts were based on the rational choice theory of governmental analysis which has 
not been able to fully explain Public Service Motivations (PSM) (Vandenabeele, 2007). Rational choice 
theories are based on self-interest, so they struggle to explain concepts such as public interest and 
altruism. This was the main reason why a group of scholars defined PSM as its counterweight (Perry, 
1996). Vandenabeele’s model of institutional PSM is composed of two essential elements. For him, 
public institutions: “embrace, up to a certain extent, public service values such as interest in politics 
and policy making, public interest, compassion, self-sacrifice, customer orientation, democratic 
values and good governance… Second, institutions respond to the basic psychological needs located 
within each individual. These are key to the institutional socialization process or internalization” 
(p.553). 
From an institutional point of view, PSM is nurtured by altruist feelings, but to be embedded, 
these feelings need to be socialised and internalised by public officers. The responsiveness of the 
institution to officers’ needs is a key factor in this process: “To the degree that these institutions' 
responsiveness is better, the public service values will be better internalized within the individual's 
public service identity” (Vandenabeele, 2007, p.553). 
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Perry (2010) on the other hand revisited the concept of PSM as a way of deepening the role 
of organisational incentive structures. He argued that officers who work in public services respond 
similarly to private sector employees to utilitarian incentives such as salaries. Despite it being a 
contested area of research, it can be argued that public sector officers are not indifferent to 
pecuniary incentives. Perry argued that differences between the private and public sector might not 
be important in this respect, arguing that: “prosocial tasks motivate performance regardless of sector 
and undermine the notion that people with high public sector motivation discount monetary 
rewards” (p.686).  
PSM is not an institutional precondition, thus to flourish public institutions need to encourage 
public values and put in place incentives that work for local officers. Public officers are not indifferent 
to utilitarian incentives so institutions should not rule out this type of reward rather than relying too 
heavily on an intangible and shared public ethos.  
My research showed that Chilean municipalities are highly dependent on self-sacrifice to 
encourage motivation but do not have any material incentives to offer officers, so their public 
motivation is unsurprisingly not high. Without such motivation officers in charge of bid preparation 
are a highly valuable but mobile asset that can move between jurisdictions looking for a better salary.  
As seen in the previous chapter this situation was acknowledged by a central government 
officer who believed that those were the unwritten rules of the system and it was a municipal 
responsibility to go after another officer once they lose a skilled one. The migration of local officers 
seeking better alternatives is then again in favour of jurisdictions that can pay more and have more 
resources, enabling a movement to bigger and wealthier municipalities. This movement is also 
inefficient because once they leave, skilled officers take knowledge that is eminently local and un-
transferrable to other jurisdiction, leaving a vacuum that could take years to be filled.    
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The interviews showed that officers struggle to balance their motivation with the over-
bureaucratic and standardised day to day operations of a municipality. Officers argued that they stay 
in their roles because of their commitment to the local public service cause, but the frustration 
expressed in their arguments shows that it would not take it too much to make them quit and move 
somewhere else.    
Although the effect of skilled officers was analysed in Chapter Five, the variable did not take 
account of which part of the municipality the graduates worked in nor the length of time spent 
working there. Nevertheless, the migration of skilled officers can be a plausible explanation of why in 
terms of per capita funds received, among small jurisdictions, the ones with high poverty received 
40% less funds per capita than the ones with low poverty. Small jurisdictions commonly struggle to 
retain skilled officers because central and large cities offer better paid jobs.  
From the perspective of local officers, grant competition is not an innocuous mechanism of 
funds distribution. Officers feel that they are not being rewarded, or in Vandenabeele’s (2007) terms, 
their needs are not being covered sufficiently. So, their commitment to the municipal team relies on 
their self-sacrifice. The lack of an appropriate incentive structure works against officers’ motivation 
and fosters a migration to wealthier jurisdictions.  
This last section has presented an analysis of how grant competition processes have been 
adapted in Chile. The absence of requirements for partnerships in the bidding stage as well as the 
inequalities among the municipalities involved has been a key context of the introduction of 
competition. Without regional or central interventions to correct local service disparities, 
municipalities did not have much option but to comply with grant requirements. So, an ostensible 
outcome of efficiency is achieved at the expense of jurisdictions that could not overcome the entry 




8.5 Conclusions  
 
The aim of this chapter was to develop the discussions that emerged once the different 
sources of data were reviewed (context, funds allocation and interviews). In this exercise three main 
topics were introduced and presented following a deductive order. Firstly, I started depicting the 
general notions of competition in public administration as an overall context for the specific case of 
grant competition in Chile.  
After recapping the case for competition in public administration I have discussed how 
efficiency is assessed and theorised in grant competitions. I argue that efficiency-seeking policies 
(such as grant competition) could potentially outweigh local preferences and introduce a centralist 
calculation of benefits. Concepts of efficiency are not unalterable across public institutions, so what 
can be seen as efficient by a senior central public officer could be highly inefficient for a local 
jurisdiction. I therefore propose that the political angle of how efficiency is seen needs to be 
considered when there are different tiers involved and asymmetries of information arise.    
Secondly, I tracked the evolution of NPM, placing special attention on the inclusion of 
collaborative agreements and the emergence of hybrid forms of service design and delivery. 
Competition as a strategy of funds allocation has usually been attenuated in most countries where it 
has been practised by the incorporation of requirements for partnership and collaborative 
agreements. These requirements were implemented by governments and supra-national entities to 
widen the scope of the funds distributed and incorporate horizontal agreements into service delivery. 
At the local scale, citizens are increasingly aware of public decisions and want to be involved not just 
as customers but also as shapers of the public offer. That would be one of the main reasons why 
hybrid forms of service delivery would be better prepared to deliver policies that resonate more 
deeply with citizens.   
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Finally, I examine the Chilean case of grant competition. NPM policies were installed by 
Pinochet to depoliticise the role of subnational authorities and leave them as mere service 
dispensers. The local grid, with its capacity to compose and deliver a development plan under the 
socialist rule of Salvador Allende, was dismantled. Efficiency-seeking policies such as grant 
competition were installed in a political vacuum, fostering the self-interest of higher-capacity 
municipalities. Thus, inter-jurisdictional competition flourished, aided by the lack of an effective 
regional authority and the absence of shared standards. Regardless of local needs and capacities, 
grant competition fostered what some would call efficiency at the expense of equity, reinforcing local 
disparities and reducing the motivation of some local officers to be engaged in it. 
Grant competition was installed in Chile to counteract the political role of municipalities. For 
Pinochet, funds distributed as prizes were a sound strategy to keep jurisdictions busy whilst central 
government decided where to invest. This paradigm nevertheless has been unable to respond to 
current local challenges faced by municipalities. International experience suggests that total 
competition is not an advisable strategy, which is why some state of collaboration or partnership is 
recommended. 
The effects of grant competition in Chilean municipalities go beyond the allocation of funds 
and span local administrations. Municipalities act as independent units, and this is reinforced by zero-
sum competitions where participants and projects are treated equally regardless of their capacities. 
By instituting competition in this way central government secures its oversight across the land, 
controlling the implementation of national policies and much of the local policies. The system is 
designed to exercise control and hampers joint ventures, building single ties between the sovereign 
grantor and compliant grantee. In this exchange, central government ensures what it may see as an 
allocation of resources mainly to the wealthier and better equipped municipalities without risking 
any loss of its directive power. This strategy suits central government interests but neglects the local 
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decision-making that could be exercised by municipalities in a clear detriment to the representative 























CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
This final chapter of the thesis has three objectives. First, to outline the contributions made 
by this research. Second, to set out a view of the limitations of the thesis and finally, to suggest further 
lines of research that could follow on from the findings that have been established.  
The chapter is composed of four sections. In the first, I list and briefly discuss the main findings 
of my study. In the second, I outline how these findings could contribute to the study of NPM reforms, 
placing special attention on the use of competition as a source of funds allocation. After this, I present 
the practical underpinnings of my study discussing the contribution of this thesis to policymakers and 
officers. Then in the third section, I examine the limitations of my research, reflecting upon my 
research strategy and mixed method framework of analysis. Finally, the fourth section suggests some 




The main objective of this thesis was to explore the effects of grant competition on Chilean 
municipalities. I theorised that grant competition was not just a scheme to allocate funds to localities, 
but it also carried with it a way of understanding the relation between jurisdictions and between local 
and central government. Empirically, this thesis explored the effects of overlapping inter-municipal 
competition in Chile – a highly-centralised and locally-uneven developing country. 
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The thesis addressed these issues by looking at the distribution of the FNDR grant and 
examined the processes leading to the successes and failures experienced by its protagonists. My 
research bridged a gap between two related, but theoretically distant topics of study. On one hand, 
distributive politics and economic studies have assessed the central allocation of goods and services 
from a post-positivist approach (Alperovich, 1984; Simon-Cosano et al, 2013). On the other, political 
science and public administration scholars have contributed to the study of officers’ responses to 
NPM reforms (Horton, 2006; Cameron, 2009). Despite the close relation between these two bodies 
of knowledge, the literature lacked a comprehensive approach that could link them. That was the 
gap that I planned to bridge with this thesis. As detailed in the introduction, this thesis had three 
specific research questions. Below I address each one individually, connecting the findings that were 
established in the analysis. 
 
How does capacity influence the allocation of competitive grants? 
Municipalities with a higher percentage of poor citizens are prone to submit more bids for 
FNDR funding but this does not translate into a higher success ratio or more FNDR funds allocated 
per capita. The bid appraisal mechanism is a difficult barrier to overcome and, among small and 
medium size municipalities, the final allocation favours better-off jurisdictions. In line with other 
research (Collin and Gerber, 2006), I found an association between municipal capacity and FNDR 
funds allocated per capita. Having wealthier citizens, better prepared staff and more resources to 
invest has a positive impact on the amount of FNDR funds allocated per capita. Capacities matter 
during competition and this relation becomes more robust as we move to jurisdictions outside the 




How do local and central government officers experience grant competition and how does 
this reflect the reality of intergovernmental relations?    
This thesis evidenced that FNDR local grant competition in Chile secured a minimum standard 
of quality enhanced by the ex-ante technical appraisal mechanism directed by central government. 
The wide scope of the FNDR grant allows municipalities to apply for funding almost any capital project 
that they want. However, the high entry-cost tends to foster a regressive allocation of funds.  
After 30 years under the same scheme of competition, officers from unsuccessful jurisdictions 
spoke of a sense of hopelessness and seemed habituated to the unfruitful reality of competition. 
Local officers displayed a sense of obedience and compliance, acknowledging that the FNDR was the 
only source of investment that they had access to. Central officers, on the other hand, argued that 
the system did not treat jurisdictions differently and because of that, fairness and transparency were 
ensured. The reiteration of examples where low-capacity jurisdictions beat the odds was used to 
argue that local bids were an opportunity, not a right. Because of this, it was argued that for low-
capacity jurisdictions it would be possible for inspired leaders and committed officers to overcome 
local shortages and succeed in FNDR competition.   
The standardised approach towards bids and jurisdictions was particularly problematic in the 
context of great inequality between local jurisdictions as found in Chile. In the FNDR scheme, it can 
be that a project to supply drinkable water can compete on an equal footing with projects for building 
Olympic swimming pools.  Moreover, the lack of minimum standards in the quality and quantity of 
local services revealed how deprived municipalities have been held back in time by the FNDR. The 
results of competition in these contexts serve as an indirect measure of local capacities, where poor 
citizens live in poor jurisdictions and receive a poor quality of services.  
The standardised approach followed by the FNDR competition has ignored the fact that 
differences do exist among municipalities and some of these are determined by factors which are out 
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of their control, such as the number of poor citizens or extension and value of taxable land within 
their jurisdictions. Fairness in this context would be fostered by acknowledgment instead of the 
denial of these inter-municipal differences.  
One of the main elements found in this research is the different tensions that come into play 
when public organisations engage in competitions. Unlike private firms where outputs are relatively 
easy to assess, public organisations’ aims are difficult to translate into unidimensional measures such 
as financial estimates of benefit. This situation leaves room for central officers’ personal (and 
subjective) tastes to influence results raising several concerns about the transparency of the overall 
FNDR system.  
The appraisal mechanism establishes a trade-off between competitions’ objectives and the 
scope of grantees action. Competitions with limited and clear objectives to accomplish are 
transparent and easy to read through, but limit the local range of action and could be subject to 
following a centrally-decided agenda. In contrast, wide and general objectives may include all kinds 
of local projects but due to the complex project comparability are open to subjectivity and clientelist 
practices.  
A similar situation seems to occur when innovation is assessed during grant competition. 
Innovation emerges during the iteration of failure and success (Foley, 1999), so any ex-ante 
evaluation that incentivises measurable and predictable outcomes would fail to accomplish a goal of 
increasing innovation. Therefore, officers are discouraged to innovate and made risk-averse if 
innovation could jeopardise the success of the bid.   
According to the literature, grant competitions are set up to promote specific policy goals or 
seek innovative approaches to tackling local problems (Pompa, 2013; Ward, 1997). Due to this, most 
grant competitions rarely try to cover basic infrastructure shortages and are established on top of a 
minimum set of service standards. In Chile, municipalities with basic (but much needed) 
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infrastructure needs (such as water collectors or sewage treatment plants) were discouraged from 
bidding for this FNDR support due to their high costs, low political visibility and slow implementation. 
This situation compromised jurisdictions’ long-scale development and was especially critical 
considering the lack of service standards and the indifference of central government to these kinds 
of shortages.  
In line with this, this research found that electoral incentives were highly influential for local 
authorities when it came to selecting and formulating bids. The length of the process and the 
relatively short span of mayors’ political cycles (4 years) fostered a focus on projects that were short 
in implementation, relatively inexpensive and highly visible for the local community. Mayors were 
unwilling to allocate officers’ time and municipal resources to bids that (if funded) would probably 
only see the light after their period in office had ended. Therefore, when resources were scarce 
authorities selected projects that were potentially rapid to implement but with merely cosmetic 
impact on their territories.  
The research suggests that being the sole source of local investment funding, FNDR 
competition has a detrimental effect in the development of local plans and collaborative agreements. 
The uncertain returns and timescales of competition hamper the capacity of local authorities to 
establish medium and long-term plans of development. Without plans to follow, municipalities 
become difficult to manage and administer, promoting a feeling of demoralisation and lack of 
ownership among officers. This situation may also affect the capacity of municipalities to attract 
skilled officers and may negatively influence their institutional reputation.   
 
What is the current state of grant competitions? Do they respond to local needs in Chile? 
Competition has proved to be a sound strategy to give customers what they want. 
Nevertheless, due to the number of incentives in place in inter-governmental competition for grants, 
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roles must be well defined, and responsibilities limited to accomplish efficiency goals. This research 
challenges the common idea that local authorities are the final customer during grant competition. 
The subjective nature of the project assessment mechanism makes local officers prone to cater to 
evaluators and politicians’ preferences instead of seeking to meet local needs.  
Politicians and central government officers are aware of their role during competition and 
impose their will through signals or more subtle mechanisms to influence local decisions. The 
efficiency gained via competition is threatened when investments are decided by officers located far 
away from the source of need. Overall, the attributes of competition are watered down if local 
decisions are being taken driven by central officers’ and politicians’ agenda.  
Without enough political leverage, but required to attract investments, most local 
governments in Chile comply with the views of central government officers that do not have 
incentives to off-set their low cost decisions. Governments around the globe seem to have 
acknowledged the issues raised here and so have decided to adapt grant competitions to include 
different voices and collaborative agreements on their bid requirements (Christensen, 2012). Unlike 
those cases, the Chilean government has not included new forms of governance in competition 
requirements and competition has been cemented as the main strategy to allocate resources among 
jurisdictions. Chilean public administration seems unable to recover from the traumas of the past. 
This situation has been exacerbated by a central government afraid to devolving more competences 
to municipalities and unwilling to invest to improve their capacities.  
Under these conditions, investment decisions have promoted a silo-mentality where 
jurisdictions behave as self-contained units isolated from their environment. This seems particularly 
relevant in metropolitan contexts where wicked issues (such as crime) cannot be individually tackled. 
Due to the mobility of this type of challenge, selfish units (or jurisdictions) thinking only of their own 
wellbeing have nevertheless well founded reasons to care about the wellbeing of their neighbours 
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(Buchanan, 2001). This situation is neglected in the Chilean context due to the limitations of the 
competitive scheme and the lack of a metropolitan (or regional) figure who could represent the 
interests of the jurisdictions within a region.  
Finally, this thesis found that all these circumstances had a detrimental effect in the 
motivation of local officers who, in the absence of pecuniary incentives, draw upon their public 
interest and self-sacrifice to endure the harshness of the system.     
 
9.3 Contributions to theory  
 
This thesis fills a gap in the study of competitive grants (Entwistle et al, 2016) and long-term 
consequences of NPM reforms (Lêgreid, 2017). This research proposed a novel approach of multiple 
assessment where central and local extremes are incorporated into the analysis. The literature review 
revealed that competitive grants have been commonly studied from a top-down position, neglecting 
the agency of competing jurisdictions (John and Ward, 2005; LLodra, 2013). This type of study details 
the variation of central government behaviour but assumes a similar impact across jurisdictions.  
In this regard this research challenges two theoretical assumptions. First, that all jurisdictions 
are similarly affected by competition, and second, that those effects are limited to the final allocation 
of the funds. I explored how jurisdictions and officers from different tiers and records of success 
respond to grant competitions uncovering some underlying patterns and long-term effects.  
This thesis has found that that the effects of grant competitions were wide and varied across 
jurisdictions. Grants respond to the needs of jurisdictions with sufficient capacity to formulate bids 
that can surpass the entry barriers. For those jurisdictions, grants were a powerful tool that allow 
them to thrive. Jurisdictions with unsuccessful trajectories, on the other hand, were willing to 
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compromise their ideal projects and, to avoid the risks of failure, submitted small and inexpensive 
bids to increase their chances of success.  
Over the years, competitive funding processes have reinforced differing standards of local 
services within cities and regions. Unsuccessful jurisdictions limit their participation and focus their 
effort on visible and easy to achieve projects without any plan or priority. Successful ones, on the 
other hand, are willing (and capable) of investing in bids with less certain returns but deep local 
impact, thus widening the differences between jurisdictions. This thesis has found that the effects of 
grant competition are not the same across jurisdictions and across time. It also suggests that without 
a set of minimum standards shared across the local grid, the negative effects are focused mainly on 
small and deprived jurisdictions.  
Second, the use of a sequential mix methods provides wider evidence for the study of grant 
competition. In this topic, the common use of a top -down approach limits the understanding of local 
experience to the demographic variables available to include in the analysis. Using two different 
sources of data allowed me to identify experiences and practices that were not limited by a set of 
demographic variables but were built on top of them, enriching the findings. 
Third, this thesis contributes to the study of NPM reforms in developing countries. Despite 
some exceptions, little evidence has been gathered about the implementation and effects of NPM in 
the South American continent and specifically in Chile. This situation comes as a surprise considering 
the deep influence of these policies in the region. In this thesis, I track how grant competition has 
been implemented in Chile during Pinochet’s regime and then reintroduced once democracy was re-
established. Due to geographical and institutional proximity some findings for Chile may be 
generalized to other countries of the region contributing to a better understanding of NPM effects 
among local government authorities.  
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Finally, this study enriches the debate about intergovernmental competition addressing the 
tensions that emerge during stakeholder exchanges. The positive attributes of the competitive 
allocation of goods and services seems to fade if incentives are wrongly placed. I found that 
regardless of its declared objectives, the lack of local powers made jurisdictions compete to cater to 
central officers’ tastes. Jurisdictions are better suited to understand and meet local needs 
(Oates,1972), it follows that a well-designed mechanism of grant allocation is well advised to ensure 
the influence of local needs and participation during its process. Local bids designed to serve central 
government purposes limit the efficiency of the system, especially if deprived jurisdictions are willing 
with comply to central officers’ agenda to receive much-needed funds.   
 
 
9.4 Contributions to practice 
 
This thesis also contributes to the debate about policy design and intergovernmental grant 
allocations. As part of the literature suggests, policies based on purely competitive mechanisms of 
allocation, have been adapted to include mixed strategies in the search for more egalitarian solutions 
where different actors can contribute (Entwistle and Martin, 2005). Despite this, grant competitions 
are still used extensively in developing countries and within the third sector.  
In uneven settings, capacity or need seems to be a good negative predictor of funds 
allocation. Grantees with deep necessities are commonly unwilling to spend their scarce resources 
on bid formulations. Because of that, policies with egalitarian or redistributive aims might consider 
investing part of grant resources in developing grantees’ capacities so all competitors have similar 
chances of success. Grantors unable to level grantees capacities may consider moving into 
conditional or matching grants instead. The imposition of central agendas reduces the influence of 
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local agents who, depending on their level of need, would be willing to adapt their bids to receive 
funding. In doing so, local determination is compromised, and the efficiency gained through the 
direct measurement of need is further reduced.   In the operation of grant competition, incentives 
must be well placed along the chain of decisions, so grantees can effectively respond to local needs.  
The political costs of limiting grantor influence may be high, but due to their close proximity 
to the source of need, grantees are best equipped to give better solutions to their problems.  
Electoral cycles must be considered in the design of competition in public organisations. Politically-
driven authorities will not invest in bid writing if they are not publicly recognised as responsible for 
it.  Acknowledging the electoral goals of politicians and the implementation times of investments is 
key to securing local participation because, unlike private organisations, public institutions need to 
consider different stakeholders during competition. Grantors should focus bid-formulation times at 
the beginning of each political period; by doing so, jurisdictions may have enough time to formulate 
more impactful bids, securing a better investment of tax-payers money and allowing them to develop 
a more robust local plan.  
 
9.5 Limitations of the research 
 
Despite my efforts to tackle the possible bias in this thesis there are still some limitations that 
need to be addressed. The time frame of my quantitative research comprised seven years. That is 
enough to capture different political cycles but insufficient to cover the whole history of then FNDR. 
Based on the number of projects/observations incorporated in the analysis the time frame seems to 
be enough to track FNDR main patterns. Nevertheless, there is the chance that different effects were 
in place before that time frame and I ignored them.  
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The second limitation relates to the qualitative section and the generalisation of this section’s 
findings. The aim of my sample selection was to establish a contrast between successful and 
unsuccessful jurisdictions, scrutinising both extremes of the competition. In doing this I may have 
ignored the effects experienced by municipalities located in the middle of the grant distribution. Also, 
the number of interviewees and regions comprised by the sample seems rather small compared to 
the number of municipalities in Chile. This decision, nevertheless, was taken on the basis of the time 
and resources I had available to travel to Chile. 
As in any other public administration research, findings here may be culturally limited to their 
context in time and space, hindering any possible generalisation. I recognise this issue but, since my 
analysis revolves around a globally-implemented policy scheme there are some common features 
that I can recognise across cases and thus establish generalisations. 
 
9.6 Future research    
 
This thesis suggests that inter-municipal competition is a rich but relatively unexplored topic 
in the public administration field. Quasi-market strategies tension public organisations’ goals, 
producing a series of adaptations where different practices come into play. Grants represent one 
among the many instances where local governments compete for centrally decided goods and 
services. Therefore, it would be advisable to examine whether other intergovernmental transfers 
follow a similar path of response to the ones described here. Competition without a clear delineation 
of stakeholders’ influences could disguise a centralist’s determination of the local agenda. This subtle, 
but relevant, practice needs to be further assessed to improve the mechanisms now implemented 
and to foster the accomplishment of goals of decentralisation.  
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Looking at the process of competition, the project appraisal mechanism looks like another 
area where further development would be advisable. The number of beneficiaries seems like a sharp 
measure of a public impact but does not consider variables such as municipal need during the 
appraisal of local projects. Evaluations based on unidimensional measures seem too simplified to 
capture local diversity. Because of this, the exploration of mixed indicators where need and costs per 
capita are better balanced would seem like a sound improvement in equity terms. 
Until now, NPM reforms have had a strong impact on public administrations in South America. 
Unlike most European cases, most South American governments have been unable to include hybrid 
forms of governance in service delivery. Thus, the implementation of NPM reforms in contexts 
marked by social inequality and feeble public administration structures can be seen as a fertile area 
of further scrutiny.  
I would enthusiastically recommend the use of mixed methods in policy analysis. The merging 
of post-positivist and constructivist epistemologies increases the scope of the findings and 
contributes to the production of more robust findings.   
Finally, I believe that the perspective of local officers has been commonly underplayed in the 
public policy and public administration fields. The experiences and knowledge that local officers can 
contribute in these two fields is vast, so its potential should be further explored. This research has 
evidenced the complexities that lie within the local delivery of centrally-designed policies. If the 
academic and political aim is to deliver more efficient and locally-responsive policies, the inclusion of 
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